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A B S T R A C T
The objectives of this dissertation are two-fold. 
Firstly, it attempts to demonstrate the relevance of a 
comprehensive marketing approach to. the improvement of the 
performance of Kingston Terminal Operators Ltd (KTO), and 
secondly to present guidelines for the development of a marketing 
plan for the Terminal. For analytical purposes, the paper is 
divided into seven chapters.
Chapters 1 to 3 attempt to set the scene. The first two are 
concerned with evaluating the impact of containerization on the 
shipping and port sectors. While chapter 3, reviews the current 
trends in both the macro environment and the shipping industry, 
and their implications for ports.
Chapters 4 and 5 present a basic introduction to KTO and 
appraise its performance to date. This serves to evaluate the 
current problems being faced by the Terminal, and presents the 
framework for subsequent proposals.
Chapter 6 addresses the question of the relevance of port 
marketing in improving the performance of ports. Some general 
marketing concepts are first presented, followed by discussions 
of their application in ports. Where possible, examples from 
other ports are furnished to demonstrate applicability. Although 
the emphasis here is on container facilities, it is intended that 
the general principles outlined can be applied, in varying 
degrees, to other types of ports.
The final section of the paper, chapter 7, takes the form of 
an illustrated manual outlining the steps to be taken in 
developing a marketing plan for KTO. It incorporates all the 
analyses of the previous chapters to develop the methodology 
required in the actual preparation of the Marketing Plan.
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C H A P T E R  1
COrsiXAIIMERIZ<SiXIOISI AND S H IR R IN G
INTRODUCTION
Since their inception in the 1950s containers have 
experienced widespread use and a-F-Forded vast economies to the 
shipping industry. The -First and most noticeable bene-Fit was 
the reduction in time vessels spent at ports - -From weeks to 
hours. In the face of increased trade flows following the 
second world war, the labour intensive nature of port 
operations represented a significant bottleneck in the through 
carriage of cargo. It was thus economically impractical for 
vessel operators to invest in larger tonnage since this would 
almost have certainly meant at least a proportionate increase 
in port time. Containerization, with its speedy and efficient 
operations, meant that larger ships could be employed and 
economies of scale achieved.
In contrast to conventional break-bulk operations, 
containership operations meant substantial investment on the 
part of both port and ship operators. Formerly, the level of 
port investment ran merely to the provision of a safe 
berth/pier, with cargo movements from ship to shore and vice 
versa, being provided largely by the ship's gear. Movement 
from quayside to transit area was very labour intensive, 
employing about 25 men per gang to unload a 15000 deadweight 
vessel. The level of port mechanization required to handle 
unitized operation therefore meant vast and unprecedented 
outlay of capital. This represented one of the reasons for 
the initial slow development of container port facilities as 
in many cases the level of available traffic did not justify 
the investment. As a means to supplement domestic traffic and 
therefore make investment more feasible, ports have had to 
cast their nets wider than the domestic market to encompass 
those of other countries and regions - thus acting out a
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transhipment role.
While the possibilities -for transhipment cargo made 
investment worthwhile, port operators soon realized that it 
also represented a sti-f-Fly competitive arena, with hardly any 
guarantee o-f continued viability. In -Fact ship operators
given the new ability to -funnel cargo to selective ports, have 
tended to trade ports of-F against each other, thus
i ntensi-Fy i ng the competition.
In a similar situation o-F heavy investment, ship
operators, in order to ensure the levels o-F loading which 
would a-Fford the desired cost savings through economies o-F 
scale, have -Found the answer in cargo and port consolidation. 
Two things became clear:
(i) It was quite uneconomic -For large vessels to make 
direct calls to outlying ports with small cargo volumes. 
Such practice would in -Fact totally erode any benefits to 
be accrued from large scale operation.
<ii) It is far cheaper to gather cargo from the outlying 
ports and absorb the inland transport cost rather than 
make direct calls.
Shippers were therefore quoted freight rates covering the 
entire movement and relieved of the responsibility of 
transporting cargo to the port. The total transport concept 
as provided by shipping companies, gave them control over 
ports from which cargo is shipped, thereby removing the long 
established revenue base of most ports - their captive cargo. 
Thus the concepts of door-to-door service, intermodalism and 
through transport gained widespread application.
The fact that the idea of transhipping was not novel, 
meant of course that the actors in the industry were aware of 
its potential and even those who were initially slow to react 
soon came aboard. The result was fierce competition leading 
to over tonnaging in the case of the shipping sector and
2
excess capacity or underutilization in ports - a new problem 
had emerged.
To e-ffectively compete and cope with the deflationary 
impact of excess tonnage in the market on freight rates, 
shipping lines have had to devise new and innovative 
strategies, which enabled them to retain their market share 
(or improve it) through continued frequency of service as well 
as maintain financial viability. Broadly speaking, operating 
strategies employed were:
a) Port Consolidation
b) Amalgamation of services and routes
c) Mergers, Joint Ventures and other Agreements
1.1 PORT CONSOLIDATION
The vast investment in larger and faster ships for the 
container trade, required for a reasonable return on
investment, a high degree of cargo density and minimum number 
of calls. As a means of achieving this, one option is to 
reduce the frequency of calls so as to gain fuller cargo 
loads. However, this has its problems in* shipper
dissatisfaction and loss of market to competitors.
Another alternative was to reduce the number of ports on 
the itinerary, primarily those with light traffic flows. 
Again, the obvious disadvantage with this strategy is that it 
could leave the door wide open for other carriers to enter the 
market, taking up the slack at the 'unselected’ ports. A more 
viable solution was found by funnel.ing ( by sea or otherwise) 
cargo from the ports not on the itinerary, to selected ports 
which became the hub of their activities.
1.1.2 . PORT SELECTION
The decision as to which port to consolidate activities, 
will depend on a trade-off between the various factors which
3
a-F-Fect the economics o-F the port call. The relevant
literature highlights the following as being paramount in the 
shaping of route itineraries
i) Liner Pricing Policy
ii) The relative cost of sea transport
iii) Transport convexity ratio
iv) Consignment and ship size
v) Port Pricing
vi) The quality of port services
i) Liner Pricing Policy ; In liner shipping, the 
practice of equalization pricing is employed wherein the 
freight charged for shipping a given cargo from a port at one 
end of the route to any of the range of base ports at the 
opposite end, was the same. As mentioned previously, it was 
the shipper’s responsibility and cost to get the cargo to a 
port frequented by the Line. This meant that in order to 
minimize their costs the port closest to the cargo source 
would often be selected. This also meant that to secure this 
cargo ships had to call at the ports. The elimination of 
traditional ports of call would therefore lead to increased 
transportation cost to shippers not sited near the hub port.
In order to implement a selective port call system 
without incurring a loss of customers, a form of absorption 
pricing was used: The inland transport cost was subsidized by
the sea freight or the resultant savings gained'on the long 
haul leg was used to subsidize feedering costs.
ii) Relative cost of Sea transport: The decision
whether to transport cargo overland or make an additional port 
call will depend on the cost and time trade-off of the 
different modes of transport. In general, the cost of
transport by sea tends to be 10 to 50 times cheaper than land 
based.modes. The cost of sea transport is also affected by
 ^ World Deepsea Container Shipping by Roy Pearson , & J. 
Fossey. Gower Publishing Co. 1983. Page 132.
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ship size, speed and age.
iii) Transport convexity ratios; As an input into the 
decision process the convexity ratio measures the relationship 
between marine distances saved or incurred as a result o-F 
making or not making a call. This is particularly useful 
where one port serves as a minor cargo area. In general an 
additional call is feasible if the distance the ship has to 
divert to make the call is less than that of feedering over 
land. = Of course, if maritime transport is decided best, 
based on this criterion, the question of whether to use a 
mainline or feeder vessel is relevant.
i v) 
call, the 
Therefore 
the ship 
diversion 
multiport 
ships than 
be shipped
Consignment and average ship size: For each port
entire ship and her attendant costs are involved, 
the greater the cargo available and or the smaller 
size the more economical it becomes to make a 
to include a port in the itinerary. Thus a 
itinerary tends to be-more feasible for smaller 
mainliners. The average distance the cargo is to 
will also affect the decision of ship size.
Port 
with later
pricing and quality of 
on in this paper.
port services will be dealt
From the above it will be seen that each of these criteria 
of themselves will not be sufficient to create an optimal 
solution but rather a simultaneous optimizing of each 
variable. Obviously, an additional port call should not only 
enhance the line’s revenue inflow, but impact positively on 
its profit position as well. Therefore, the decision to 
extend an itinerary involves a constant balancing of to be 
incurred and potential revenues to be gained. That is, the 
impact of the additional call on the entire system.
1.2 AMALGAMATION OF SERVICES AND ROUTES
5
Ibid. 1. Page 136
The e-F-fect of containerization on ship size has already 
been highlighted: Container ships had far more carrying
capacity and operate at higher speeds than the conventional 
general cargo ships, spent less time in port and were 
therefore more productive. In order to maintain the desired 
service frequency and fill these substantially larger vessels, 
changes had to be made to some of the former operating
practices. One such change involved the amalgamation of 
routes and services. A brief look at the impact of
containerization on the route itineraries and services offered 
by shipowners is relevant.
The effect of selective port calling on shipping 
itineraries and operations can be readily seen: Instead of
multi-port calling, it became economical to call at a few 
ports located strategically along the route, where cargo was 
concentrated and fed to various other ports. The most far 
reaching change in ship itineraries since containerization has 
been the introduction of the global strategy originally by two 
operators: Evergreen and US Lines. Far reaching, since at the 
time of its introduction in 1984/85 the container routes were 
already experiencing massive over tonnaging, and based on the 
logistics of such a global service, some 34 new ships of 
larger than average capacity appeared on the market for the 
new Round-the-world (RTW) service.
The increase in tonnage in a market already over supplied 
and experiencing fierce competition for the available cargo 
seemed foolhardy. However, in a market so fiercely
competitive and where the strategy for survival (at least in 
the short term) largely involves rate undercuts to lure 
business away from competitors, operators must ensure that 
vessels are operated in such a way that capacity utilization 
and thus slot earning capability is improved beyond that of 
rivals and that operational costs are also lower. Thus the
deployment of newer, larger, faster and more fuel efficient 
vessels by the RTW operators impacted favourably on their 
operating costs, thus providing the competitive edge. 
However, the main benefit from the adoption of RTW itinerary
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is the possibility to cross subsidize di-f'Ferent trade routes 
thereby ensuring not only stimulation o-F trade but high vessel 
utilization. ® In -fact, this is the crucial element in any 
RTW strategy and the US Lines -Failed largely because by 
adopting a unidirectional service route compared with 
Evergreen's east and west—about, they were unable to -Fill 
their substantially larger vessels. ^
A concomitant o-F the move to load centering is the 
development o-F door—to—door services by ship operators so that 
shippers not located close to the selected port will not be 
disadvantaged. Thus a through rate is quoted covering the 
movement of cargo from consignor to consignee regardless of 
the various modes of transport used to achieve this. This 
gave rise to the concepts of intermodalism/multimodalism and 
large investment by some of the larger operators in road and 
rail networks ( and even recently into air transport) to 
facilitate inland on-carriage. Thus the use of double stacked 
train in the carriage of containerized cargo between the US 
East and West coasts became a feature of APL, and piggyback 
operators are a regular feature of the roads.
The development of a reliable information network through 
EDI allowed for smoother transportation logistics and more 
recently the Just In Time (JIT) concept. What JIT affords is 
the ready availability of goods to various manufacturers and 
retailers, where needed and when needed, thus keeping 
inventory costs down.
The ship operator providing these services can be seen as 
a transport specialist who will employ any mode of transport 
(and not necessarily including sea transport) to get cargo to 
the client on time. The role and responsibility of the ship
= Traffic & Competition on Round-The-World Container 
Routes. Page 61-62. Drewry Shippinrg Consultants. January, 
1986.
^ Round-The-World Services: Its All Square.
Containerization International. November, 1982. Page 65.
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operator has signi-ficantly changed -from the days where it 
began and end at the ship's rail and included just voyage -from 
A to B and possibly loading and discharge o-f cargo. This 
change o-F responsibility is amply re-Flected in the IMO 
Convention on Multimodal ism. Today, the total transport 
concept is more active since the ship owner has integrated 
both backwards and -Forwards, the services it supplies to its 
clients.
1.3 MERGERS, JOINT VENTURES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS
At this juncture, it is necessary to look at the impact 
of containerization on the liner shipping conferences as this 
will place in perspective the new forms of cooperation and 
organizational designs which emerged.
Conferences have existed in the deep sea liner trade 
since the 1870s when the Calcutta - UK conference was 
established.= The primary aim of such an organization is to 
stabilize the market served (in terms of shipping tonnage and 
thus freight rates) and guarantee revenue to its members. The 
need for a stabilized market is a result of the inherent 
problems faced by companies offering liner service, that is, 
frequency of sailing at fixed tariffs (in the short run).
Fixed schedules imply a. commitment to sail at a 
particular time and this is true whether a full ship load is 
received or not. The load factor is again dependent on 
frequency of sailing of not just a particular line, but also 
its competitors. Hence a situation of over tonnaging can 
occur on a route where there is no regulation of tonnage as 
exemplified by the open conference system in US trade.
The formation of a cooperative organization by shipowners
Conferences operating out of the European Community 
by B. Allen. Paper presented at Worlpl Maritime University in 
1991.
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regulating the availability o-F supply o-F shipping services and 
guaranteeing revenue to each member (through a cargo sharing 
■Formula) was a means o-F ensuring the desired stability (both 
■From shipowner and shipper’s viewpoint), by placing a limit on 
the competition between member lines.
O-F course, the objective o-F tonnage regulation meant that 
not all lines desirous o-F joining the con-Ference were 
accepted. This ability to dispense or re-Fuse membership and 
there-Fore to some extent determine the financial viability of 
new lines was a powerful tool and often used. This was a 
prime reason for the UNCTAD international code of conduct, 
dictating mandatory admission of national shipping lines to 
conferences serving their country’s trade.
Conferences not only regulated tonnage but tariffs, 
frequency, fleet size and ports of call. Tariffs were 
established on a commodity basis with the higher value cargo 
attracting a higher rate and therefore subsidizing the lower 
valued ones. Schedules and frequencies are organized to 
prevent intra-conference competition (eg. two conference ships 
should not call at the same port at the same time). Market 
share of liner cargo is allotted to each member and if 
exceeded the revenue has to be handed over to the conference 
for redistribution to members.
Conferences therefore developed into a powerful force 
within a trade and under the conventional liner system it was 
rare that ’outsiders' could survive. As a new line in a 
trade, there was the choice of trying to develop a market by 
securing a port and shippers which could take a long time 
(depending on the strength of the existing conference) and 
outsiders largely went bankrupt. Another option was to seek 
to join the conference and be given a share of the conference 
trade and have a more or less secure revenue base.
The advent of containerization has seen a considerable 
weakening in the power of conferences and the growth of 
outsiders. Whereas in the 1950s conferences controlled over
9
70% o-f trade on most routes, today its between 40 and 60%. 
"Competition with the conference in the days of conventional 
vessels required the acquisition of substantial expertise on 
shore and at sea for the handling and stowage of cargo". 
With containerization, the emphasis is on marketing, the 
efficiency and flexibility of service now rest with the ports.
Other factors that have limited the power of conferences 
are the emergence of shipper’s councils with negotiating 
powers regarding freight rates, and service quality; 
governmental intervention primarily through the UNCTAD Code of 
Conduct and cargo reservation practices; different ship 
sizes, designs and cost structures. The latter is important. 
For a conference to exist or work at all, its members should 
have similar cost curves and hence no incentive to compete on 
pr i ce.
It is within this scenario of weakening conference powers 
and loss of control on capacity, that shipping companies have 
sought new and innovative methods of survival. With the
massive capital investment required to operate a container 
fleet, the stability of revenue became even more vital. But 
the power of the* conference is so weakened that vicious 
competition from both within and from outsiders, resulted in 
loss of conference market share, excess tonnage (further 
exacerbated by the mandatory admittance of national lines to 
conferences under the Liner Code) that operators had to resort 
to other means of cooperation. Such cooperation may be found 
in the establishment of shipping pools, joint ventures and 
consortia, joint service, slot chartering and other operating 
agreements.
^ Conferences operating out of the European Community 
by B. L. Allen. Page 12
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C H A R T E R  2
COMT AIIMERI Z AT IOM AIMD RORTS
Be-fore discussing the impact of containerization on ports 
it is important to review the general functions of ports as a 
link in the transportation chain. This will serve to better 
illustrate whether, and to what extent the basic functions of 
ports have altered.
The transport chain can be viewed as a system with three 
major subsystems:
a) the nodes, which consist of interfaces between 
different modes or link of the chain
b) the links which consists of railroads, highways, air 
routes, inland waterways, marine routes, and
c) the flows which involves the movement of the
different means of transport along these routes with 
cargo and people.
The marine port represents a very important node in the 
total transport system as it is the interface between the sea 
link and the land link. It is here that the largest
possibilities for inefficiencies exist, since large amounts of 
cargo (or people) are transferred from one means of transport, 
processed/stored and passed on in smaller quantities to 
another mode of transport. This implies that to prevent 
bottlenecks, congestion and increased costs, adequate 
facilities will need to be made available.
This does not mean the provision of port facilities
11
should be o-F the order to cover any conceivable volume o-f 
tra-F-Fic. Rather, such a strategy would certainly result in 
very high port costs and therefore the aim of minimizing cost 
in the total transport system would still be frustrated.
Instead, it becomes necessary for a trade-off to be made 
between the cost of providing a given level of port facilities 
as against the cost of not doing so. For example, the cost of
a ship waiting for a berth (and the probability of loss of
business to the port) against the cost of provision of an 
additional berth. This will depend on the port's objectives. 
If the aim is to attract transhipment traffic, then this 
becomes more important.
The foregoing has two implications: Firstly, the port
authority must view the port as a part of the entire
transportation system in order to properly evaluate exactly 
where additional investment in the expansion of facilities is 
required. Another example will serve to illustrate; It must 
be carefully investigated whether the long lines of lorries 
awaiting receival or delivery of cargo is a result of too 
small a gate complex to accommodate the peaks, or whether it 
is the congestion on roadways which have caused a 'lumping' of 
arrivals. While the former . reason would necessitate an 
expansion/reorganization of the gate complex the latter would 
suggest that improvements need to be made to the road
infrastructure. In such a case the upgrading of the port
facility would actually result in a worsening of the
situation.
Secondly, the trade off situation implies that sub­
optimalities will necessarily have to occur in the different 
subsystems in order to minimize the cost of the whole. And
conversely, that optimalities in the parts will not
necessarily constitute minimization of the whole.
Besides facilitating the change between different modes
12
o-F transport, the following may also be said of ports;
<i) They are the point where change of economic and 
commercial systems occur such as customs formalities, payment 
of duties and taxes, change of ownership, quality control- 
inspection and so on.
(ii) They generate economic activity within a country and 
facilitate trade. In addition to its facilitation role, port 
activities themselves tend to generate the development of 
commercial activities relating to the various support services 
required by shipping. Such as ship chandlering, warehousing, 
bunkering, agencies and forwarders, banking and insurance, 
drydocking and so on.
With the post war trade boom, the advent of 
containerization and the possibility to use larger ships and 
high technology cargo handling equipment to achieve improved 
productivity, the volume of cargo passing through ports have 
experienced quantum increases; between 1970 and 1984 world 
container fleet increased at an annual rate of 18’/. with 
capacity moving from 195,000 TEUs to 2 million, and 
containerized cargo from 47 million tonnes to over 225 million 
- an annual growth rate of 127..  ^ Since these containers
will have to be handled at ports, at least a similar growth 
rate in throughput can be concluded^
This rapid and rather widespread growth in container 
traffic is placing considerable pressures on port authorities 
and port operators. Not only in terms of providing new 
facilities, adapting old ones or expanding present facilities, 
but also in terms of operational organization, as the
increased volume of cargo now being handled means that the
 ^ Improving Port Performance; Container Terminal 
Development. A project of UNCTAD S< SIDA. Page 3.
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possibilities for congestion is now magnified.
Under the conventional system where ship size was 
constrained, the depth alongside required was relatively 
shallow, and ships were often equipped with their own cargo 
handling gear, the port’s role was limited primarily to the 
provision of stevedores, forklifts and warehouses for cargo. 
Indeed the geography of ports in this era was characterized by 
massive shed structures, some owned by consignees, from which 
cargo was sold. Thus the level of investment in port
facilities was moderate and extended primarily to land and
buildings.
Container operations on the other hand, are highly 
dependent on high capacity specialized equipment and therefore 
high investment cost to port developers. This is not merely a 
function of initial capital outlay but operating and 
maintenance costs as well (eg. approximately $ 6 - 9  million a 
year for equipment costing say $30 million). ®
Further, the features of conventional berths with their 
narrow aprons have disappeared and are replaced by the vast 
expanse of land required for stacking containers. The fact
that ports lie in cities with vibrant commercial activities
means that the cost of such prime and often scarce land for 
port expansion is quite considerable. This has frequently 
meant large investments in land reclamation.
Also serving to increase the cost of container operations 
relative to conventional, is the increase in ship’s draft. 
The newest container vessels have draft exceeding 12m and in 
many cases this has meant extensive and expensive dredging
== Operating Maintenance Features of Container Handling 
Systems. Researched by B. J. Thomas & D. Keith Roach for 
UNCTAD. Page 3.
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tidal ports, maintenance dredging is also considerable.
These -factors have led to the emergence o-F new concepts 
in the management and operation of ports:
(i) The Terminal as a system. Here the concept of the 
port as a subsystem of the total transport system needed to be 
developed further to embrace the new operational requirements 
dictated by containers. In order for the container port to 
carry out its function effectively the entire operation within 
the terminal needed of itself to be viewed as that of a system 
with its own subsystem, complementary and interdependent. 
This relationship is depicted below.
The type of quay transfer system used will determine the 
quantity of storage space required, which in turn will impact 
on the efficiency of the loading and discharging operation and 
in turn be determined by the rate at which cargoes clear the 
port. The output of the whole system is therefore constrained 
by the capacity of its weakest link.
(ii) The Terminal Operator: Cargo passing through a
conventional general cargo port was handled and facilitated by 
several organizations, such as the stevedoring company for 
shipboard activities, a cargo handling company for quay 
transfer, port authority for transit shed and so on. Each
15
ownwith its  objectives, management structures and 
administrative procedures. Coordination o-F activities was 
there-Fore poor and duplication often occurred. In order to 
obtain the economies afforded by containerization and dictated 
by the scale of investments, it became essential that the 
integrated nature of the various activities be recognized and 
a coordinated approach adopted - that is unity of command 
should prevail in the management of port facilities.
The high level of investment in both infra and 
superstructure in most countries, and especially in the case 
of the developing world, meant that this responsibility has 
fallen to the government. Thus government (central or local) 
became owners of the port and can choose to operate the 
facility. This was however not often the case. Operation of 
the conventional facilities were often carried out by private 
companies and thus the necessary expertise in port operations 
resided with private operators. Therefore, they were often 
contracted by governments to operate the container facility. 
Thus the concept of the Terminal operator emerged where port 
facilities were either leased out by the port authority on a 
long term basis to terminal operators or an operating company 
is established jointly between the port authority and 
stevedoring companies.
Containerization necessitated changes not only in port 
operational and management practices but had far reaching 
effect on the requirement for and the level of port labour 
employed. The conventional system of employment of often 
casual labour was well suited to an industry of largely 
unpredictable activities (due to unpredictable vessel 
arrivals) fluctuations in trade, the relatively unskilled 
nature of tasks and the general availability of labour in 
excess of demand. Liner services afforded some level of 
predictability in traffic and thus labour requirements could 
be calculated. So dock workers were registered, rostered and
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experiencBd some stability o-F tenure and earnings. Later, in 
order to ensure an economic level o-F earnings (especially in 
some countries where registered dock workers numbered tens o-f 
thousand) manning levels in excess o-F the actual required was 
often laid down by unions.
The combined unitization of cargo and speciali cargo 
handling equipment served not only to increase productivity 
per gang but reduce the number of men required per gang from 
roughly 26 to something within the- range of 12 to 14. 
Additionally, the introduction of the through transport system 
has meant that much of the traditional dock work is devolved 
to consignees/consignors, ICD's and other off—dock cargo 
processing facilities.
The social, economic and political consequences are 
enormous, and with the displacement of labour which .ensued, 
labour discontent in the form of strikes and go slows can ruin 
a port if proper management techniques are not applied to 
manage this change. The level of skill required of today's 
dock worker is now of a high level and preferably multi­
faceted. This new breed of dock worker is remunerated
handsomely and it is frequently found that crane drivers are 
among the most highly paid port employees.
2.1 THE TRANSHIPMENT DECISION: PORT PERSPECTIVE
From the discussion in chapter 1, it was seen that the 
decision to tranship was that of the carrier as a part of his 
operating strategy. The primary benefit to him being the 
ability to serve a wider market, parts of which would not have 
been economical to service via direct calls with mainline 
vessels. The decision to tranship was based on economic
factors such as load level, diversion distances and so on, as 
well as characteristics of the various ports to be served. In
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the discussion o-F the impact of containerization on ports, the 
vast capital investment required to develop a container 
terminal was mentioned and that in many developing countries 
the only entity that can obtain finance on such a scale is the 
government.
Containerized cargo is primarily manufactured cargo, and 
the production centre for these is usually located in the 
developed market economies and more recently in Asia’s Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NIC). Exports of the developing 
countries tend on the other hand, to be mostly of primary 
products such as ores and agricultural produce (most of which 
does lend themselves to containerization) although some 
limited amount of manufacturing exports does take place. 
Thus in many cases the actual or potential level of container 
cargo may not be sufficient to justify the level of investment 
required in even a single container terminal facility.
Port planners are therefore faced with the decision: 
should the country construct a container terminal and try to 
attract transhipment traffic in order to make it economically 
viable and therefore justify its existence, or should they 
allow their trade to be transhipped via another country/port 
and feedered to them thus requiring relatively minimal 
investment. Obviously the decision will be based on a complex 
mix of political and socio-economic cost benefit
considerations.
2.1.1 RISKS AND BENEFITS OF TRANSHIPMENT
Based on a UNCTAD report on transhipment ports, ® the 
risks and benefits of a transhipment port may be said to 
affect primarily shippers, shipping lines and in addition to 
these, the national economy. The benefits attributed to the
=* Development Improvement of ports: Transhipment ports 
TD/B/C.4/293. 1985
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shippers are:
a) reduction in maritime transport cost will result in 
cheaper services. Here it is assumed that economy 
o-f scale achieved by carriers will be passed on to 
the shipper in the -Form o-F reduced rates and this o-F 
course depends on the contestability o-F the market.
b) greater sailing frequencies
c> connections with a wider range of foreign ports and 
thus
d) the possibility of new trade markets.
The primary disadvantages is that those on the feedering 
end of the service may have longer transit times, increased 
probability of cargo loss or damage due to multiple handling 
and ports and that disruption at the transhipment port 
imperils the security of supply. These constituted the 
primary grounds for shippers resistance in the beginning, to 
having their cargoes transhipped.
The major disadvantage to national shipping lines is the 
possible inability to compete with the larger carriers calling 
at the port, in terms of securing long haul cargoes. In such 
a case national lines may find their role relegated to the 
feedering option not in terms of increased market opportunity 
but for survival.
Local shipping lines can however, also derive some 
benefits from transhipment activities of a port. The improved 
efficiency afforded by modern cargo handling facilities and 
dictated by the fast turnaround time and increased 
productivity for vessels necessary at a transhipment port, 
will also accrue to national lines and serve to strengthen
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their competitive position. Transhipment also o-F-fers new 
markets -For local lines through the possibility to set up 
■Feedering operations if the mainline carriers do not have 
their own feeder networks.
The foregoing merits and demerits of the transhipment 
option will likewise impact on the national economy in varying 
degrees. Additionally, the existence of a transhipment 
facility generating increased port activity and traffic growth 
and establishing wide trade links, will serve to encourage the 
development of industrial services within the port estate, 
such as export processing zones, which in turn increases port 
activity.
A transhipment port is also a very lucrative means of 
earning foreign exchange and this is very important in the 
developing world where this is often a scarce commodity.
Finally, the use of feeder* vessels allows access to 
smaller ports thereby affording the option (as far as the load 
centre country is concerned) of wider distribution of cargo by 
the cheaper water means and relieving the pressure on inland 
transport. For countries on both end of the feedering
services, it also affords greater spread in the development of 
the country and serves to promote intra regional trade.
2.1.2 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR A TRANSHIPMENT PORT
The previous discussion concentrated on the various 
factors which influence the selection of ports on the 
itinaries of shipowners. From a port standpoint, it is 
essential to be aware of, and understand the interrelationship 
between these factors so as to be better able to predict the 
response of ship operators to a given change in any of these 
parameters. With these in mind, if a port’s decision is to
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try and attract transhipment traffic, the following criteria 
are also relevant, more so because the majority of these are 
largely within the ability of the port to furnish or
influence:
a) The level of national trade
b) Potentially available traffic volume
c) Physical location
d) Port facilities
e) Efficiency and Organization of port operations
f) Competitive arena ( national and regional)
g) Pricing
h) Existence of Free Zone/Port, storage and assembly 
processing of cargo
i) Range of container and -other shipping services 
available
j) Availability of feeder services to and from relevant
feeder port; level of hinterland development and 
inland transportation.
k) Customs procedures (fast and efficient)
l) Freedom of trade and the existence of 
market/preferential trade agreements with other 
countries.
m) Government regulations.
These requirements are largely self explanatory. However 
the following points need to be made. While a high level of 
domestic traffic is not a prerequisite for being selected as a 
transhipment port, it has already been shown that the cargo 
uplift factor is considered by ship operators. Therefore a 
good cargo base relative to neighbouring countries enhances 
the potential of being selected.
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What is most important however, is the -Future tra-F-Fic 
potential. Here the analysis is not limited to that o-F the 
country/port hinterland under consideration, but the entire 
region. It is regional trade which creates transhipment 
opportunities -For ports and not necessarily domestic trade. 
This point is repeatedly demonstrated in ports such as 
Singapore and Colombo whose actual trade relative to other 
countries for which they serve as transhipment points (India, 
Thailand etc) is quite small, yet today they are flourishing 
regional transhipment ports.
Of course this brings heavily into play the factor of 
government regulations which might adversely affect the ports 
possibilities for developing the transhipment trade. For 
example, one of the reasons for Colombo being used as a 
transhipment port for cargo destined for India is because of 
Indian Government regulations re transhipment.
In an effort to minimize voyage costs, the port that will 
be of interest to ship operators will tend to be that which 
offers the minimum deviation from the major trade routes. 
Thus port planners, especially in countries with large land 
mass should also bear this in mind when deciding where to 
establish a port.
Port .facilities should be well maintained and of 
sufficient capacity to accommodate the expected vessel sizes. 
This means that tugs, where needed should be available; 
handling equipment, storage facilities, cranes and berths. . In 
the transhipment business where the whole aim of the exercise 
is cost reduction, this assumes even greater importance to the 
success of the port.
This brings us to the requirement for a high level of 
efficiency and organisation. Port management must employ a 
commercial approach to the running of ports. There needs to 
be proper selection and training of employees and most
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importantly, a degree o-F -Freedom and -Flexibility in decision 
making. For example, the level of authority accorded to 
management must not merely extend to the repetition of goals, 
objectives and rates. Instead especially in the case of the 
latter, they must be in a position to use discretion in 
negotiating these rates in accordance with prevailing market 
situation (charging what the market can bear). Of course to 
implement such decisions without it being disastrous to the 
company, the decision maker must be aware of all the elements 
which enter into play, namely the cost structure of the ports 
and the basis of the established tariffs.
2.1.3 UNDERUTILIZATION IN CONTAINER PORTS
Notwithstanding the vast investment required to set up 
container facilities and the general shortage of capital in 
developing countries the number of world container ports have 
increased rapidly since the 1770s. This is because following 
on the rationale of cost justification in the face of low 
domestic volume, many countries/ports have decided to bid for 
the available transhipment traffic. Obviously if several 
ports within a region develop transhipment facilities then 
there is that much less traffic available to each. Thus the 
situation of overcapacity and underutilization (different 
sides of the same coin) is evident in far too many ports.
A large part of the reason for overcapacity rests with 
port planners and decision makers. In order to justify the 
cost level very optimistic forecasts are sometimes used, or 
competition understated, if mentioned at all. Also the lure
of scarce foreign exchange inflows expected from such a 
service is enough to make the need for in depth analysis of 
the market secondary.
In developing terminal facilities, the level of increase
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in regional and national trade expected over the planning 
horizon will greatly determine the terminal capacity 
required. However, whilst trade projections may or may not 
materialize, the -facility, once constructed can rarely be 
altered. A fourth reason is the influence of shipowners. In 
deciding whether or not a market will exist for its proposed 
transhipment facility, port planners often rely on the 
feedback it receives from the prospective users - the ship 
operators. The fact that it is in the interest of the 
shipowners to have a wide choice of ports at which to call 
will generally mean that the response received by the port 
planners is very positive. In fact it is in their interest 
not to discourage ports which are willing to provide 
transhipment facilities. The tendency is to encourage as many 
ports as are willing to make the investment and need not 
choose from among them before they have all made the necessary 
investment, and even the favoured one will find that the 
decision, of necessity, is not permanent, so the inter-port 
competition can be exploited in the future. ^ While the
creation of such a cut throat atmosphere may impact favourably 
on the efficiency of the competing ports, the same cannot 
however be said for the financial performance of the 
unselected ports.
2.1.4 ROLE OF AGREEMENTS
The only means of protecting port investment is to have a 
guaranteed traffic volume or a guaranteed level of facility 
usage. This may be possible through agreements between;
a) The port and the ship operator; This normally 
involves joint development of port facilities and therefore 
spreads the investment risk and assures the port of a level of
 ^ Development 8< Improvement of Ports; Transhipment 
ports'. UNCTAD TD/B/C. 4/293
24
usage. While contracts/agreements of this nature are
widespread in the developed world, it is a rare occurrence in 
developing countries (Singapore the major exception) and may 
only occur if the port is in such a dominant position and 
expected to generate much traffic. In which case one may 
argue that the port would not necessarily need the contract 
and should probably go for a common user approach. From a 
carrier’s point of view such contracts restrict flexibility 
and endanger the competition between ports on which they rely 
for improved port efficiency.
b) Agreements between ports. Ports compete not only on 
efficiency but on pricing. Thus published tariffs and actual 
charge will tend to differ from customer to customer. While 
this flexible approach is in accordance with that advocated 
earlier, it is often found that the size of the variation is 
dependent on how desperate the pbrt management is to secure a 
particular line and not necessarily because this is what the 
market will bear.
There is scope therefore for ports to restrict 
competition among themselves through the charging of not 
dissimilar prices. In effect the formation of a cartel 
similar to conferences. This approach has several drawbacks. 
The effective functioning of any cartel assumes a similar cost 
structure for its members so that there is little incentive to 
reduce prices to lure cargo.
Unlike shipping 
different management 
affect cost levels, 
employ its stevedores 
as, and when needed, 
than that port which 
base he can reduce p 
detriment of the next
lines, ports are disparate entities with 
structures and policies which greatly 
For example, a Terminal which does not 
directly but subcontracts this function 
will have a lower level of fixed costs 
employs them directly. With a lower cost 
rices and still make a profit, to the 
port.
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It can be argued that such an environment will -Force 
other ports to seek economies through cost reductions. 
However the structure o-F port relationships is o-Ften dictated 
by government and can take decades to change (as exempli-Fied 
by the registered dock worker scheme in the UK). O-F course, 
assuming similar cost structures and a willingness to
cooperate, the problem of policing the actual rates charged 
would also emerge.
Another alternative arrangement that can be made between 
ports is the possibility for joint investment in return for a 
share in both the control of operation and profit. This is 
probably a more feasible alternative to that presented 
earlier, since it would avoid, in the initial stages,
unnecessary waste of capital while accruing the benefits of 
transhipment. This would however (like the price fixing
agreement) work best between ports of the same country in 
terms of operational logistics. It must be stated that while 
the proposed agreements between ports has obvious advantages, 
hardly any inclination at cooperation between ports along 
these lines has been shown to date.
c) Agreements between Governments. Agreements could be 
made between governments to either invest jointly in port 
facilities or share different aspects of the transhipment 
services between countries. For example, one provides the 
port facilities and the other the feeder service.
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CURRENT,TRENDS IN CONTAINER BHIPPINS AND IMPACT ON PORTS
The two previous chapters were concerned with presenting a picture 
of the impact of containerisation on the evolution of ports. In 
particular, it was shown that historically the port’s role in the change 
process has been typified by reactionary measures. They were not 
innovators but facilitators. This behaviour may be seen as very much in 
line with the generic function of ports, that is, as facilitators of trade 
and the interface between maritime and other transport modes. Thus the 
impetus for change - technological and operational - resided with the 
carriers, and the survival of the ports depended on their ability to 
anticipate, and respond effectively to this challenge, in order to prevent 
being marginalised and indeed survival was often at stake.
However, the all-powerful role of carriers in trade/transport has 
been significantly diluted over the years due particularly to the decline 
in conference power and the rise to power of shippers' organizations. 
While the ports themselves have not really gained power, it may be said 
that they are nevertheless in a stronger position by virtue of the 
carriers being in a less dominant one. However, they are still a long way 
off from, and may never be in the position of calling the shots.
.In this chapter, based on recent trends, an attempt will be made to 
forecast the general environment in which ports will have to operate in 
the future and where appropriate, the response of some ports to the 
challenge.
3.1 n-E ENVIRQM^ ENT
The demand for shipping and port services is derived based on the 
need and ability of geographically disparate nations to trade, and in turn 
is affected by fluctuations in trade. Trade, on the other hand, is 
affected by a host of factors encompassing the more obvious economic and
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political, technological ones as well as the unpredictable, such as 
natural disasters. Thus an analysis of the more predictable of these 
* leading indicators' can offer invaluable insight to industry management 
by not only indicating tsfiat future demand for port services will be, but 
by offering hints as to where the markets are and how they may tailor the 
port's services to respond to these changes.
By and large, it is agreed that the prospects for future trade is 
one of sustained healthy growth in the 90s. It is expected that world 
economic growth will average 3.2 to 3.5 percent per annum While this 
remains in keeping with the general growth of the '80s, the pjattern of 
trade is expected to c±»ange mainly ckae to:
1. THE STATE OF THE US ECONOMY
The growth of the '80s was led by US imports - largely from the 
Asian economies. However, with the yawning trade deficit and softening of 
the Dollar, as well as the strengthening of the Asian currencies, there is 
in progress a realignment of trade on a more bDalanced level. That is, US 
imports are expected to decline while their exports increase.
2. REGIONALISATION OF TRADE
The impending economic integration of Western Europe will make it 
into the single largest trading group in which there will be free movement 
of persons, goods, services and capital, which is in turn expected to fuel 
economic growth of the region. The removal of all tariff barriers between 
the community memhers will mean that trade between them is more 
competitive relative to non-members. This in itself constitute a barrier 
to trade as far as non-members are concerned. It has also resulted in 
what is increasingly referred to as the globalisation of production, which 
has the irresistible benefits of increasing investment inflows to the 
region, thereby stimulating both production and employment.
‘World trade to the year 2000. Implications for shipping: Asian
Shipbuilding in the 1990s Conference. By Ben Hackett S< Doug Beck. Page
2.
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The indirect disbenefit may well be that unless the trade CDff
between technological efficiency in production (thus reduced costs) and 
the relatively higher cost of European labour (especially in the more 
northerly states) is positive, the European consumer may be faced with
higher costs for locally produced commodities. This will of course render 
imports more competitive, given a constant level of tariff on imports. In 
this regard one can expect the 'industrial banana' (great prodicing areas 
of Europe) to shift to the south where labour is cheaper.
Not only has the EC been a catalyst to the decentralisation of
production, but the potential benefits of such integration has not 
entirely escaped the notice of other regions. There has been an increase 
in the number of agreements - bilateral and multilateral - aimed at 
accruing these same benefits. Witness for example the USA — Canada Free
Trade Agreement and the proposed America's Initiative. For economic 
unions that already existed, new purpose has been added, thus the
resurgence of activity in say CARICCM (Caribbean Cormion Market).
Other factors' besides collective political action are at work to 
undermine international trade in favour of regional trade: Namely, the
unequal development of the different countries within a region. In almost 
every region with maybe the exception of Africa, there exists a marked 
distinction in the economic development of the countries. For example 
Northern Europe versus Southern Europe, West more developed than East; USA 
and Canada more developed than Central, South America and the Caribbean; 
In Asia, Japan and increasingly South Korea are ahead (in terms of econmic 
development) of say China, ASEAN, India and so on. Granted, this position 
has always existed, but its importance is now underlined in this movement 
towards regional trade which it facilitates, by virtue of the presenting 
the possibility for investors to exploit the various comparative 
advantages of the different countries (sub region). Thus 'the fastest 
interregional trade growth should occur between Japan and the Asian NICs, 
as the Asian NICs will increasingly become a feeder of the fast growing 
Japanese appetite for imported products, and Japanese direct investment in
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that region and generate company trade’ = The magnitude and importance 
of intra-regional trade in the -future is tabulated below:
TABLE 3.1
LONG TEF31 OUTLOOK FOR INTERREGIONAL TRADE 
($blllion, both ways)
1988 1995 growth
EC4 - US 117.4 239.0 10.7V. pa
EC4 - JAP«\J 51.2 114.9 12.2
EC4 - fsifm 50.6 117.5 12.8
US - JAPWM 125.7 263.7 11.2
US - ASIW4 97.7 230.4 13.0
JAPAN - ASIWM4 71.0 181.0 14.0
TOTAL 513.6 1,146.5 12.2
WORLD TRADE 5,613.0 11,734.8 11.0
Source: Extracted form ’Overview of the world economy & trade
By S. Masuyama. Havencongress, charts 8 and 10.
While the above table ckDesn't prove conclusively the argument, the 
fact that the incidence of intra-regional trade (Japan-Asian4) is expected 
to grow at a faster rate than both interregional and global trade
nevertheless underlines the point. If the other regions chose to 
facilitate intra regional trade based on the model of the Asian NICs and 
Japan, namely by pumping investment in the less developed countries to 
take advantage of reduced inputs costs, then this will have the positive 
e-fFect of raising the general level of economic development regionally. 
This will however, also reduce the demand -for sea transport.
3. EAST - WEST DETENTE
The end of the cold war which had created a bi-polarisation in the 
world economy in -former years should serve to boost world economic growth 
and a -further restructuring of trade.
Firstly, the COMECON barter trade has collapsed under the new free
O^verview of the world economy & trade, HavenCongress. By 
'S: Masuyama, page 5, para. 4
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market system, as the countries try to secure hard currency necessary to 
survive and develop. This offers vast potential for trade in the short to 
medium term, since their exports tend to be primarily of heavy industry 
and natural resources while import demand is for manufactured goods and 
services. Potential t^'^ide will be limited, in the short run to their 
ability to pay.
The reduced level of military spending now possible through the 
warmer East-West relations has also the effect, if channeled into 
productive processes, to impact positively on world economic growth. The 
other side of this is that, the Developing countries will face stiff 
competition from these emerging free market economies for the available 
investments, aids and loans. This coupled with the debt problems will 
result in further weakening of their economies.
In general therefore, while the world economy and trade is expected 
to record healthy growth in the future (3.5 and 11% p.a. respectively) the 
demand for shipping services, by virtue of being depenctent not only on 
quantity but also on the distance shipped, is expected to record less 
growth due to the above mentioned factors.
TABLE 3.2
GROWTH IN VOLUME OF COMMODITIES SHIPPED 
(Average Annual growth rate)
CRUDE & PETROLEUM PROD.
IRON ORE
COAL
GRAIN
BAUXITE it ALUMim 
PHOSPHATE ORE
Source; Extracted from JAMRI report on Medium to Longterm Analysis 
of the Shipping Market (1990-2005)
The general trend of expected decline observed in the table above is 
explained by Dr. Joon-Soo Jon as being attributable to ’...the decline of
19S5-S9 1 1989-95 1 1995-2000
5.8*/. i 2.1*/. 1.5V.
2.7 1 -0.3 0.6
3.8 1 2.3 2.7
1.8 1 1.9 1.7
4.7 1 0.5
l_ 1.1 1 1.0___________
31
heavy industry in the developed countries, the localisation of natural 
resources and the industrialisation of developing countries’ The
outlook for growth in the general cargo sector and in particular, the 
liner trade seems brighter, although still not up to the level of world 
trade. Viz; Increased demand for manufactured and semi manufactured 
goods is rapidly increasing, facilitated by increased containerisation. 
One forecast speculates that growth in the liner trade should average 
around 5.1% per annum, reflecting strong growth in consumer demand and 
globalisation of world production."^
3.2 n-E SHIPPING INDUSTRY
For the shipping industry the implications of the above discussion 
can be translated as slower growth in the major arterial routes, but 
expansion in intra-regional activity:
TABLE 3.3EXPECTED AWMUAL GROWTH IN CONTAINER TRADE
T------------------------------------------- 1--------------------------------------11 ROUTE 1 1984-89 1
1
1989-94 1
1 1iNorth America-Asia I 8.4% 1 5.1% i
1 " " -Europe I 3 .4 1 2 .6  1
lEurope-Asia I 9 .0 1 7 .7  1
1 Intra-Asian 1 10.6 1 9 .9  1
1 " Europe 1 4 .6 1 4 .9  1
I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I. . . . . . . . .   1- - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
Source: Extracted from Containerisation International
1990. Based on T^/DRI forecasts.
Other factors which will impact on the industry include;
1. The trend towards increasing ship sizes. As of May 1989 around 
38% of the capacity on order was for ships of 3000 TEU and more, many of
=^ hanges in Shipping Environment & Counter Strategies of Korea 
Towards year 2000. Page 151, para. 3
■^ World trade to year 2000; Implications for shipping. Presented 
to Asian Shipbuilding Conference, Busan, Korea in 1990, by 
'B. Hecket & Doug Beck.
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which were to be delivered in the 1990s This trend towards larger
mainline vessels has also influenced (for operational reasons) required 
size of feeder ships. Coupled with the existing overtonnage, then it can 
be expected that the downward pressure on liner rates will continue in the 
foreseeable future as carriers scramble for the available cargo to ensure 
economic load factors.
2. Adoption of differentiated marketing strategies_by carriers.
Through the 80s the industry has seen the emergence of two distinct 
marketing strategies by carriers. Dn the one hand there are those who 
position themselves as global carriers offering customers not only door to 
door transport but also more sophisticated logistics, thereby becoming an 
almost indispensable part of the client's JIT distribution system. In 
contrast, other carriers adopted the approach of not vying for this global 
integrated service, but have positioned themselves as niche operators, 
specialising in a particular region or aspect of the total service 
package. This has resulted, in both cases, in increased investment in EDI 
- a necessity for logistics service - to provide shippers with accurate 
and timely information.
3. The increasing trend towards customer-oriented services. This 
is set to continue as shippers continue to demand better and more 
sophisticated services and carriers are forced for competitive reasons to 
comply. The rise of shippers power and outsiders have seen a weakening of 
conferences which is expected to continue in the future. This is a result 
of the conference's increasing inability to control tonnage and enforce 
rate levels - the purpose for which they were created.
4. The changing pattern of carrier cooperation. The emergence of 
market strategies based on service differentiation led to, and increased 
the importance of brand supremacy. Under this scenario, the 
inappropriateness of consortia, has therefore led to its decline in favour 
of operating agreements. The latter, while ensuring economies of scale, 
does not involve the loss of or a merger of carriers' identity in the
= Top 20 Carriers Consolidate. 
June, T990. Pages 46-50.
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Containerization International-
market place. It therefore offers the possibility to engender the much 
sought after customer loyalty.
Increased usage of non-ISO standard boxes. The philosophy 
behind containerisation was to enable the packaging and transport of cargo 
origin to destination with minimal handling to the cargo itself, 
while in transit. It means that the form used to unitize the cargo must 
be interchangable between different transport modes and can be handled by 
standard equipment. A standard for containers v^ s therefore essential.
The creation of specific box sizes by the International Standard 
Organization (ISO) has largely governed the container sizes in use today. 
However, an increasing trend towards introducing different container sizes 
is much in evidence. This will have serious implications for the ability 
of existing port equipment to handle these new containers.
3.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR PORTS
Given that cargo handled in ports tend to grow at a higher rate than 
trade (due primarily to double handling), it can be inferred that cargo 
handled at ports in the coming decade or so will experience an average 
annual increase in excess of 5.15(. This in turn implies an increase in 
the demand for cargo handling services. On the other hand, falling liner 
rates means that carriers are more sensitive to costs and therefore that 
ports, in order to win the patronage of carriers will need to play their 
role in recLicing carrier costs. While the response is normally that of 
tariff rebates, by far the largest contribution ports can make in the 
redaction of the transport cost is through short vessel stay in port. A 
survey to identify what is most important to the ship operators from a 
port standpoint reveals that port cost was by no means the top priority, 
but rather fast and efficient service.
The trend of increased ship size holds several implications for 
ports and their developmental plans. Obviously there will be the need to 
increase the depth of channels and berths, and to accommodate the higher
34
throughput per vessel per berth, there will be a need -For more stacking 
areas to be made available -For each ship’s interchange and a given trade 
volume. The requirement -For -Fast turnaround will be stronger than ever 
thus also implying necessary increases in number oT cranes per ship, their 
speed and outreach. In general, increased efficiency is required in 
container cranes in order to enable reductions in ship’s capital costs, 
operating costs and inventory costs of loaded cargoes, by shortening the 
turnaround time in port and total time cargoes are in transit.*^
The degree of flexibility with which the port responds to the 
challenges of change can be the decisive factor to its survival. Thus, 
ports in responding to changes must select the appropriate strategy which 
will satisfy customers while maximizing its returns on investment. Dr. H. 
Beth highlights two broad responses. Namely,
1) Capital widening, which involves the quantitative 
improvement of facilities, and,
2) Capital deepening, which depicts a qualitative response 
where strategies for the better utilization of current 
resources are employed such as rationalisation and increased 
productivity of existing facilities.
In practice it may iasII be that the optimum strategy comprises a 
combination of the two. For example, a port responding to the challenge 
of bigger ships will almost certainly need to deepen access channels and 
so on. They will also need to invest in new cranes (post panamax). But 
there may not exist the need to build additional berths since ' as was 
already stated, there will be fewer ships, ceteris paribus. What may be 
necessary is reallocation of berth lengths in keeping with the prevailing 
vessel lengths.
C^hanges in world shipping 8t counter strategies of Korea towards 
the year 2000. By Dr. Joon-Soo Jon
Developments in l^torld Shipping - Effect on ports, page 2. 
Presented at a Lecture to the World Maritime University in June, 1991.
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Also the need to provide additional transit area may be avoided by 
the employment o^  ^policies which engender more efficient utilization of 
the existing areas, such as shortening of storage periods and strong 
penalties for tardy removal of cargo, divesture of CFS functions to other 
warehouses and the increased use of ICD’s (inland container depots).
In the era of containers computerisation of the port operations and 
planning is vital to improved operational efficiency, and in order to find 
the most feasible and cost effective solution to the issues of port 
development, finance and management. The leading ports of the world have 
sought and found the competitive edge in the various services they afford 
clients through a comprehensive computer system, involving in some cases
linkages with ports at the other end of the trade route. Although this is
admittedly,a very advanced and complex undertaking, the logic is however 
clear: By direct communication with the other end of the trade route
they are able to know, as soon as the vessel sails, all the various 
details of the cargoes destined for their port. Thus they are able to
plan well in advance for its arrival.
The rise of individual marketing strategies through service
dif-ferentiation aimed at customer loyalty, and the decline of consortia in 
favour of operating agreements, poses both opportunities and threats for 
ports. One possible disadvantage is the need to widen the marketing
effort. For example, ports in their marketing activities could target 
three or so lines through a consortia, since the decision as to ports of 
call was collective. Similarly, with the breakaway, ports which had 
secured these lines may find they run the serious risk of losing a 
substantial portion of business.
On the positive side, this resurgence of independent carriers has 
opened up the market of potential customers as far as ports are concerned. 
Thus given equivalent efficiency in various ports and no great 
geographical/trade disadvantages, there should be a trend towards a more 
even distribution of carriers among ports. Ports can also seek to exploit 
the increased powers of shippers to influence carriers, to their 
advantage. This may be done by appealing directly to shippers who can use
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their clout to decide on the ports -from which their cargo should be 
shipped.
Thus, in the -future, ports will undoubtedly need to concentrate on 
development o-F services both qualitatively and quantitatively but on an 
eT-Ficient and cost effective basis since it is unlikely that they will be 
able to pass on all their' increased costs to carriers/shippers and remain 
competitive. It will also mean that ports will need to be innovative in 
both the provision of services and more active in influencing the ports 
through which cargoes are shipped.
In addition, in the planning of equipment purchase, management has 
to be cognizant of current trends which may render equipment prematurely 
obsolete. One significant example is the increased popularity of non­
standard ISO boxes by shippers in order to secure cost benefits. A 
proposal was placed before ISO by A^ BI (American National Standards 
Institute) to legitimize such sizes as 48 feet boxes although the payload 
is to remain the same as that of the 40 feet This has implications
for the size of crane and yard equipment spreaders, the size of the slot 
per box allocated in the transit areas, and, in the case of the former, 
management will want to build in an option -For adjustment/extension when 
purchasing equipment. The proposal of increased size while maintaining 
current allowable weight, raises the' issue of control to ensure that 
overweight boxes do not damage costly equipment.
From the foregoing it would seem quite clear that ports .need to 
register a voice in the organizations that take decisions which impact on 
their activities. For this there will be the need for unity. This will 
undoubtedly be the determinant of how success-Fully ports will perform in 
the -Future.
USA proposal for ISO series 2 High Cube container size. ISD/TC 
104 WG.4 no. 28. Prepared September 23, 1988
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C H A R T E R  ^
INTRODUCTION TO THE KINGSTON CONTAINER TERMINAL
In 1975 Jamaica and in particular the Port o-F Kingston 
joined the ranks of countries vying for the container 
transhipment business. The decision was taken by the Port 
Authority to construct a container terminal to facilitate the 
growing containerised trade of the country and at the same 
time capitalise on the lack of such facilities in the region 
as a whole, by offering transhipment for the region and for 
certain other trades. This was seen as being possible due to 
the strategic location of the island, representing minimal 
deviation from the trade routes utilizing the Panama Canal.
The existing port estate was extended by land 
reclammation and a f.our berth terminal was developed and 
started operation in 1975. The strategy to vie for
transhipment traffic has been largely successful as TEUs 
handled at the Terminal rose steadily during the first 12 
years of operations, to peak at over 253,000 in 1987. 
Estimates by the Ocean Shipping Consultants projected that the 
port of Kingston would have been handling over 265,000 TEUs by 
1990.»
However, several events have since occurred to
drammatically alter this picture. Namely, the destabilization 
of the Panamanian economy and the resultant impact on its 
freezone activities; the increasing use of the US land-bridge 
for cargo movements between its East and West coasts; and the 
stigma of illicit drug trafficking, from the port which was 
largely responsible for the withdrawal of a major transhipment 
line at the end of 1987. Today, traffic at the Terminal
World Container Ports to 2000.
Consultants, 1986. Page 166
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Ocean Shipping
averages about 90,000 moves or just over 100,000 TEUs.
The Terminal is therefore facing a crisis. In the face 
of downward spiralling of traffic, the increased port costs 
with its impact on profitability, and the more recent 
industrial relations problem, the Terminal faces the very real 
danger of losing her present, if somewhat tarnished status as 
one of the premier container facility in the region. And 
with the increasing competition now faced from ports such as 
Cristobal, San Juan and Santo Domingo, any further loss of 
business could affect its survival.
In this chapter, a brief history of the development of 
the port is given, the general operational structure of the 
Terminal and in chapter 5 a situation analysis detailing 
performance to date and problems faced by the Terminal. It is 
hoped that this will present the background for the subsequent 
chapters in which it is suggested that the port may be able to 
resolve some of its more crippling problems and improve its 
declining transhipment market by adopting a comprehensive 
marketing plan.
4.1 BRIEF HISTORY
Since the early 17th Century during the English 
occupation of Jamaica, the Kingston harbour has been the 
centre of the Island's shipping and commercial activities. 
With over 8 square miles of navigable water and depth of over 
90 feet, large ships could berth safely alongside the shore, 
discharge cargo and sail again quickly — a necessity during 
the period when Port Royal (the most easterly end of the 
Harbour) served as a base for the activities of the reknowned 
English pirate. Sir Henry Morgan. The ensuing years saw 
activities of the port being relocated from Port Royal (after 
it w^s destroyed by earthquake in 1692) westerly, to what is
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today known as Newport West.
As the rapid increase in the demand -For sugar and other 
agricultural produce increased profits and gave wealth to the 
city, Kingston grew in size and importance to the Island. The 
development o-F port structures within the harbour was hard put 
to keep pace with that o-F the Island’s commerce. The 
prol i-Feration o-F -Finger piers to handle the rising tide o-F 
goods -Flowing through the port, concentrated a large number o-F 
ships on a relatively small area o-F coastline. This resulted 
in acute congestion in the port, as the road in-Frastructure o-F 
the city was not designed to take that level of traffic.
By the mid 1950s private developers began dredging and 
reclamation operations on the shoreline west of the city, 
resulting in the replacement of the pier structures with 
modern lateral quays. This was part of an integrated plan to 
link the development of the port with the general plan for 
that of the city and outlying areas.
The operation of the Newport West facilities (then 
berths 1 - 9) was to be entrusted to two of the old wharf 
companies, viz: Kingston Wharves and Western Terminals.
4.1.1 THE PORT AUTHORITY OF JAMAICA
Established in 1966 as a statutory body, it is directly 
responsible to the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport 
for matters pertaining to the Island’s ports and is thus 
entrusted with their overall supervision, and in general the 
various shipping related facilities found on the port estate. 
"As such it was empowered to:
a) Fix and review wharfage rates for all public wharves 
in the Island
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b) Regulate the use of port facilities
c) Provide and operate port facilities and related
services •
d) Operate and lease such facilities as may be vested
in C i13
e) Maintain and improve port facilities
f) Regulate and control navigation within the limits of
the ports of the Island
g)' Provide for pilotage.services in all ports of the
Island" *
In 1972 the Government assumed responsibility -for all 
-Future port development. The decision was taken to build a 
modern transhipment container terminal and -Free port 
•facilities. "This was conceived as a part of a coordinated 
policy for:
i) developing the Port of Kingston to meet the future 
shift to container and transhipment traffic
ii) attracting foreign investment; and
iii) expanding exports" ^
thereby contributing to Jamaica's economic growth. The idea 
behind the double development of both the Terminal and 
Freezone complex is that both should work in tandem. The 
responsibility for policy implementation was also divested to 
the Port Authority. Given this responsibility, the Port 
Authority of Jamaica (PAJ), a relative newcomer to the port 
business, recognised its lack of expertise in the area of port 
operations. So in order to secure the loan necessary to build 
the facilities, entered into operating agreements with the two
=KTD 10th Anniversary Booklet, page 7
.^Report to the Port Authority by Public Relations 
Associates
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existing' whar-F companies, whereby it provides capital and the 
private sector the expertise.
Between 1975-1979 the container terminal was operated by 
Kingston Wharves .and Western Terminals <KW & WT) on a joint 
venture basis. The container Terminal was subsequently made 
autonomous with these two companies becoming equal 
shareholders in the new company - Kingston Terminal Operators 
Limited (KTO) . "KTO is a limited liability company with sta-F-F 
taken originally -From the joint venture partners. This new 
company was given responsibility -For the total operations o-F 
the Terminal, and for advising the PAJ, the owners of the 
facility, on the purchase of equipment." ^
Here it should be noted that the container terminal 
comprises berths 8 - 11, but the PAJ owns only berths 10 and 
11. It will be recalled that berths 8 and 9 are the property 
of KW. However, a special arrangement with the PAJ was 
concluded whereby these berths are operated in conjunction 
with berths 10 and 11 as the container facility at no charge 
to the PAJ (this arrangement is claused in the Terminal 
Operators Agreement, Appendix 4.1).
Such agreements characterise the relationship between the 
PAJ and the private sector, resulting in a conflicting and 
overlapping structure regarding the ownership and operations 
of the public wharves (see figure 4.1). obvious area of
conflict is the fact that private interests who own and 
operate a portion of the port's facilities are being regulated 
by the PAJ who not only set the wharfage rates but also own 
and operate competing facilities. This situation is further 
worsened by the fact that these private concerns have seen a 
portion of their traffic diverted to the container facility.
■^ KTQ's 10th Anniversary Handbook, page 7.
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under the direction o-F the PAJ, in order to increase the 
utilisation o-f the Terminal. As a means o-F compensation 
however, a -Further agreement was entered into between the 
parties, whereby "...wharfage on those containers directed 
away (domestic cargo) from their facilities is remitted to 
them in its entirety". =
4.2 THE OPERATING AGREEMENT
Although the appendixed Operating Agreement is not 
current (having expired in 1987), it is not substantially 
different frorrt the current one and thus is adequate for 
purpose of illustrating the impact of certain clauses on the 
Terminal’s operations.
Responsibility for equipment and plant maintenance under 
clause 7 falls to the Terminal Operators. However, clause 8 
gives the PAJ responsibility for the provision of spare parts. 
The obvious advantage of this arrangement is that the PAJ, 
being a governmental institution has more ready access to 
lines of credit and is therefore in a position to garner the 
necessary scarce foreign exchange for the purchase of the 
spare parts. Although there exists an efficient means of 
communication between the Terminal and the Authority regarding 
spares needed, the fact that the purchasing entity is 
physically divorced from that doing the actual using, has 
resulted in certain inefficiencies and time lag in ordering. 
The problem of late arrival is often experienced and in some 
instances it was found that the parts actually received were 
of an incorrect specification - an expensive mistake.
For the above reasons it was often found that while there 
existed shortage of some spare parts, very high inventory
“Kingston Port Development Study, Page Xl-6.
19 O-F Terminal Operating Agreement, Appendix 4.1
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Also Clause
the Terminallevels existed -For others. To this end 
management recently devised an inventory system to calculate 
the Economic Order Quantity (EDQ) -For some 0 "F the more crucial 
parts. The success o-F this system will of course depend on an 
accurate assessment o-F the lag time between ordering with the 
PAJ and receiving.
Another crucial i-F obvious -Factor will be actual usage 
rate versus predicted. With the increasing breakdown of ship- 
to-shore cranes being experienced, and thus the need for 
constant repair, forecasting usage rate is not at all easy. 
It is worthwhile to mention this experience of crane 
breakdowns is a result of the continual postponement of a long 
overdue refurbishing of these equipment. Such capital
expenditure is the preserve of the PAJ and since the 
refurbishing exercise will require outlay of foreign exchange 
for both parts and overseas experts, it is delayed until the 
PAJ is prepared to spend the money. This is one of the 
inherent disadvantages in the present arrangement, since the 
PAJ is responsible for several port facilities and at any one 
time, the Container Terminal may not be number one on its 
priority list regarding the allocation of foreign exchange.
Clause 11 stipulates that the Operator (KTO) is to 
"provide adequate security for the container terminal and all 
the plant and equipment thereon...". At the same time it is 
the regulated responsibility of the Shipping Association of 
Jamaica (SAJ) to provide security for the entire port estate. 
As such, operating within the Terminal are at least two 
different security organisations. The security provided by 
KTO has largely been with regards to cargo security in the 
container yard and freight stations, while that provided by 
the SAJ covered the entire perimeter of the Terminal including 
access and exits, security aboard vessels and container 
security. In the mid ’80s the Terminal experienced serious 
security problems which threatened its existence and has
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resulted in a wider involvement by the PAJ in Terminal 
security matters. This involvement has also seen the 
introduction of another security organisation on the Terminal.
Regarding the marketing of the Terminal, clause 22 
establishes joint responsi1bi1ty between the parties for this 
funciton. However, in reality port marketing is spearheaded 
by the PAJ and constitutes primarily promotional tours with 
some members of the Terminal's management team being included 
in the delegation. To some extent the logic of such an
arrangement is overwhelming: since the PAJ is responsible for 
other port facilities such as the freezone, it can best launch 
an integrated promotional campaign. The great disadvantage to 
the Terminal of not having its own in-house marketing 
department is that Terminal marketing activities is seen as a. 
once-off activity, carried out a few times per year to try and 
drum up business, instead of an ongoing activity involving 
constant service improvement, market evaluation and forward 
planning.
4.3 THE KINGSTON INDUSTRIAL FREEZONE (IFZ)
Although this paper’s major • concern is with the
transhipment terminal, it is felt that in as far as the 
freezone constituted a part of the plan for overall port 
development, a brief analysis of its success in terms of its 
goals could serve to place in context any evaluation of the 
transhipment port’s own performance. The proposed twin
development of a freezone complex and a transhipment terminal 
was viewed by the Government as being vital to economic 
development of the country.
The primary goal of the IFZ was to foster trade expansion 
and increased employment from the expected investment inflows,
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FIGURE 4.2
i
while transhipment would increase foreign exchange earnings. 
A sort of symbiotic relationship was envisioned between the 
port and the IFZ wherein the former, by providing modern port 
facilities would attract regular scheduled service to the 
port, thereby enabling efficient transportation of the 
Island’s trade and make Kingston more attractive for Freezone 
Investments. The IFZ on the other hand, would serve not only 
to feed cargo to the port, but by the very fact that its 
operation represents expanded trade for the Island, attract 
more lines to the port.
One of the essential criterion for the successful 
operation of a freezone and indeed a transhipment port is 
location. Here Jamaica has the benefit of being ideally
located (see figure 4.2), viz:
i) Jamaica is strategically located between Europe 
and South America and is directly on the route 
via the Panama Canal from the Far East to 
Europe and to the East Coast of North America.
ii) The Island is centrally located relative to the 
rest of the Caribbean, Central America, South 
America and the Gulf area of the USA.
It was therefore felt that with this natural advantage 
the Island could become the hub for cargo destined not only 
for the region but also Europe and the Far East (this, as will 
be seen later, materialised to some extent when the port was^ 
chosen by Evergreen as a hub in its round-the-wor1d service). 
In fact, it was a widely held belief that if this natural 
resource was properly exploited, the Island had the potential 
to become to these various regions "what Singapore was to the
t
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Far East" and indeed at the time there was no reason not
to believe this.
Basic Criteria For Success-Ful Operation of a Freezone
To successFully compete For Freezone investment on the 
international market, a wide range oF incentives and 
Facilities need to be provided by the host country. Using 
Eric Pollock's classiFication, these need to be both
physical, and non-physical as set out below:
PHYSICAL
a) geographical location
b) availability oF appropriate port Facilities
c) adequate land area (100 acres minimum)
d) availability oF labour
e) " oF cheap power and water
F) availability oF buildings
NON PHYSICAL
g) Favourable investment conditions and general 
Financial and economic stability
h) tax concessions
i) reasonable rentals For Facilities
j) minimum Fuss and bureaucracy.
The. Kingston Freezone Company Ltd. is a joint holding oF 
the Port Authority and the Government oF Jamaica, established 
in 1976. Over 150 acres oF land is dedicated to its
development with just over a third being already developed 
into standard Factory warehouse modules. The area is well
<*>Paper based on speech by Hon. Eric Bell (then Minister 
oF Public Utility 8< transport) at the Opening oF the Port 
Authority Seminar. 27/3/74.
■^ Free Ports, Free Trade Zones, Export Processing Zones 
Economic Develoment, page 15
47
served by electricity and water as well as the major motorways 
o-F the Bustamante Industrial Estate on which it is located. 
With well over a -Fi-fth of the Island’s labour force being 
unemployed, investors in the Kingston Freezone have the 
benefit of not only a vast pool of semi and unskilled labour 
but also at a cheap cost, as these employees were normally 
paid at the national minimum wage of US$18.00 per week for a 
40 hour week. Jamaica’s favourable geographical location has 
already been mentioned and it may be readily seen that with 
the freezone being located adjacent to the modern container 
facility the second criterion was also met, thus completing 
the physical requirements.
A wide range of financial and operational incentives were 
put in place, viz:
"TAX EXEMPTIONS - 100’/. tax holiday on profits
CUSTOMS PROCEDURES - waiving of import licencing
requirements minimal customs 
formalities
DUTY EXEMPTION - no duty is levied on capital
goods, consumer goods, raw 
material or imports for 
construction, extension or
repair of Freezone premises - 
including office equipment
PROFIT REPATRIATION - there are no restrictions on the
repatriation of profits by 
companies operating in the Zone 
client companies are permitted 
to operate foreign currency 
accounts in accordance with the 
Exchange Control regulations of
48
the Bank of Jamaica.
WORK PERMITS - work permit applications are
exempt from normal taxation". ®
In the marketing of the complex, a further selling point 
was the benefits exporters of Jamaican made products would 
receive from the various international Agreements that the 
Island was a Signatory to. Such as the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, Lome Convention, GATT, Caribcan and Caricom.
The Freezone targeted the full scale light manufacturing 
industry, thereby attracting activities in assembly of 
machinery, production of packaging material, printing and 
garment manufacturing. Over 90% of the‘labour employed on the 
Zone are engaged in the latter activity. Table I gives
performance data on the Zone for the periods 
TABLE 4.1
1982-1989
1
11 YEAR 1 EMPLOYMENT
1 FDREIBN EXCHANGE 
1 EARNINGS (US$) 111
CONTAINERS 
IN 1 OUT 
____________1_________________r-
1 1982 i 875 . 1 1,100,000
I
1 407 1 163
1 1983 1 960 1 1,700,000 1 331 1 167
1 1984 1 3,134 1 2,400,000 1 456 1 205
1 1985 1 5,085 1 7,000,000 1 542 1 381
1 1986 1 7,781 1 10,800,000 1 727 1 596
1 1987 1 11,049 1 30,500,000 1 945 1 914
1 1988 1 6,559 1 28,700,000 1 750 1 879
1L.1989 1 7,441 1 27,700,000 ----------------------------------------------- 1— J_____
684 1 
____________L 650
SOURCE: Statistics Dept, at the Kingston Freezone
Employment rose impressively from the 1982 level of 875, 
peaking at 11,049 in 1987. A similar trend will be observed 
in the performance of the container port but it is reasonable 
to conclude that there exists no significance to this
® Kingston Export Freezone. Produced by Communications 
Consultant Ltd., 1987. For the PAJ.
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correlation. As to the reason -For the drammatic reduction in 
-Freezone employment -Following on 1987, it can only be 
speculated that this may have been a result o-F the widespread 
industrial action by the Freezone employees in demand o-F 
better pay and working conditions which led to some companies 
pulling out, while others cut sta-F-F. Un-Fortunately -Further 
interviews with the Freezone Statistician was not possible, 
and so it can only be assumed that this was the case.
Studies done on the implementation and bene-Fits o-F the 
Freezone, where any attempt was made to actually quanti-Fy the 
expected bene-Fits, were also unobtainable. This renders the 
task o-F concluding the extent to which its objectives were 
achieved, difficult. What is obvious however, is that in more 
than any other area the Freezone has been successful in 
tapping a respectable portion of Island's unemployed labour, 
force. Also in the light of the volume of containers entering 
the country because of the existence of the zone, it may be 
deduced that with the maximum of 1859 achieved in 1987 being 
just over 1'/. of the containers passing through the Terminal 
for the same period, the Freezone has largely not achieved the 
goal of feeding cargo to the Terminal.
4.4 THE KINGSTON CONTAINER TERMINAL
Having briefly reviewed the performance of the Freezone 
primarily in order to assess impact on the Container 
Terminal, the objective now is to present a brief outline of 
the facilities of the Terminal itself, the operational 
structure and the current labour arrangement thereon. It is 
hoped that by so doing, a framework will be presented which 
will enable a better undertstanding of the Terminal and 
possible reasons for the level of performance discussed in the 
next chapter.
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It will be recalled that responsibility -For the operation 
of the Island’s only specialised container facility was 
entrusted to an operating company - Kingston Terminal 
Operators Limited (KTO). For the purposes of this paper, the 
Kingston Container Terminal and KTO will be regarded as one 
and the same, since for all practical purposes this body is 
responsible for the operation of the Terminal on a profitable 
and efficient basis. Although as have been shown, the ability 
to do so effectively is constrained by the reliance on the PAJ 
for.certain crucial decisions such as investment.
4.4.1 FACILITIES
The Kingston transhipment container terminal (also 
referred to as KTO) began operations in 1P75 with 2 Paceco 
gantry portainer cranes for its shipside operations along 
2,100 ft of berthing space. These were complemented by a 
tractov— trailer system for the quay transfer operation along 
with medium span transtainers for stacking. Shore-side 
operations, namely receivals, deliveries and transfers to the 
Container Freight Stations (CFS) were achieved through the use 
of straddle carriers, tractors and forklifts.
By 1991 the equipment inventory of the Terminal included:
-5 gantry cranes
m 2 Paceco Vickers installed 1972
% 2 " Dominion Bridge 1982
* 1 Post Panamax 1991
- 1 140ton mobile crane
- 12 medium span rubber tyred gantries
- IB Valmet straddle carriers
- 16 Tractor heads
- 54 chassis
- 1 30 ton Kalmar Forklift and an assortment 
of smaller forklifts
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- 72 receptacles for integral reefer units
- 16 reefer towers (accommodate 64 containers)
- 30 clip on units.
It is important to note the ages of the gantry cranes. 
The two Vickers which were installed in 1772 are now over 18 
years old and as far as shipping technology is concerned, 
their inability to efficiently service the present generation 
of vessels calling at the Terminal have rendered them more or 
less obsolete. Thus as will be later discussed, the problem 
of frequent breakdown and thus replacement options are 
presently being considered by the Terminal’s management. 
Recently, there has been a move to phase out the Tractor- 
trailer relay system in favour of the straddle carrier direct 
system to take advantage of a more speedier quay transfer 
possibilities and less space requirements afforded by the 
latter system. However, some problems are being experienced 
since the question of the age of the gantries and thus 'air 
height’ and clearance needed to ensure a safe operation. 
Consideration is being given to the installation of sensors 
on the cranes.
Constrained by depth of the channel leading to the 
harbour, the maximum allowed draft is 39’. Total Terminal 
area is approximately 37 hectares, of which there is over 
6,500 TEL) used for container stacking.
Other facilities provided directly by the Terminal 
include transhipment cargo reconsolidation utilizing its two 
Container Freight Stations (CFS). Vessel storage planning 
using the Terminal Information Control System (TICS) which is 
an online system providing up-to-the minute information on 
container movements in and out of the Terminal. This facility 
is provided to the shipping lines as part of the general 
service and as such attracts no direct cost to the users. 
Indirect port facilities (ancilliary) include a network of
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Agents along the entire water -Front, bunkering -Facilities, 
cold storage, hauglage companies, brokers, container repair 
-Facilities, warehousing and various banking institutions.
4.4.2 LABOUR
KTQ currently employs about IBO workers allocated with 
varying densities among the departments. The operations, CFS 
and maintenance departments will on average be accountable -For 
about BO’/. o-F the total sta-Ff. None o-F the Terminal’s 
employees are engaged in stevedoring activities. Instead, 
this -Function is subcontracted to a stevedoring company — 
Terminal Services Limited (TSL) — which in turn -Furnishes them 
from a 'Port Worker’ labour pool maintained by the BAJ, while 
itself supplying the supervisory personnel. KTO’s staff are 
used as far as direct ship operations are concerned, in 
longshore activities, that is, the location and carriage of 
containers to and from stacking area to guay apron.
Thus, working a vessel will essentially involve labour 
from three separate organisations: KTO, TSL and SAJ. Set out 
below is the typical gang strength required to work 'a Lift-On
Lift-Off (LO-LO) vessel:
TSL: 1 Supercargo - assigned to ship
1 Time keeper 
1 Dispatcher
1 Foreman
SAJ: 2 Operators (crane)
2 Signalmen
13 Lashers 
1 Bearsman 
1 Waterman 
4 Oangwaymen
- assigned to ship
24
53
The above mentioned are in turn supervised by a KTO team 
comprisi ng;
1 Asst. Operations Manager - assigned to Terminal
1 Stowage coordinator - " " Ship
2 Stack clerks - " " Ship
2 Tally clerks
2 Karrili-Ft Operators
The orders for gangs are placed by KTO's operations department 
which is in direct contact with the Shipping Agents. A 
typical gang strength (excluding supervisors and those 
assigned to the vessel or Terminal) constitutes 27 men. This 
is considered large and seem to suggest that the Terminal is 
not accruing the benefits of reduced demand for labour 
afforded by mechanization.
A very important point which emerges is that KTO is not
directly responsible for the recru-itment and training of those
persons who directly affect its ability to perform as crucial
a service as vessel operations efficiently, and therefore
respond to the needs of carriers for fast turnaround of
vessels. Thus even with the most meticulous planning and 
terminal arrangement, the desired increase in productivity is
not always attainable. As will be discussed in more detail
later on, the Terminal is plagued with low productivity and
more recently, increasing labour unrest which is seriously
affecting its credibility as a reliable and efficient port in
the shipping community.
4.4.3 OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE
To carry out its function KTO is divided into six (6) 
departments. Viz; Administration, Accounts,
Operation/Planning, Maintenance, CFS and Data departments.
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A D M IN IS TR A TIO N : It may be said that the this department
carries out all the non—technical -functions o-F the Terminal. 
Based on these activities it can be further divided into the 
'Executive' Admininstration and Personnel. The former is 
headed by the Managing Director with whom the major policy 
decisions rest. Under his office and in association with the 
General Manager and Deputy General Manager, the public 
relations function of the Terminal is carr.ied out. These 
three also comprise the major link between the PAJ and KTD and 
usually participate in port promotional tours. The Personnel 
Department is run by a Personnel Manager and carries out a 
wide range of functions traditional to personnel departments, 
ranging from manpower recruitment to administration of the 
employee health scheme.
ACCOUNTS: Headed by the Accountant/Dffice
Manager/Financial Controller, this department has a wide range 
of functions. As such, certain functional sub-departments 
headed by their respective surpervisors are evident. Namely, 
Accounts Receivable, Accounts Payable, Administration, 
Payroll, Statistics, Inventory and Dispatch. The Acccounts 
department’s function is vital to the organization as it is 
from the comprehensive records kept that information is 
available for revenue collection and management control. It 
was not surprising therefore that not only did the Terminal 
computerisation process begin in this department but it was 
responsible for the actual spearheading of the port 
computerisation process. The Administrative section of this 
department is responsible for, among other things, the’
generation of the monthly accounts of the Terminal and 
accompanying reports, cash flow management, budget preparation 
and Tariff review computations. The Accounts department, 
because of its various functions therefore represents the 
nucleus of the Terminal’s information system.
The . activities of the operations 
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OPERATIONS/PLANNINB:
department may broadly be divided into two areas: those
activities related to ship operations and those to the 
receiving and delivering -functions. On this basis, the 
operations department, headed by 2 Operations managers, is 
divided into sub departments under the direct control o-f 
individual Assistant Operations Managers (AOMs).
Ship Operations; This involves vessel preplanning, 
ordering o-f stevedores, and during the actual vessel working, 
the location and carriage o-f containers to and -from ship's 
si de.
Receiving & Delivering; The two sub departments
concerned are responsible -for the receival and delivery o-f FCL 
containers -from and to consignees. It is the -function of the 
Equipment Control department to verify the necessary- 
documentat ion prior to releasing or accepting the containers. 
The deliveries department is responsible for the mounting and 
grounding of containers leaving or entering the Terminal and 
which are not to remain on chasses. Of course this is 
normally done on the advice of Shipping Agents.
The foregoing activities are carried out with some degree 
of efficiency by the use of computerised container tracking 
system and 2-way UHF radios and more recently portable 
terminal, enabling efficient communication and the rapid 
storage and retrieval of containers as well as vessel storage 
planning.
Df>TA PROCESSING DEPARTMENT'. The Data Department is 
responsible for the computerisation of port functions. It 
grew out of the Accounts Department where the computerisation 
process was started and received departmental status in 
1988/89. To date it has achieved a high degree o,f
computerisation in all aspects of port activities with the 
priority areas of accounts and Operations being fully
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computerised.
It employs the strategy of developing inhouse programmers 
and utilizes two computer systems which operate in parallel. 
The first and oldest is the IBM System 38 which is housed in 
the central port computer facility for the entire port of 
Kingston (Port Computer Services Ltd). On this system resides 
the TICS system developed by HTDATA, Gothenburg, Sweden, and 
modified by local programmers to fit the Terminal’s needs. 
Software for the payroll department and in general the 
Terminal’s accounting system is also housed on the IBM 38.
As just mentioned this system belongs to PCS, and the Terminal 
(along with all other port users) is charged for the use of 
the service on a real time basis, and where applicable, for 
programming services. This arrangement was made at the 
beginning of the computerisation process (early 80’s) when 
neither the volume of traffic nor the inhouse expertise was 
available at the Terminal to justify the investment in its 
own computer facility on an economical basis. However, today, 
the Terminal could justify having its own system and as will 
be discussed later there may exist a case for the Terminal 
management to actually opt for this.
Whilst the first system is a portwide network system and 
thus affords the interchange of information /data between the 
port and agents, the second system - Xenix 3B6 - is an inhouse 
network system which contains spreadsheets and various other 
management information softwares.
CFS AND MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENTS’. The CFS department 
carries out those functions typical of container freight 
stations. That is, the consolidation and deconsolidation of 
cargo into/out of containers. Although this function is 
performed primarily on domestic cargo, it is also carried out 
on transhipment cargo. The Maintenance department in addition
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to being responsible for the maintenance of the Terminal’s 
equipment, for which purpose it is staffed with engineers, 
electricians, mechanics and so on, is the depository for the 
Terminal’s spare parts inventory, which as mentioned above, is 
administered by the Accounts Department.
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C H A R X E R  5
ANALYSIS OF KTO'S PERFORMANCE
The UNCTAD publication on Port Per-formance Indicators  ^
highlights two broad categories o-F performance indicators; 
those which answer the question of revenue versus cost 
performance (Financial Indicators) and those which measure 
output and productivity at the Terminal, (Operational 
Indicators). In this chapter, an analysis of KTO’s
performance to date is undertaken based on available 
statistics and an attempt will be made to highlight the 
problems faced. However, recommendations for possible
solutions will be deferred to the final chapter in this 
dissertation, since from the view point of the Author, 
solutions require an integrated approach encompassing all the 
various terminal subsystems and not a piecemeal approach.
Applying the important measures of cargo handling 
performance postulated by G. De Nonie =, the framework of 
this chapter will look at the Terminal’s performance in terms 
of:
a) Output
b) Service
c) Utilization
d) Productivity
and to complete the picture, the trend in Terminal tariffs 
will be briefly analysed, the intention being to highlight the 
possbile impact of all the above on the level of tarrifs. It
 ^ TD/B/C.4/131/Supp.1/Rev.1
Basic Principles of Berth Operations (Ship-to-Shore Iper, Lb Havre. Page 8.
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system).
will be readily appreciated that the four indicators listed 
above are necessarily inter—related and the arguments for one 
or the other will tend to overlap.
An evaluation of OUTPUT entails not only the quantity of 
work done in a particular period of time (throughput), but 
also embraces an analysis of the quality of cargo handling 
operation as manifested by such measures as moves per ship 
working hour at berth and in port, and gang or crane output 
per hour. SERVICE quality tends also to be measured by
ship’s time in port (turnaround) and moves per gang hour. 
Therefore, to prevent repetition, these two will be dealt 
with together. PRODUCTIVITY will be analyzed separately, 
while the degree of UTILIZATION will be mentioned where 
appropriate.
5.1 OUTPUT & SERVICE PERFORMANCE
5.1.1 THROUGHPUT
In accordance with the country’s advantageous 
geographical location relative to the trunk line shipping 
routes, and her proximity to the Panama Canal mentioned in the 
previous chapter, KTO targeted, as potential users of its 
transhipment facility, the following services: ^
1. Far East to US Gulf & East Coasts
2. US West Coast to Europe
3. US East & Gulf Coasts to Oceania
4. Europe to West Coast South America
5. Europe to East Zc Gulf Coast of North America
6 . Eurpoe to Central America and Caribbean
7. US to Caribbean & Central America
=*Kingston Port Development Study, 1985. Pages V-1 to V-
18.
60
Obviously, the potential traffic from each service is 
related to the degree of economic activity of the regions 
concerned. Thus given the burgeoning economic activity in 
Asia and the resultant increase in trade between her and both 
the developing and developed world, trade with the Far East 
and between the US Gulf and East Coasts presented by far the 
largest transhipment possibilities for Kingston.
The Terminal’s marketing efforts were therefore directed 
primarily at the operators of these services. This strategy 
was largely successful as the Terminal managed at a relatively 
early stage to secure some of the largest operators on the 
route such as ZIM and Evergreen Lines, which used Kingston as 
their only direct mainline port of call in the Caribbean; Zim 
on its service between the Far East and Europe/Meditarranean 
and Evergreen in its Round-The-Wor1d(RTW) service. SeaLand, 
another major operator used Kingston as a distribution hub for 
regional cargo.
Appendix 5.1, shows throughput at the Terminal for 11 
years (1980—1990). As depicted in figure 5.1 below, container 
throughput experienced moderate fluctuations for the period 
1980-1984 (average 5'/.) but enjoyed explosive growth for the 
ensuing three years (rates of up to 54*/.) before suffering a 
rather rapid decline (average 14%) to the 1990 recording of 
88,113 - below the 1980 level of 95,273 !
It will also be observed that domestic throughput over 
the period remained relatively stable, recording no dramatic 
increases, except between 1987 and 1989 before declining in 
the final year. This is basically a reflection of the state 
of the Jamaican economy for which very limited growth rates 
(average 2%) were recorded. The ’boom’ in 1988 can be 
attributed to the influx of relief and reconstruction cargoes 
following the 1988 hurricane. Thus the norm in terms of
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domestic tra.-f-Fic is relative stability.
A look at -figure 5.2 detailing the distribution of 
transhipment containers on a per line basis offers some 
answers to the overall erratic performace observed. In 1980 
SeaLand accounted for over 78*/. of the transhipment traffic 
handled at the Terminal. It was already mentioned that 
Kingston was of value to SeaLand as a distribution centre for 
regional cargo. However, in the mid 80s the line transferred 
its Caribbean distribution hub from Kingston to San Juan, 
Puerto Rico (where it has leased its own Terminal) as the 
latter was regarded as being more strategically located 
geographically to merge the Line’s several services within 
the Caribbean Basin Thus by 1987 there was no
transhipment activity from this line.
The Terminal however, managed to stem the tide of 
decreasing transhipment traffic by securing Evergreen's use of 
its facilities in its RTW service. Thus the remarkable levels 
of growth experienced. Again it will be noted that three 
years after calling at the Terminal, Evergreen was responsible 
for roughly 78*/. of total transhipment activity. Whether it 
was the nuisance of having its ships seized and fined (later 
mitigated) by the US Customs for illicit narcotics or the 
inefficiency of Terminal operations that led to the line 
withdrawing its transhipment business at the port (the line 
still calls for domestic traffic), the effect is the downward 
trend in container throughput observed. The point here is 
that KTO has successively found itself in a position wherein 
it relies on a single carrier (or a limited number) for the 
bulk of its business and thus the loss of their patronage tend 
to have a disproportionate impact on the Terminal’s traffic, 
revenue and ultimately its profitability.
'^Kingston Port Development Study, 1985. Page IV-12
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The only stabilizing presence (in terms o-F volume 
handled) has .been the ZIM Israeli Line which while exhibiting 
comparatively modest growth (average IT/.) has nevertheless 
done so on a sustained level and is now, by virtue of default, 
the port’s major carrier.
The question arises as to why Kingston has found herself 
in a position of relying heavily on a limited number of 
carriers which subject to their whims and fancies, results in 
unstable throughput performance, and conversely, why hasn't 
KTO sought to widen its base of users and so prevent such a 
situation? The rather obvious answer is that it has become 
increasingly difficult for the port to attract new/major 
operators due to:
1. The impact of the US landbridge
2. Increased intef port competition, and,
3. Inadequate port facility ~ or rather poor 
timing of investment .
Impact of the US landbridge
Initiated by American President Lines(APL), the use of 
rail to transport containerised cargo between the Pacific and 
Atlantic Oceans has gained popularity among other vessel 
operators. This is because sending the cargo by rail between 
the US East and West Coasts saves upwards of 7 days ® and 
thus reduce costs and required fleet size, in comparison with 
the all-water route via the Panama Canal. This increased 
usage of landbridge is highlighted by the fact that of the top 
20 carriers in terms of TEU capacity (shown in the table 5.1) 
only five (25*/.) do not employ the use of the US land bridges 
in their services. If the fact that two of these ’non-users’
Structural Changes in Ocean Liner Transport: ProspectsS( Implications for Policy Formulation. UN Economic Commission For Latin America & the Caribbean, 1987. Page 16.
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(Scandutch and SNCDV) have no service which would necessitate 
the use o-f either the landbridge or the Panama Canal is 
considered, then the percentage of these mega carriers which 
have so far opted for the use of the bridge service jumps to 
over BOY,.
TABLE 5.1Top 20 Carriers in terms of TEU capacity as at March 25, 1990.
1 — 1 in 1
1 1 No. of 1 CAPACITY PANAMA! U8 !1I. 11 Ships 1 (TEU) 1 CANAL 1LANDBRIDGE! _ 1__ 1
1 EVERGREEN [ 67 i 130,916 X ! X !1 SEALAND I 63 I 115,367 X 11 MAERSK 1 53 1 94,703 — 1 X !1 NYK 1 56 1 78,148 - 1 X !1 MDL 1 55 1 70,334 - 1 X !1 APL 1 35 1 66,380 - ! X !1 OOCL 1 30 1 58,117 - 1 X !1 K-LINE 1 35 1 55,462 - 1 X !1 COSCC SHANGI 55 1 54,505 - 1 X !1 HAPAG-LLOYDI 32 1 53,178 » 1 X !1 HANJIN 1 25 1 49,621 - 1 X !1 P&O CDNTS. 1 26 1 49,368 . I X 11 YANBMING | 20 1 46,817 - 1 X !1 ZIM 1 46 1 44,817 X ! 11 NEDLLDYD 1 42 1 40,335 X !1 BSC 1 59 1 36,760 - 1 11 NOL 1 • IS 1 35,294 — j X !1 SCANDUTCH | 20 1 32,948 — 1 I
1 SNCDV 1 40 1 31,204 — 1 — 1
1JU CGM 1 27 1 29,040 1 X !.1 , 1_________ 1
SOURCES; 1. Containerisation International, June, 1990 
Top 20 Carriers Consolidate, pages 46-50 
2. Containerisation International Year book 1991
Another consequence of the increased landbridge usage is the 
removal of restriction re vessel size which was formerly 
dictated by the limits of the Panama Canal. Thus ships with 
capacity in excess of 3,000 TEU are gaining in popularity and 
it is significant that over 96% of such existing vessels 
belong to these operators ^ and this could further explain
Containerisation International.
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June, 1990.
the preference for landbridge usage. What this means as far 
as KTO is concerned however, is that a new approach to the 
marketing of the Terminal will be required, since the 
available business based on the port’s proximity to the Canal 
is no longer a decisive advantage and there are precious few 
mega carriers still utilizing the Canal service to get from 
the one ocean to the next.
Increased Port Competition
Although the unit of measure in table 5.2 below is not 
uniform among the ports being reviewed, the trend is 
nevertheless obvious. While port activity at the Terminal has 
suffered a decline over the 1988/89 period (and up to the 
present) the trend among her major competitors has been that 
of steadily ' increased traffic - with the exception of 
Cristobal which dipped from 128,000 TED in 1987 to 82,000 TEUs 
in 1988 (most likely due to the political crisis at the time), 
but has managed to stage a recovery in 1989.
TABLE 5.2
Containers handled at selected ports
1 '' ' .........IPDRTI
T—
11
119S5 1 1
........... I""*19S6 1 1 19S7 1 1
1...19SS 1 1 19S9
“I
1 KINGSTON 1 12S,816i 157,613i 159,223i lll,699i 91,5751 CRISTOBAL* 1 77,3011 102,7511 12S,5S2| S2,44 1 102,702ISAN JUAN* 1 940,4041 972,76611 ,107,77011 ,2S9,0011 1,334,053ILIMON-MON 1 53,OSS! 60,6S3| 67,1751 S7,27S| N/AIMIAMI*1__________ I 229,6141 ________ L. 219,52411 223,6961 ________l_ 273,0771 ________1_ 337,961
* Reported in TEUs not containers.
Source: Extracted from Bremen Institute of Statistics 1990
It may be said that each of these ports, to varying 
degrees, are also well located to carry out a transhipment 
function. The argument also exists that Kingston has lost her 
competitive edge due to the proliferation of ports in the 
Caribbean now equipped to accommodate larger vessles, whereas
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as recent as 1985 Kingston was the only port with su-F-ficient 
dra-Ft to accommodate the larger mainline vessels. However, 
there is strong evidence pointing to the -Fact that competition 
is now, and will continue in the -Future to be, not so much 
•From other Caribbean and 6ul-F ports but from an entirely new 
range of ports, that is those on the West Coast of North 
America.
This is particularly evident when it is borne in mind 
that Kingston’s major transhipment business stemmed from cargo 
which originated in the Far East and destined for the 
Caribbean and this, based on the discussion above, has
largely been siphoned off by the rail services operating 
between both coasts of North America.
Port facility and timing of investment
As hinted at earlier, the loss of Evergreen's 80,000 
transhipment moves per annum was purportedly a result of the 
rather costly inconvenience of having the Line’s ships seized 
and fined by the US Customs, following the discovery of 
illicit drugs in containers originating from Kingston.
However, based on discussions with a former associate of that 
company it would seem that the finding of drugs onboard
the vessel was merely the proverbial 'last straw’ - a 
culmination of the general dissatisfaction with the level of 
service and perceived commitment of the Terminal’s management 
as manifested by the slow development of facilities.
This dissatisfaction may have had its origins not only in
■^Kingston Port Development Study, 1985. Table IV-5, page 
IV-21.
® Prof. E. Frankel was responsible for designing 
Evergreen’s feedering network in the Caribbean and had 
occasion to visit Kingston. The Author held discussions with 
him when he came to WMU in May, 1991 as a visiting professor.
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the relatively low productivity levels ( to be discussed later 
on) but in the severe congestion experienced at the Terminal 
during the 1986/87 period when Evergreen's activities were at 
a peak. The situation occurred where containers were being 
stacked on every available pocket o-f space, which obviously 
played havoc with their eTTecient retrieval and thus impacted 
negatively on vessel productivity, translating into high 
operating costs to the carrier. On a RTW service, a delay by 
a vessel resulting in missed Canal appointment, is even more 
costly than -for other services, since each ship and leg is 
dependent on the other to ensure a high degree of cargo and 
route linkages.
The rapid throughput growth experienced at the Terminal 
no doubt would present difficulties for management to remedy 
in terms of stacking space in the short term. However, the 
fact that space for redevelopment was earmarked in the 
Terminal's longterm development plan meant that it should have 
been far easier for the Terminal to respond to this increased 
demand. This was however not the case. After innumerable 
petitions by the Terminal’s management to the PAJ (who it will 
be recalled from chapter 4 has sole rights and responsibi1ty 
for Terminal development) work was finally started on a new 
area and completed in 1989. By this time however. Evergreen 
had already withdrawn its transhipment business from Kingston, 
not favour^ing any other Caribbean ports, but instead using the 
land bridge service for its eastbound service, using Kingston 
as a feeder port though making direct mainline calls on its 
westbound service before proceeding through the Panama Canal.
Thus with the now completed transit area the Terminal has 
found itself swinging form a position of congestion to one of 
underutilization.
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5.1.2 SERVICE
According to the UNCTAD Monograph on Port Management 
port per-Formance should best be assessed -For each area 0 "F 
activity. The major ones being:
(i) ship operations 
<ii) cargo operations, and 
(iii) inland transport.
Since the interest o-F this paper concerns the transhipment 
activities o-F the Terminal and Jamaica is an island, no 
assessment of the performance of the Terminal re its inland 
transport (receiving and delivery) function will be made.
The most important indicator of the quality of ship’s 
operations in port, is the duration of their stay (Turnaround 
time). It was mentioned in chapter 4 that the PAJ retains the 
responsibility for such services as pilotage and towage. Thus 
it has direct control over the time it takes the ship to reach 
berth following its arrival at the pilotage station. That is, 
phases 1-4 and 7-8 of the diagram displayed in figure 5.3. 
KTO’s control is therefore at the point when the ship is at 
berth. An analysis of the number of hours ships spent
alongside for the period 1988-1970 are presented in Appendix 
5.2. This can, in the absence of further data, effectively be 
regarded as the vessel service time of the Terminal, even 
though it is more probable that service was completed before 
this time, but ship was awaiting outbound pilotage. Thus each 
vessel spends on average, roughly 9.8 to 11.8 hours alongside.
Based on PAJ statistics, for the final quarter in 1989 
(see Appendix 5.3) vessel turnaround time averaged .56 of a 
day or nearly 14 hours. Assuming their definition of 
turnaround time takes into consideration both waiting and
Measuring & Evaluating Port Performance & 
Productivity, by G. De Monie. UNCTAD/SHIP/494(6), 1987.Para. 5.
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SBrvice time, then estimated waiting time -For the vessel is 
about 3.7 hours or 38% o-F service time. Given that the 
optimal berth occupancy is one that gives a waiting to service 
time ratio o-F between 20—30% then the estimated waiting
time -For vessels would seem to indicate some degree o-F 
congestion. However, based again on PAJ statistics -For the 
same period, we are given a berth occupancy averaging 28.16% 
which, -For a 4 berth system entails <assuming random arrival) 
an almost zero waiting time. It is there-Fore logical to 
conclude, based on these -Figures, that the waiting experienced 
by ships in receiving a berth is not a result of berth 
unavailability but rather delays in the provision of the other 
port services such as pilotage or towage, which are
compulsory. Although the figures are not available to enable 
an analysis of the waiting time for say pilots, suffice it to 
say that if the prime concern of the Terminal’s management is 
to reduce port cost to its carriers, implying primarily 
reduced turnaround time, then it must seek to influence the 
various organizations in the port which affect the ship's time 
in port.
The most popular and controversial measure of the level 
of service to port users, is the moves per gang or crane 
hours. This is because it indicates the performance of 
labour/equipment which has a direct bearing on the total 
vessel service time. A look at KTD's productivity report
for the period 1.01.90 to 28.02.91 for its major transhipment 
carrier reveals that gross moves per crane hour (or gang hour) 
averages just around 13 moves (see Appendix 5.4), or more 
importantly, in only 69.5% of the time can Zim expect a 
performance rate in excess of 13 moves per hour of operation, 
and only 2% of the time can the Terminal expect to achieve its 
standard performance level of 20 moves per hour, depicted in 
figure 5.4. Therefore, if as the statistics indicate, there
Port Development; A Handbook developing countries.
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i nfor planners
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION '
f ig u r e  5 .5
SCATTER PLOT OF PRODUCTIVITY
VESSEL SIZE: ZIM (2.1.90 -  26.2.91)
Source: KTO Productivity Report for period 1.1.90 to 28.2.91
is only a buccbbb rate of 2%, then an analysis of the reasons 
for the divergence between targeted and achieved performance 
levels is essential.
In evaluating a port’s performance it is important to 
look at the various factors which may have contributed to the 
observed level of productivity. The relevant 1 iterature’-^ 
suggests the following:
(i) Ship size & type(ii) Total containers discharged/loaded per vessel 
call(iii) Weather conditions(iv) Port of call sequence in a given range
(v) Balance or lack of balance between the 
various terminal subsystems
(vi) Motivation S< quality of container Terminal 
personnel<vii) Number, type & capacity of cranes employed on 
a vessel(viii) Stowage position in, 8< distribution over the 
bays of the vessel
(ix) Number of outsized containers(x) Lashing systems utilized for on-deck containers(xi) proportion of import/export/transshipment/transit 
conta i ners.
The factors which influence productivity of the ship 
operations are therefore primarily (a) ship related and (b) 
port related.
Ship related factors
Further analysis of the productivity levels for the 
various vessels of call for Zim Line are as presented below:
UNCTAD Monographs on Port Management 6 - "Measuring & 
Evaluating Port Performance"
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TABLE 5.3
VESSEL
NAME
SIZEI 
(TEU)1 1
YEAR 1 BUILTl
ROUTE
DEPLOYED
AV GROSS 
PROD./HR
J--------------
IZIM Haifa 1,721 i 1972 i MED/EC-WCNA/FE 9.4Caribe II 377 1 1983 1 Carib. Feeder 13.0
Montreal 1,746 1 1973 I Med/EC-WCNA/FE 10.6
Ki ngstoniI 431 1 1979 1 Carib Feeder 11.6
Genoa 1,721 1 1972 1 Med/EC-WCNA/FE 10. 1
Keelung 2,224 1 1981 1 n M M 10.8
Savannah 2,224 1 1981 1 10.1
Hong Kong 1,746 1 1973 1 I I  I I  I I 10.3
New York 1,721 1 1972 1 I I  I I  I I 10.6
Iberia 2,224 1 1982 1 I I  I I  I I 11.2
Tokyo 1,721 1 1972 1 I t  I I  I I 10.5
Pusan 2,462 1 1981 1 I I  I I  I I 12.2California 1,721 1 1971 1 I I  I I  I I 9.9
Livorno 2,588 1 1976JB11 I I  I I  I I 11.0
Amer i ca 1 8.7Ki ngston3 1 14.3
Canada 3,039 1 1990 1 12.3
Sources: 1) 
2 )
KTO’s Productivity Containerisation I
Report 1.01.90 - 
nternational Year
28.02.91 
book 1990.
All the above listed vessels are of the Fully Cellular 
type except the Zlm Caribe II which is Semi Cellular. From 
the Scatter Plot diagram in figure 5.5, it will be observed 
that vessels of similar sizes tend to record similar 
productivity levels. It will also be seen that productivity 
for smaller vessels such as the Caribell are higher than that 
for the mainliners. This may be explained by the fact that as 
far as the smaller feeder vessels are concerned Kingston is 
the first or last port of call in their itinerary, thus 
facilitating easier and quicker loading/discharging
operations, while as far as the mainline vessels are
concerned, the Port represents the middle port in the range 
(say the 10th) from the Mediterranean/East Coast/West Coast 
North America/Far East. Thus, high levels of restows are 
evident regarding the mainline vessels with the complete 
absence of any for the feeders.
The average of 10 to 11 gross
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moves per hour on mainline
vessels is quite below average and considering that these are 
the more expensive ships (on a daily running cost basis), it 
is important to look at the possible factors which affect 
their level of productivity.
It becomes apparent • that these are primarily old ships 
(first and second generation) with over 50*/. of them having 
been built in the 1970s. The result is a poorer level of 
functional performance on areas such as hatch coamings and 
lashing gears. Thus a significant percentage of the delays 
recorded are attributable to the ship. The definition of 
ship’s delay embraces dead gang hours (idle labour awaiting 
vessel’s arrival) as well as delays caused during the opening 
of bays, lashing etc. Popular figures for these ship related 
delays run between 8-12 hours. While this is in no way 
conclusive evidence since it would be necessary to know 
exactly how many of the hours stated are attributable to 
defects in the vessel’s gears, the argument is however
strengthened when the following is considered: The feeder
ship Zim Kingston II was built in 1979 and averaged 11.6 moves 
/hour as against the other feeder Caribell built in 1983 which 
returns 13 moves/hour. In 1991 the Kingston II was replaced 
by the Kingston III, a newer ship and immediately productivity 
jumps to 14.3 moves per hour.
While the argument for the correlation between
productivity levels and age of vessels is no doubt valid, it 
is somewhat complicated by a look at productivity figures for 
Evergreen (E/G) line (over the same period) which has 
substantially modern vessels, reveals a very low average of 
just over 11 moves with the modal being roughly 12-13 moves. 
Here again, it must be pointed out that the report being 
analysed indicates that of the 339 total hours delays incurred 
in E/G’s 45 vessel calls, over bT.'/, was attributable to the 
ship. In order then to have an unbiased view of the
Terminal’s productivity levels, it is essential to take out
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the impact o-F ship’s delay, the new level would then re-Flect 
the actual terminal per-formance.
Ideally, it would have been more profitable to be able to 
deduct only the hours lost awaiting a vessel’s arrival, since 
delays caused in unlashing and so on, while not being under 
the strict domain of the Terminal, are indeed operational 
delays and should be reflected in the productivity figures.
Further, information on the time the vessel spends 
awaiting pilots, tugs etc should be added to the dead gang 
hours since such delays are the fault of the port if not 
exactly that of the Terminal. However, although these 
refinements are not available in the data at hand, a clearer 
picture of the Terminal’s performance is possible, by 
deducting the delay figures given as being attributable to the 
ship. The probability distribution depicted in figure 5.6, 
shows that nearly 90*/. of the time E/6 can expect a handling 
rate of 20 moves/hour with the average being about 16 moves - 
certainly an improved picture if not exactly the level 
required.
Terminal related factors
Regarding the factors pinpointed above as having a 
possible impact on productivity, the Terminal has little or no 
control. What the Terminal can and does have control over is 
the performance level of its equipment, the balance between 
the various Terminal subsystems and can certainly influence 
labour productivity.
Equipment Performance
A high degree of equipment performance assumes minimal
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downtime during operations and this in turn implies certain 
preconditions, such as an effective preventative maintenance 
programme, skilled engineering staff and availability of spare 
parts on a timely basis. The Terminal retains a highly
skilled and knowledgeable maintenance staff and a team of 
these engineers are at the Terminal on a round the clock 
basis. There is also a preventive maintenace programme in 
place.
It is found however, that the degree of success 
attainable by this team is very much dependent on, or affected 
by (a) the lack of spare parts and (b) the age of the ship to 
shore gantries. By the latter it is meant that the
maintenance of these cranes, due to their limited number, 
tends to be carried out when they are free rather than when it 
is scheduled. This is of course understandable, but added to 
the fact that the machines are, as far as the ships calling at 
the port are concerned, technologically obsolete (inability to 
handle safely vessels with 5 high containers on deck), their 
substantial ages and thus the performance condition, dictates 
that a higher degree of maintenance is necessary to retain 
historic performance. During the 13 months examined, 26"/i of 
the delays reported on the productivity report were 
attributable to Gantry failure. The fact that these cranes 
experienced reduced utilization (a result of reduced terminal 
throughput) and thus should have more time for maintenance, 
would seem to indicate that it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for the repair team to keep them in operational 
condition.
In contrast to the performance of cranes, less than 8'/. of 
the operational delays were caused by breakdown of yard 
equipment such as straddle carriers'. This is because these 
are not only largely new, but are available in enough 
quantities to enable rapid substitution in the event of a 
breakdown. This brings home the importance of the existence
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o-F some degree of excess capacity or slack in the system. To 
be more explicit, the Terminal’s fleet of gantries falls way 
behind the recommended minimum. Given that 2 gantries are 
needed for a single berth or on average 1.5 cranes per berth 
for multi—berth terminals it means for KTD’s four berths
the recommended fleet size is a minimum of 6 cranes. KTO up 
until 1991 had only 4 cranes, averaging 1 per berth. What 
this means is that at no time can the berths be fully occupied 
with any ship working more than one gang per ship. Given that 
its a transhipment terminal, we should not only expect vessels 
of a relatively large size, but in addition ensure them the 
rapid turnaround they need to remain competitive. This
implies the availability of at least 2 cranes per ship.
The Terminal is considering extending its berthing 
facilities by an extra berth but has recently only acquired a 
single new crane, bringing the fleet up to 5. But 5 berths 
will dictate at least some 7 cranes. It is very important 
that the Terminal plans its development, not on an ad hoc 
basis but taking into consideration the various elements which 
make up the system - that is develop a model of the optimum 
number/capacity required for each subsystem to reduce
bottlenecks and improve turnaround time.
Other factors affecting the ability of the Terminal to 
produce a high level of service includes the layout of the 
stacking area and the degree of illumination of the Terminal 
at nights. In the case of the former, a few years previously 
this was not carried out as would have been desired by the 
operations team due to shortage of stacking areas coinciding 
with surge in terminal traffic, and, as already been stated 
severe congestion ensued which rendered any attempt at an 
organized yard layout futile. This' problem has largely been 
solved by the reduction in traffic, but more importantly by
Improving Port Performance 
Development. UNCTAD S< SIDA Project.
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the paving o-F additional area to bring the total stacking 
area to 6500 TEU.
The problem o-F poor lighting has been one plaguing the 
Terminal -For several years. A use-Ful exercise would be to 
plot the varying levels o-F productivity against the shi-Fts so 
as to see precisely, the impact o-F illumination on 
productivity. Although one would normally expect lower levels 
•For the night shift as against day even with perfect lighting, 
the factor of poor lighting, in KTD’s case would undoubtedly 
reflect itself in the observations of low productivity (below 
13 moves) being recorded for the night shifts. Unfortunately, 
the relevant data are not readily available, but suffice to 
say that the Terminal’s managaement have long realised the 
possible impact of inadequate lighting on the Terminal’s 
performance and has been agitating for its upgrade. This area' 
of investment comes under the responsibility of the PAJ. 
Work on this started in 1990 and it is hoped will be completed 
in 1991.
Another nagging problem suffered by the Terminal is that 
of its surface condition. There seem to be the constant need 
for repaving and remarking of the box slots. This undoutedly 
has its effect on costs, service quality and the necessary 
maintenance level required for the yard equipment.
5.2 PRODUCTIVITY
The basic concept of productivity seeks to establish a 
relationship between quantity and quality of goods or services 
produced against the quantity of resources used in their 
production. The main indicator of improving productivity 
being a decreasing ratio of input to output at constant
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As a continuationquality  ^= .  in the analysis o-f KTO’s 
per-FoKnianee, this section will be concet^ned, -firstly, with the 
trend in Terminal costs and the various factors impacting to 
produce the observed levels, and secondly, productivity of 
both labour and equipment and the impact of these on Terminal 
costs. It is expected that from these analyses and
suggested reasons, a clear picture will emerge which will 
indicate the measures which need to be taken to reduce costs 
and improve productivity. .
If figure 5.1 showing trend in container throughput at 
the Terminal is taken in conjunction with figure 5.7 showing 
trend in total cost, it is immediately evident that while 
throughput experienced differing degrees of fluctuation, costs 
were for the main, constantly rising. Also, the period of 
most intensive cost increases (19B4-1987) coincided with that 
of increased traffic, which on a global scale tends to imply a 
high degree of variable costs. However, the fact that 
plummeting traffic levels following the 1987 period recorded 
only a slight decrease in total costs before it reverted to 
the previous level, seems to suggest the opposite. It should 
be noted that for the peak year 1987 really represented 15 
months spending pro rated and presented for 12 months for 
comparative reasons. It is therefore conceivable that
1987’s 12 month approximation could be more within the range 
of say $55M and thus we would be faced with a constantly 
rising cost curve, further solidifying the impression of 
primarily fixed costs.
The breakdown of costs as displayed in figure 5.8 reveals 
that of the five elements comprising the total cost the one 
exhibiting the widest variation and one which is consistent
1=* Productivity Management - A Practical Handbook by 
Joseph Prokopenko. ILO, 1987. Page 5.
KTQ changed its financial year from Jan - Dec to 
Apr-Mar in 1987. Thus the Audit covered 15 months.
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exhibiting the widest variation and one which is consistent 
with the behaviour observed in total costs is the Direct 
Expense category. It represented the largest area o-F Terminal 
expenditure, standing at over J$23M in 1986 or 47/i o-F total 
cost.
The Direct Operating cost, as the term implies, 
represents all those costs incurred by the port in 't:he 
provision o-F its service to users and which would not have 
been incurred i-F there was no tra-F-Fic at the Terminal, that 
is, container handling costs. It there-Fore encompasses costs 
such as stevedoring, stripping & stuf-Fing o-F containers, 
mounting and grounding and repair and maintenance costs among 
others. As such this essentially represents variable costs 
and by de-Finition should vary with the level o-F Terminal 
activity. Variable costs (vc) seem only to be -Flexible 
upwards and recorded only a marginal decrease despite a 
substantial one in throughput. Thus the VC component o-F the 
Terminal’s costs may be said to have evolved overtime into 
-Fixed costs. The reasons -For this are manyfold, and can be 
partly attributed to constantly rising labour and equipment 
costs fuelled by high inflation and the basis of the 
stevedoring arrangement in effect with TSL.
In chapter 4 it was mentioned that stevedoring operations 
at the Terminal are carried out on a subcontract basis by TSL. 
It was also mentioned that the straddle carrier relay system 
was employed by the Terminal in the quay transfer operation. 
What was however not stated was that the leg of the quay
transfer involving movement from the apron to the stacking
area was also carried out by TSL with KTQ’s personnel being 
utilized in the actual stacking. It is not clear whether this
arrangement is union dictated. However, what is clear is
that KTD paid nearly J$7M in 1990 to TSL for this service.
This underlines the fact that substantial savings may be
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carrier direct system -For its quay trans-Fer operations, as 
this would eliminate the need to employ TSL labour and
trucks. Again, it is not quite clear .what the prevailing 
arrangements are -For work allocation on the Terminal as there 
exists some complex associations. For example, several o-F the 
a-Forementioned trucks used by TSL are actually owned by the 
PAJ and bought for use on the Terminal. One would therefore 
expect that these would represent equipment at the disposal of 
KTO in much the same way as the straddle carriers and cranes. 
KTO is however billed for their usage by TSL.
Before proceeding further, a brief description of the 
basis of stevedoring charges will be instructive. To repeat, 
TSL is contracted by the Terminal’s management to provide 
stevedoring labour which it in turn recruits (on a need basis) 
from a central labour pool run by the SAJ. The labour engaged 
by TSL from the SAJ are paid at the union negotiated rates. 
TSL itself provides the supervisory personnel for the 
stevedoring and switching operations. Therefore in the case 
of stevedoring, KTO's payment to TSL has to cover wages and 
fringe benefits of both these categories.
TSL bills KTO, based not on hourly basis, but at a fixed 
cost per box moved. In the case of stevedoring it is the cost 
per shift divided by the estimated number of moves per shift 
(20 per hour for Lo-Lo and 10 for Ro-Ro) The cost of
TSL supervisory personnel which represents a fixed annual cost 
is recouped by charging KTD a rate based on their total cost 
allocated over the estimated annual moves.
This charging practice is analogous to the Sliding-Scales 
method. According to the theory, the main advantage of
Internal Report on cost of services provided by KTO
. Port charging practices by B.J. Thomas, MaritimePolicy & Management 1978, vol.5 page 124
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this method is that "a productivity agreement is built into 
the contract based on the knowledge that as per-Formance 
measured in Cmoves/gang/hourl increases, so average total 
costs -Fall". Thus the rationale is that since revenue
received by the stevedoring company is based on box moves and 
not hours, while its costs (primarily labour) are incurred 
largely on a hourly basis, then by increasing the moves per 
hour (higher productivity), that much less stevedoring cost 
will be incurred by them -For a given revenue.
However, the system breaks down simply because the 
interests o-F the stevedoring company and that o-F the 
stevedores themselves are diammetrica1ly opposed: It is in
the interest of TSL to improve productivity but from a wage 
point of view not beneficial to the stevedores. This problem 
is a result of the fact that the labour institution and the- 
stevedoring company per se are separate entities and that 
stevedores are wage earners and not salaried employees. This 
of course explains the relatively stagnant levels of
productivity achieved by the Terminal to date — around 13 
moves per gross gang hours.
The Terminal's management to some extent attempted to 
protect itself against this low productivity level by building 
in the calculation of the stevedoring rate, a higher level of 
performance (20 moves per hour) thereby penalising TSL for non 
performance, and the intention being to create an incentive 
for improved performance. However, the degree to which this 
is actually effective is questionable. It is conceivable, 
even logical, that TSL, faced with this situation and knowing 
quite well the more probable performance level of the 
stevedores, would make allowance for this in their 
presentation of the overheads used in the calculation.
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1 7“ Ibid. 16
presentation o-f the overheads used in the calculation.
The present stevedoring arrangement offers certain 
benefits for the Terminal. The primary being, it avoids the 
carrying of stevedoring costs as overheads. This was
especially important during the formative years of the 
Terminal's life when keeping fixed costs to a minimum was 
important. Thus fluctuations in throughput would not result 
in surplus or shortage of .labour nor in the Terminal incurring 
huge losses. Maintenance of stevedoring labour as a variable 
cost was therefore important. This strategy has backfired, in 
that stevedoring costs are variable upwards but highly 
inflexible downwards and KTO may have to revise this strategy.
In addressing the question of productivity, it is 
essential to look at the efficiency of resource use, where 
efficiency is from a port standpoint synonymous with cost 
sffectiveness, usually measured as the cost per container 
handled. For the years between 1985 and 1990 cost per
container handled at the Terminal are as below:
TABLE 5.4
II------
I Direct
I Staff I Promotion 
I A dm i n.
IF i nance 
I PropertyI----------
ITotal (J$)
I----------------11ndex
I-------------
I1
1985
113.36
62.22
44.52
9.95
0.34
20.44
250.83
100
1986
144.58 
72.41 
52.54 
15. 13 
0.37 
22.10
307.13
122
1987/88 1988/89
188.02
108.85
73.34
34.90
0.37
29.16
261.IB 
178.13 
62.86 
55.70 
1.06 
60.35
434.13 619.28
173 247
Source: KTO Audited Accounts for Years 1985-1990.
' "I1989/901
283.351 
253.521 
61.141 
70.221 
1.781 
72.631------ 1
742.641
..^296 I
Basic Principles of Berth Operations, 
Iper, Le Havre, 1985. Page 19.
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G. De Monie.
From a cost standpoint it may be said that during this 
period the e-f-Ficiency o-f the terminal in terms o-F cost
e-F-Fectiveness worsened dramatically with cost per box displaying 
steep increases, re-Flecting in 1990 an almost 300% increase over 
the base year 1985.
5.3 IMPACT OF COSTS ON TARIFFS AND PROFITABILITY
Be-Fore remarking on’the impact o-F port per-Formance on the 
level O-F tari-Ff, a brie-F commentary on the structure and 
allocation o-F revenues is necessary. The allocation o-F the
various port costs incurred by the Terminal’s users is shown in 
Appendix 5.5. Except in the cases o-F wharfage (see discussion of 
the Agreement in chapter 4) and stripping and stuffing, KTD is 
not involved in the collection or billing for services which do 
not constitute a part of its revenue. Thus Harbour Fees, 
Pilotage, and Towage are contracted by carriers directly with the 
PAJ.
The general structure and content of the container tariffs 
is simple. Regarding the loading and discharging and quay 
transfer activity, a single rate is quoted for domestic and 
transhipment boxes respectively, regardless of box size. The 
rate for transhipment is a onp way rate, that is, discharge is 
billed separately from loading. The loading/discharging rate per 
box covers all activities from ship's side to transit area. Thus 
there is no separate contract between the stevedoring company and 
the carriers.
The flow diagram below summarizes the container handling 
charges associated with various stages of the handling process.
82
FIGURE 5.9
SHIP <--- > QUAY <->
LCL 
<-- > CFS
LQAD/DISCHARBE TRANSFER STORAGE
FCL
DELIVERY/
RECEIPT
1 < ■ HANDLING TARIFF
The PAJ regulates all tari-F-Fs used in the common user ports 
o-F the Island. In the case o-F the Container Terminal, these 
rates are reviewed biennually, jointly between KTO and PAJ. The 
approach taken in deriving the tariff may best be viewed as cost 
based: The annual costs for the coming two years are estimated
and then a form of sensitivity analysis is carried out, 
increasing the existing rates by various increments so as to 
ascertain the expected profit. Here due concern is given to
continued competivtiveness of the Terminal’s pricing. As with 
all terminals competing for transhipment, the Terminal’s tariff 
policy is one in which the domestic traffic subsidizes the 
transhipment. The degree of subsidy tends to hover around 65/.
According to the internal cost report carried out in 1990, 
the currrent cost of handling a box (including administrative 
overheads) exceeds the transhipment tariff. This is not
surprising as, as can be seen in the appendix 5.6, while the 
biennual increment of container handling tariff is relatively 
modest (averaging 6 to 8 percent per review, or 3 to 4’/. per 
annum), increases in costs tend to be pretty dramatic. For 
instance, using 1985 as the base year,'transhipment and domestic 
tariff recorded a 19’/. increase for the 1987-1989 period while 
total cost per box soared by 91’/. for the 1988/89 fiscal year. 
Naturally this has a deleterous effect on the Terminal’s profit 
position and therefore investment returns. In the same appendix
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a steady decline in unit profit is evident, almost without 
exception, for the years 1985-1990.
Given the need to remain competitive in the transhipment 
arena, the Terminal’s first priority must be to restrain and 
reduce costs along with improving service quality. It may well 
be that both can be achieved through more efficient and 
productive use of resources.
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The paper has, so far, progressed from a general 
discussion of the impact of the trends in container shipping 
on ports, to a more specific analysis of problems encountered 
by a container terminal, KTO. This chapter aims at
presenting an approach that can be, and indeed has been 
adopted by many ports, in meeting the challenges of the 
dynamic container shipping environment - the marketing
approach. The aim is not to present marketing as a panacea 
for all the port's problems. Instead, it is hoped that by 
presenting a systematic yet integrative plan of action, the 
marketing approach applied to ports, and indeed any
organization, represent an invaluable tool for analyzing the 
market. It therefore places the port in a better position 
respond to or initiate changes to its benefit.
After looking at a definition of marketing and some 
general marketing concepts, the focus of this chapter will be 
to highlight the need for a marketing approach in ports. By 
so doing, it is intended that the ground work will have been 
laid for the final chapter concerned with hov-j to develop a 
marketing plan for KTO. Therefore, the current chapter will 
be dealing with the role and scope of port marketing while the 
final will concentrate on the 'how to' or 'doing' aspect.-
6.1 A DEFINITION OF MARKETING AND GENERAL MARKETING CONOEPTB.
The term marketing usually conjures images of advertising 
and other promotional efforts. While this is undoubtedly a 
marketing activity, it is not itself marketing. Broadly 
speaking marketing may be defined as "...the part of Cthel
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business concerned with the way in which a product is sold..."
This implies that there are two prerequisites in 
marketing the company’s product or services, namely
(1) a structure or marketing department with the
responsibility -for organizing, -Formulating, and executing 
the -Firm’s marketing strategy, and
(2) the method or strategy itself.
Modern marketing theory which traces the evolution of 
marketing from the periods of a role primarily restricted to 
selling and distribution, today would tend to disagree with 
this basic concept of marketing as "part of the business" 
activity and instead advocate that "marketing is so basic Cto 
the firml that it cannot be considered a separate function ... 
it is the whole business seen from the point of view of its 
final result, that is, from the customer's point of view". == 
The implications are that the organization of the various 
activities of the company should be centered around and be 
interrelated to the marketing department which then constitute 
the hub ~ a modern marketing company.
Similarly, there are distinct approaches to the
arrangement or method of marketing. These concepts may be 
classified as
a) the product concept
b) the selling concept and,
c) the marketing concept or more recently, the 
social marketing concept.
Under the product concept the firm concentrated its 
efforts on the creation of a good product under the
^Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary 
^Marketing Management by Philip Kotler, page 3
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assumptions that, given a good product, reasonably priced, 
little marketing effort is required to achieve desired sales 
and profit levels. The emphasis was therefore not so much on 
the utility of the product to the consumer as a marketing 
tool, but on quality/price trade-off.
This approach typified that taken by most port management 
wherein, having developed their facilities, they resolved to 
compete based on pricing and quality of service. This 
approach was and still is to a large extent valid. But gone 
are the days when the availability of well equipped and 
competitively priced port facilities were hard to come by , or 
conversely, when cargo belonging to the port’s hinterland 
could be regarded as captive, and the demand for services 
seemingly endless. In addition to increased competition, this 
approach is rendered further incomplete by the fact that while 
cost/quality trade-off is still important, it now comprises 
only one of the many considerations in the port selection 
process.
With the manifest deficiencies of the product concept 
approach in meeting the firm’s goals, another concept was 
developed, that is, the selling concept. Here in contra­
distinction to the product concept, the firm took the view 
that its products would not be sold unless it approached 
customers with a substantial selling and promotional effort.
Unfortunately, this approach normally meant a shift in 
focus, with the creation of a quality product becoming 
secondary. For this strategy to work it would mean that 
customers were not too concerned with quality and if 
dissatisfied would not communicate this to other potential 
users, and most importantly from a port stand point, that the 
company was not dependent on repeat business.
I n approaches
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the above two to marketing, the
product/service was developed with little consideration as to 
the speci-fic needs o-F customers, and the predominant ■factor 
was to achieve profit objectives. The marketing concept still 
maintains this profit objective, but sees it as being 
achievable not merely through the development of high quality 
reasonably priced products or through intensive selling and 
promotional efforts but instead the emphasis shifted from 
company-based to customer-oriented.
The key task of the organization was geared at the 
identification of customer needs, wants and values and to 
fulfilling these satisfactorily and more effectively and 
efficiently than competitors, on a profitable basis. Customer 
satisfaction was seen as the key to that of the organizational 
goals. Such an approach has several implications:
i) the organization conceives of its mission in
terms of satisfying a defined set of wants of a 
defined set of customers
ii) active marketing research is undertaken to 
determine these wants
iii) a recognition that all customer-impinging 
company activities must be placed under 
integrated marketing control, and
iv) the company believes that doing a good job
of satisfying customers, wins their loyalty, 
repeat business and favourable word of mouth 
promotion - all of which are crucial in 
satisfying the organization’s goals.
The social marketing concept takes as an additional 
element, the consideration of general public welfare in 
responding to needs and wants of the market.
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Having outlined the evolution o-F the various concepts 
under which -Firms carry out their marketing activities, it is 
now possible to move -From a generic definition of marketing to 
a more specific and practical one. Marketing or more 
accurately marketing management, can be defined as the 
analysis, planning, implementation and control of programs 
designed to bring about desired changes with target markets 
for the purpose of achieving organization goals. Three 
elements emerge as being essential to successfully marketing a 
company;
i) a product oriented to the customer’s needs and » ’ 
wants
ii) a marketing organization or department, effective 
in bringing the product/service in contact with the 
potential customers, and,
iii) a marketing plan, which identifies strategies and 
responsibilities for implementing action programs
to achieve organizational objectives.
Marketing management thus presents a unified plan__of
action for the achievement of organizational goals. The major 
benefits to be gained from such a unified plan of action are 
threefold;
i) It engenders coordination between the various 
activities within the organization and thus strengthens 
it.
ii) It allows for the organization to specify expected 
development in the industry and thus use them to forecast 
and plan.
iii) As a concomitant of i) & ii) strategic marketing 
planning eliminates surprises, and creates an effective 
climate for managing change.
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The elements comprising, and process o-f strategic 
marketing planning is set out in flow diagram below:
FIGURE 6.1
ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC MARKETING PLANNING.
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Source: Rarketing Strategy & Ranagesent by P. Kotler, page 69, Prentice Hal!, 1976.
The essence or end product of the marketing planning 
process, is therefore to arrive at the optimal marketing mix 
(that combination of price, service range, distribution 
methods and promotional activities) with which to capture 
potential clients. It represents all the organization’s plans 
and policies towards and through which it seeks to influence 
the market.
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6.2 THE ROLE OF MARKETING IN PORTS
Changes in ship size, transport cost and the need -For 
intermodal interchanges have significantly affected the port 
routing decisions of ship operators. The tendency is for a 
large percentage of a region or country's traffic to be 
concentrated at a few ports, especially in the deepsea trades, 
from which other locations are served. There exist mega 
ports where well in excess of 50/4 of the traffic handled are 
often not destined to or originating from their immediate 
hinterland or even country. Witness Colombo, where 70/4 of its 
containerized cargo is transhipment * .
The corollary is that there are ports which will 
experience undef— utilization by virtue of their traffic being 
handled in another country's port. In the case of non-island 
states, the need for a port can all but disappear.
Based on the manufacturing concept of using marketing 
techniques to stimulate demand, port management often tends to 
view the role of marketing in ports as being limited to 
i ncreasi no the utilization of port facilities. While this is 
no doubt a very important function, it nevertheless represent 
a rather narrow perspective. A more liberal view may be to 
regard marketing in the light of imorovi no the utilization of 
port facilities. The distinction is subtle, but nonetheless 
important. The former bears the connotation of increasing the 
throughput, while the latter places•emphasis on the efficient 
utilization of port facilities, including
a) more efficient allocation of resources
b) attracting new traffic
^ Lecture on Port Marketing by E. Pollock. WMU, Malmo 
Sweden. August, 1991.
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c) Ksducing unl't cost of opsratlons and Ltlt,i(nat.elyy 
d> Improving the port's profit position.
An additional and important function of port marketing 
can also be identified. Viz:
e> Improving customer and worker relations.
It is within the context of these functions that the 
relevance of the planning process (or marketing scope) 
described earlier, will be discussed.
r,. . - •
6.2.1 IMPORTANCE OF SETTING PORT OBJECTIVES
The existence of a port selection process (discussed in 
chapter 1) implies that the choice of ports of call is not 
fixed, but subject, in varying degrees, to external 
influences. This means there is scope for the port’s 
management to influence the carriers and cargo interests 
decision as to the ports to be used. The means by which it 
seeks to influence their action must however be based on the 
overall objectives of the port as derived based on a situation 
audi t.
The need for clearly defined port goals and objectives is 
very basic to its long term existence, since it represents the 
company’s mission translated into precise targets and thus 
serves as a powerful management tool. It provides (a) the 
people in the company with a specific sense of their role in 
the company’s overall plan, (b) a basis for consistent
coordinated decision making and planning among the various 
echelon of management and stimulate or motivate action for 
their achievement, and (c) a basis from which to measure 
actual performance and thus represents a vital control tool.
(5iven the port’s mission, formulation of objectives (in
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terms o-F what markets to target and with what services) should 
include :
a) Environmental Analysis & Forecast
b) Industry Analysis and competition
c) Analysis o-F Organizational Strengths & Weaknesses
d) Development o-F Market in-Formation system
The analytic process just described may be summarized in 
the diagram below:
FIGURE 6.2 PROCESS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
^  »  -  '  <  • *  ' •
SDurcE! UNCTAD Sesinar papers on Strategic Planning for Senior Shipping Hanagers
The mission oF ports may often not be stated explicitly 
but may be deduced based on the policies or objectives 
adopted. R. 0. Goss identifies three frequently stated 
objectives of seaports Namely,
i) to increase employment in the locality
ii) to maximize profits, and,
iii) to create added value through economic efficiency.
Moving from the broad policy objectives, ports need _ to
•^Economic Policies & Seaports: 1.
Management 1990. vol. #17.
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Maritime Policy &
in order to determine where theanalyze the market 
opportunities lie and how to respond to them. Based on the 
process outlined above, the first step is an analysis o-F the 
present environment and -Forecast o-F its -Future behavior.
6.2.1 ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS FORECAST
The demand -For port services is derived based on the need 
to transport goods -From one country to another or within a 
country through the use o-F maritime transport. There-Fore key 
•Factors which in-Fluence the demand -For port services are 
necessarily those that a-F-Fect trade in general. Such as 
general state O'F the national regional and global economy, 
commodities traded, shifts in pattern of trade, political 
events, currency fluctuations and so on. These were discussed 
in chapter 3 and may be summarized as follows:
- World economic growth is expected to average around 
3% annually to the year 2000.
- The trend to the organization of regional trade 
blocs.
- New trade opportunities in Eastern Europe.
- A shift in trade flow between USA and her trading 
partners in an effort to reduce the balance of 
trade deficit.
- Weakening of the US dollar.
- Trend in larger ship sizes, and non-standard ISO 
boxes.
- Liner trade is expected to average a rate of 
growth, half that of the 11'/. expected for trade in 
general (see chapter 3, page ).
Another factor to be added is the short term impact of 
the increased oil prices as a result of the recent Middle East 
war, on the economies of oil dependent non-producing 
countries. It can be expected that this will . impact
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negatively on their economic growth and there-Fore trade.
The above macroeconomic environmental conditions hold 
several implications for ports, which was also underlined in 
chapter 3. The most significant however, is the fact that 
cost efficiency will in the future be emphasized as the 
decisive factor in port survival, especially in the face of 
declining freight rates and the regionalisation of trade which 
can render the use of larger ships not as cost effective from 
a carrier stand point, as originally anticipated- The port’s 
management has to decide whether the objective should be 
towards say, providing the highest possible service, or the 
most economical — being a trade off between, service and 
quality.
6.2.2 INDUSTRY ANALYSIS & COMPETITION
"The essence of formulating competitive [marketing! 
strategy is relating a company to its environment. ...the key 
aspect of the firm's environment is the industry or industries 
in which it competes." ® An industry analysis includes 
therefore, a look at the company itself as well as the various 
actors in the industry which shapes its performance. These 
analyses will therefore look internally to pinpoint the 
organization’s strengths and weaknesses, then externally to 
identify opportunities and threats in order to formulate the 
appropriate strategies so as to minimize the impact of threats 
and or maximize the opportunities.
The internal analysis includes:
a) identification of the company’s major activities and 
its customers
=Note on the Structural Analysis of Industries by Michael 
E. Porter Harvard Business School (376-054). 1975. Page 1.
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b) customers' requirements "From the organization and 
the price they are willing to pay. From a carrier 
standpoint, the decision to transship is based on 
the trade-o-F-F between the cost o-F making additional 
call (with a larger more expensive vessel), loading 
and discharging relatively small volumes o-F cargo,
\ and the cost o-F discharging a series o-F smaller 
consignments at one port and using smaller ships or 
inland transportation to convey them to -Final 
destination. Therefore as discussed in chapter 2, 
the choice of transhipment port must represent a 
combination of operational efficiency anxd low 
overall port costs. Indeed it is the former which 
by impacting on vessel turnaround time that is of 
great importance.
Cargo interests are concerned with speedy and safe 
transit of cargo through the port at minimum cost. . 
Operational efficiency itself assumes the provision 
of adequate port facilities and a well trained and 
highly motivated labour force. Price of port 
services must be distinguished from and is 
secondary to port costs to the users. The latter by 
virtue of including ship’s time, reflects to a great 
extent operational efficiency.
c) the company’s aspirations in the market place
d) identification of the company’s strengths and 
weaknesses in meeting customer needs relative to 
competitors
e) Legal/political constraints which will affect future 
growth and development.
An assessment of the other actors in the market who
96
compete with the company present invaluable guidelines as to 
what approach, in terms o-F marketing strategy, is to be 
pursued. However, since the determinants o-F the -Firm’s 
pro-Fitabi 1 i ty are the various -Forces which drive the 
industry’s competition it is important not to con-Fine the 
analysis only to competitors, but all the forces which affect 
the port’s ability to compete. Michael E. Porter identifies 
five major forces which drive industry competition, as 
diagrammed below: ^
FIGURE 6.3 
COMPETITIVE FORCES OF AN INDUSTRY
Threat of Entry
New entrants to an industry adds new capacity and 
reallocate and or reduce market shares. The threat of entry 
depends on the barriers to entry. Six major barriers to 
entry:
a) economies of scale
b) product differentiation
c) capital requirements
d) access to distribution channels
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Ibid 4. Page 2.
e) other cost advantages 
-F) Governmen-t policy.
Based on the six -Factors listed above, it may be 
concluded that there are no substantial barriers to entry in 
the Port Industry. In that, it is di-Fficult to use a strategy 
based on di-Fferentiation and while capital requirements are 
substantial, governments and international lending agencies 
are willing to give ’ so-Ft loans’ -For port development. 
Government intervention through subsidies can also render a 
cost ine-F-Ficient port, price competitive. Government policies 
regarding permission to develop port -Facilities, by virtue 
limitation o-F jurisdiction, tend to deter new entrants only in 
the domestic arena.
The port industry is in a no win situation in this 
regard, since while there exists relatively low entry 
barriers, the market is still not contestable. This is so 
despite the -Fact that there exists possibilities to sell port 
equipment and reutilize port lands (often prime land), because 
governments usually prefer to continue subsidizing a port than 
have it closed. This attitude is often a function of the 
importance of the port and port related industries as 
employers of labour as well as the fear of depending on 
another country/port to handle its trade.
Competitive Rivalry
Rivalry occurs because one or more competitors either 
feels the pressure or sees the opportunity to improve 
position. It normally takes the form of price competition, 
advertising battles, product introductions and increased 
customer service." The degree of competition in the
industry is dependent on:
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■^’Ibid 4. Page 8.
a) number o-F competitors, their size and relative 
power
’ b) rate o-F industry growth'
c) level o-F -Fixed costs
d) degree to which product di-F-Ferentiation is 
possible
e) high exit barriers
■F) capacity
The port industry is characterized by a prol iferation o-F 
ports o-F varying sizes with the top 10 accounting -For over 40% 
o-F total throughput in 1989 . ® The port recording the
largest throughput (TED) in 1988 was the port o-F Hong Kong 
with over 4 million TEUs representing a market share o-F 5.5%. 
KTO was itself ranked 42nd in the world container port traffic 
league, with over 180,000 TEUs representing a .25% market 
share. The big ports in the industry do not compete overtly 
on the basis of price, but rather on service innovations and 
performance standards. Relatively speaking, the dominance of a 
port is limited largely to the region it is in and the trade 
of that region.
After recording double digit rates of growth in the 1980s 
liner traffic growth is slowing considerably - a result of the 
declining possibilities for further containerisation of trade, 
especially in developed countries. This coupled with the 
larger number of container facilities in existence and those 
coming on stream, is a recipe for increased competition 
especially for transshipment traffic. The highly mechanized 
nature of container port operations dictates a high degree of 
fixed costs which in turn affect pricing strategies. Added to 
(d), (e) and (f)> it is evident therefore that the port
industry is a highly competitive one.
®Containerisation International Yearbook, 1991.
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Substi tutes
While there are no direct substitutes for port services, 
ports by virtue of being the interface between land and sea 
transport are nevertheless affected by factors which reduce 
the need for this interface. In the case of KTO., the use of 
the US Landbridge as against the Panama Canal has resulted in 
the restructuring of trade routes and decline in the demand 
for KTD’s services.
Bargaining Power of Users
. i. 'V ,
• ‘ 'Buyers or customers compete with the industry by forcing 
down prices, demanding higher quality or more services, and 
playing competitors off against each other - all at the 
expense of industry profitability' . This quote aptly 
describes the position of ports today with respect to 
carriers. The fiercely competitive nature of the port 
industry gives port users and in particular carriers, enormous 
leverage in terms of dictating the service quality and 
significantly influencing the price the ports charge. That 
this erodes port profitability is evident. Huge investments 
are undertaken by ports to achieve or retain the competitive 
edge. At the same time the level of tariff cannot be 
significantly increased to provide a reasonable return on 
investment, relative to cost of capital. For example during a 
study tour to the port of Rotterdam, it was mentioned by a 
speaker from a stevedoring company that one of the biggest 
stevedoring companies on the port records a turnover of 
several billion US dollars, yet makes a profit of a couple 
million. This would seem to indicate the cut throat nature of 
the competition which forces such high cost levels, or a need 
for cost controls. Carriers are made even more powerful when 
their contribution. to the port's traffic is a large proportion
Note on Structural Analysis of Industries by Michael 
E. Porter. Havard Business School (376-054). 1975. Page 12.
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d -F total Terminal tra-F-fic.
Bargaining Power o-F Suppliers
From a port stand point, the most important and power-Ful 
suppliers are the stevedoring bompany and labour unions. 
Terminal Operators rely on stevedoring companies to provide 
well trained and motivated labour -Force at an economic cost. 
Thus both its operational and cost e-Fficiency relies heavily 
on the stevedoring companies. Also the power o-F unions cannot 
be overemphasized. Tightly unionized labour can bargain away 
the competitive position o-F ports as demonstrated by the. UK 
experience under the Dock Labour Scheme. It was shown that 
with the present labour arrangement on the Terminal, KTO -Finds 
itsel-F in a position o-F dwindling pro-Fits in the -Face o-F high 
labour costs, while increasing labour unrest is serving to 
undermine the credibility of the port and ultimately 
throughput.
By setting port objectives, it not only provides a plan 
of action and means of management control, but by virtue of 
dictating an analysis of the port’s current position and the 
prevailing environment in which it operates, it forces
management to make assumptions and forecasts of the future 
behavior of the market. They are therefore in a position to 
better seize any market opportunities that may arise or 
mitigate the impact of any threats. This assessment of the 
competitive position of the port is referred to as the SWOT 
(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) approach 
and is an essential step in formulating port objectives and 
therefore, marketing strategy.
6.2.2 MARKET OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS IN A PORT CONTEXT
Market opportunity analysis aims at identifying scope for
101
•future growth and development of the port, by examining trends 
in the market and evaluating whether opportunities exist which 
can be exploited on a profitable basis. Generally speaking, 
the opportunity -for a port to grow will depend on the vibrancy 
o-F the national economy’s trade and the existence o-f good port 
infrastructure at competing ports. It will also depend on the 
region’s trade and the efficiency of the transport link 
between the various countries. It is the latter which will 
provide transhipment possibilities for ports.
In searching for transhipment opportuni.ties the following 
considerations are applicable:
_ # •i) what are the transhipment motives of carriers,
and,
ii) how the port can cater to these needs.
E. Pollock highlights the following as being the
major driving force behind a line’s decision to transship:
- rationalization of services, reduction on costs and 
increasing operational flexibility
- logistical advantages such as the exchange of
containers between different services operated by 
the same line or consortia. This also widens the 
market served, by increasing the number ' of 
destinations that can be reached from one port.
sufficient reduction of ship’s time so that fleet 
size can be reduced
- where the geography of certain countries, for 
example those with long coastlines and high inland
Based on a discussion with Prof. Pollock during the 
authors visti to London, March, 1991.
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transport cost, may necessitate calling at several 
ports, so -Fragmenting the cargo availability of 
each port
- when an existing service is operating with capacity 
for extra cargo
- when extra capacity is planned either in the form of 
larger vessels and or additional vessels, making 
possible increases in service frequency. Such 
situations increase the need for extra cargo, hence
, the search for additional markets
- possibilities also arise when lines are introducing 
new services, which may still be at a formative 
stage of development
- conditions at other ports which preclude or make 
direct calls less favourable as far as the line is 
concerned.
Additionally, the trend in shipping services offered by 
carriers to shippers can offer a port scope to carry out a 
transhipment role. More and more carriers are catering to the 
needs of shippers in other respects than mere transportation. 
Thus keeping abreast of the latest developments in this area, 
will also indicate the future role expected of ports.
6.2.3 DEVELOPING A PORT MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM
In order to carry out the foregoing analyses, an 
efficient and up to date' market information system is
essential. Decision makers must constantly be on the alert 
for leading indicators of business activity, signals and signs 
that will alert them to possible changes, new markets, changes 
in competitors’ strategy, or general development in the
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overall environment holding dangers or opportunities -For the 
•Firm. Because marketing is the firm’s response to external 
opportunities, marketing decision making is disastrous without 
accurate information to evaluate those opportunities.
Marketing research can be defined as the systematic 
gathering, recording and analyzing of data in order to assess 
problems and opportunities related to the marketing of the 
s services. Diagrammed below are the components of a 
market information system.
* ■ figure 6 . 4  ■ ■
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Adapted from: Marketing Management by P. Kotler page 421
,A good port data base will need to provide information to 
enable management to pinpoint:
its major customers and traffics, in terms of both 
volume and profitability
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general -financial per-formance o-F the port
operational data regarding capacity and manpower
- activities or developments planned by ' competing 
ports which can a-F-Fect demand -for the port's 
services
~ current and -future changes in the pattern and volume 
o-F trade -for particular countries and a regions
- operating strategies . o-F major carriers, including
. present and targeted users of the port’s facilities
financial position and market share of current and 
potential customers
governmental regulations that will impact on the 
port.
Some of these data are available from the port’s
accounting system, while others will dictate the need for 
external market research. Appendix 6.1 tables some important 
sources of shipping industry information, while Appendix 6.2 
provides some considerations in carrying out a frequently used 
market research technique in the shipping industry - postal 
market surveys.
Having reached the point of identification of objectives 
in the context of market opportunities versus the port's 
present position, the next step is to devise the strategy 
(plans) to achieve the objectives.
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6.3 DEVELOPING THE MARKETING STRATEGY
The development o-F a marketing strategy or plan o-F action 
involves two basic steps. The -First is the selection o-F 
target markets and the second, the development o-F e-F-Fective 
marketing proarama to win these markets.
6.3.1 MARKET SEGMENTATION & TARGETING
Market segmentation is • the process whereby management 
tries to identi-Fy di-F-Ferent user groups who would probably be 
most receptive to using the port’s -Facilities, and so target 
them -For their marketing e-F-Fort. By selecting target markets 
the port is able to utilize its resources more e-F-Ficiently by 
-Focusing on a specific group’s needs and wants. In the 
selection of market segments the following criteria must 
apply:
i > measurable
ii^  access i ble so that the firm can focus its efforts at 
it. Chances of success must take account of, and. 
identify how satisfied the target is with their 
present port of call.
iiiJ substantia1 enough to be exploited on a profitable 
basis. This is important since it would not be cost 
effective nor profitable to develop the service for 
a segment too small to offer favourable return on 
required investment.
Market segmentation also involves selecting target 
markets, since it . is not possible to pursue all traffics due 
to resource limitations; there is little point in winning new 
business only to lose existing customers due to congestion or 
lack of capacity. In selecting
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target markets. due
%consideration must be given to the existing (and planned 
increase in ) capacity.
Rasas o-F Port Market Segmentation and Ta>"netlnfl
Market segmentation -for ports will -Firstly be geographic, 
based on trade patterns and the port's proximity to the 
various trade routes. This will then be narrowed according to 
the type and -form o-F commodities being traded, and those the 
port is interested in pursuing.
Dividing the market on a-commodity basis is especially 
useful in the port development phase, since the type and form 
of the commodities to be handled would largely determine the 
type of facilities required. Similarly, it provides a useful 
indication of the types and probable sizes of ships that can 
or are expected to use the port facilities. Commodity 
classifications which will affect and dictate terminal 
facilities and thus serves as a useful basis of segmentation
are;
i) dry bulk cargo
ii) liquid bulk cargo
iii) general cargo break bulk
iv) containerized cargoes: dry and refrigerated; Ro-Ro
and Lo-Lo.
Since the port cannot take its services to the lines, the 
factor of deviation distance (and therefore cost) to call at a 
port will influence the carriers decision and so must also be 
considered by port management. Another factor is the
strategic location of the port to blend in with the carriers- 
overall operational strategy -does the port afford smooth 
connections between the various inter-1inking services of the 
carriers? Based on these, specific carriers and cargo
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interests may be targeted.
^ t  was previously mentioned that a market segment in 
order to -Facilitate success-Ful targeting without wasting 
resources must be viable. This means that an evaluation o-F 
the various possibilities is essential. Estimates o-F
potential tra-F-Fic volume and income level, the port’s cost o-F 
pursuing and servicing this market and ultimately, the 
expected contribution o-F this market segment to the port s 
overall pro-Fitabi 1 ity is essential.
6.3.2 CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PORT MARKETING 
MIX
The marketing mix represents the various media through 
which any organization seeks to secure the patronage of the 
target market. In general, these are identified as being the 
price, product/service, distribution channels and promotional- 
efforts. In a port setting, these therefore comprise the 
combination of:
i) service quality and range 
il) tariff levels, and
Hi) selling and promotional activities.
Distribution refers to, the various channels through which 
the product or service reaches the customer. The simultaneous 
production and consumption of port services necessarily means 
that the distribution is embedded in, and a part of the 
service. For this reason, considerations regarding the 
service, incorporates that of its delivery.
6.3.2.1 PLANNING PORT SERVICES
Planning the range and level of port services in the 
marketing mix entails ascertaining whether the present quality
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This -Fact would havelevel is as desired by customers, 
emerged -From the analytic process based on market research. 
It a^o involves setting targets -For service quality, in terms 
of (a) productivity levels and (b) maximum vessel waiting 
time.
Since productivity levels are functions of the 
performance of labour and equipment, due consideration needs 
to be given to labor motivation, remuneration and training, 
and equipment supply and maintenance. Other factors which 
impact on productivity such as imbalance between the various 
subsystems of the port will need to be taken into account and 
plans made to address these.
It may be that changes will need to be made in the 
operational planning. Especially in the container shipping 
industry where the vessel's daily cost is high, rapid 
turnaround is vital. This is not only a function of
productivity alongside berth, but of total time in port. It 
therefore becomes essential to also minimize the time spent in 
port before receiving a berth. Other services which impact on 
the ship’s stay in port such as pilotage, towage and customs 
documentation may need to be considered for improvement.
Additionally, it may be that there exist inadequate 
berthing space, which may indicate the need for new
investment. At this point the need for targets being set 
cannot be over emphasized. While the ideal situation from a 
carrier perspective is zero waiting time, which means the 
availability of a berth at all times, it is not feasible to 
provide the needed numbers due to investment cost to the port.
The port needs to establish the maximum time it can afford 
to have ships waiting, bearing in mind the need to satisfy 
customers so as to retain their business. Based on this, some 
notion of the required number of berths needed can be gained.
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Improvement o-F service to users may also be looked at 
through more involvement of the port in the through transport
'Hkprocess. It may be through providing information to users 
about alternative modes of transporting cargo to and from the 
port (feedering services, rail and road) and some indicative 
costs. It may be that there is a need to get involved in the 
actual arrangement of on-carriage either through contracts or 
direct investments.
The decision will need to be made as to whether the port 
should seek to increase customer satisfaction and entice new 
users by offering new services,* such as EDP logistics and 
distribution services. Some ports have seen the benefits in 
terms of improved customer service and operational planning, 
of establishing links with ports on the opposite end of their 
trade. Ports such as Hamburg, Bremen and Rotterdam have set 
up EDP links with their opposite number in Asia and the United 
States (Singapore and the port of New York). This ’data 
bridge’ gives instant information to customers on,cargo flow, 
while by providing data on the number and type of containers 
to be shipped to the port, the identity of consignees and a 
breakdown of the status in terms of FCLs and LCLs, it affords 
the port a higher degree of operational pre planning.
The cost benefit trade off needs to be considered as well 
as whether the existing level of port competition requires it. 
Clearly, if the major competitors have gained an edge by 
offering this facility, it may be that it will constitute an 
important service improvement feature for the port, in order 
to avoid loss of business, and so the benefits will outweigh 
the cost. On the other hand, if it does not already form a 
part of the existing competitive arsenal, then the decision to 
pursue its development must rest on the financial costs to be 
incurred versus additional revenues to be gained.
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6.3.2.2 PORT PRICINB POLICIES
Port tari-f-Fs represent the remuneration to the port -for 
its various services, and in the case o-f ports operated on a 
commercial basis, represents the means o-f achieving its 
-Financial objectives. While the prices o-F the various port 
services are usually stated in a published tari-f-F (see 
appendix 6.3), in addition to planning the tari-f-f level, 
consideration should be given to the need -For a -Flexible 
pricing policy. This may be in the -Form o-f:
<i) incentive rebates -For large throughput customers;
(ii) lower rates to encourage new tra-F-Fic and
(iii) incentives or penalties to encourage e-f-Ficient 
utilization o-F port -facilities.
A prerequisite to employing a flexible pricing policy is 
a knowledge of port costs. It is important to know how low 
charges can go if necessary, without being uneconomic. If it 
is desirable that each traffic/customer make a contribution to 
the overall profitability of the port, then this will dictate 
the minimum price be at least above direct costs.
A position on the desirability of special agreements with 
individual customers re tariffs will- need to be taken: some
customers may prefer the simplicity of a consolidated rate 
while others prefer detailed breakdown-so that they have scope 
to arrange their operation in order to minimize outpayment. 
It is important for the port's management to have policies 
that respond to these needs, since it may affect the user's 
confidence in the port. Considerations as to special charges 
to encourage different traffic is also necessary. For example 
lower charges for transhipment versus domestic cargoes.
Due note must also be taken of the charges at competing 
ports (if available). This will indicate the scope for
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•further increases, especially regarding increased charges in 
light o-f additional investment in improved port -Facilities.
6.3.2.3 SELLING & PROMOTION OF PORTS
Before looking at the factors to be considered in the 
port selling and promotional effort, a distinction needs to be 
made between marketing and promotion. Marketing has been 
defined as the analysis, planning, implementation and control 
of plans aimed at satisfying port users. It involves devising 
that combination of service variety and quality, price and 
promotional activities, that will do so effectively. This 
means that promotion and selling is only one of the activities 
necessary in marketing the port.
Promotion and selling involves the overt efforts to 
increase customer and the public awareness in general, and 
usage of the port. Typically, a port will consist of several 
companies - competing and complementary. It is here that the 
distinction becomes important since it also dictates the 
division of the marketing effort. the role of promoting the 
entire port is normally the function of the Port Authority or 
an association of port companies (terminal operators, 
stevedoring companies, Agents, forwarders, truckers etc.). 
The task of promoting and securing business for a particular 
port company, say a terminal operator, must be the
responsibility of the latter.
Port authorities and associations increase awareness of 
and generate interest in the port and can secure business for 
the port in general but should not allocate it to the port 
companies. For this, the individual companies should compete. 
While this arrangement does not preclude individual companies 
carrying out their own promotional activities to secure 
business, it does save costs and provide an integrated picture
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o-F all the various port services to potential users. Such 
port bodies as the Port Authorities are therefore, allowed to 
solicit business but cannot conclude contracts or set rates 
though they may regulate it.
Whether promotion and selling efforts are being carried 
out at the port or company level, consideration has to be 
given as to whom the effort is to be directed at : shipowner, 
shipping agents, exporters, importers, forwarding agents, 
marketing boards and so on. This will depend on their
perceived power (based on market research information) to 
influence or control port routing. , ■
f  .r
The effectiveness of the various media type for the 
different target audience is also important. This point 
cannot be over-emphasized, from both a cost and impact stand 
point. For example the use of television advertisements might 
be appropriate in a public relations effort but quite 
inappropriate compared to say trade journals, for reaching 
potential users.
6.4 ROLE OF THE MARKETING MIX IN ACHIEVING PORT OBJECTIVES
The next phase of the planning process is to develop the 
actual marketing strategy for the port." This involves the 
development of the marketing mix based on the objectives, and 
markets targeted. The final marketing plan must also consist 
of:
a) targets and projections (in terms of TEU or tonnage) 
by traffic types
b) a budget of both financial and human resources to be
expended in the marketing effort, and
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c) a statement allocating the marketing actlvitlBB 
among the various elements of the mix.
As can be seen, this represent the actual plan 
formulation phase, which, as stated earlier, is the concern of 
chapter 7. In this section, the role of the marketing mix in 
addressing some of the concerns of ports will be explored. 
Earlier, these concerns were identified as (a) more efficient 
utilization of facilities and (b) improvement of customer and 
worker relations.
6.4,1 The role of the marketing mix in improving efficient 
port utilization
Inefficient usage of facilities may occur as a result of 
excess capacity or too high a level of usage, which results in 
congestion or alternating situations of peaks and troughs in 
usage. In the case of the existence of excess capacity the 
aim will be to attract new, and of course, profitable cargoes.
In the case of the latter, the need may be to increment 
capacity. Judicious manipulation of the marketing mix can 
delay or reduce the need for new investments or attract new 
traffic to the port.
The fact that port services cannot be produced and stored 
ahead of demand, and that ship arrivals are not always 
predictable and will often tend to bunch, means that port 
facilities will experience periods of under-utilization and 
congestion. Seasonal demand for port services may be smoothed 
by pursuing a pricing policy wherein lower rates are charged 
for usage during the off-peak periods. This should serve to 
shift or spread some of the demand and so reduce congestion 
and the need to increase capacity.
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Alternatively, it may be possible to encourage a -Faster 
turnaround o-F vessels;
i) by calculating ship related charges based on time 
spent alongside. Increasingly, this is being used 
and is more e-F-Fective the shorter the time -Frame -For 
the charge. For example, charges based on hourly 
rates would be more e-F-Fective than a daily charge.
ii) higher tari-FFs may be levied on vessels lying 
alongside port facilities and not working cargo.
iii) higher rates may also be levied for vessels working 
slower than average -'
iv) incentives can also be given to encourage rapid 
despatch: For example, port Klang in Malaysia
offers a reduction in wharfage charges for vessels 
of certain size which leave the port in under eight 
or six h o u r s . A n o t h e r  basis which might be 
more fruitful from a port management point of view, 
is to offer similar reductions to different 
categories of ships, but also based on the quantity 
of cargo worked per call, since the time spent 
alongside is also a function of the cargo volume to 
be handled. Another example, is the strategy used 
by Singapore and Kaoshung <Korea) wherein ships not 
leaving berth within say two hours after completing 
work, pay extra charges, which can amount to five 
times normal charges. All these represent
effective methods of persuading more efficient usage 
of berthing space.
* ‘ Lecture 
August, 1991.
on Port Marketing by E.' Pollock. WMU,
Similarly, more efficient usage of storage areas can be 
made by shortening the free periods and using an escalating 
rate for succeeding days above the free period.
Where situations of underutilization (not attributable to 
seasonal fluctuations) exist, the task is to use the marketing 
mix to attract new traffic. In this context it has already 
been shown how port marketing can serve to pinpoint new market 
opportunities. For a port pursuing new traffic, it is 
important that its tariffs be flexible in order to enable 
negotiations. Increasingly the trend is away from standard 
tariffs, in favour of individual contracts based op what the 
traffic will bear. This also means that there must exist 
proper knowledge of the carriers' revenue base.
6.4.2 The role of the marketing mix in improving customer and 
worker relations.
'Improving customer relations’ is a somewhat nebulous 
objective, but a practical one nonetheless. The port's 
success in maintaining or improving these relations will 
depend on its awareness of what is desired by the users, which 
is in turn a function of good market research. However, 
broadly speaking, the port can increase its ’popularity’ among 
its users by maintaining a high market profile and more 
importantly, by offering practical assistance when and where 
necessary, through:
Keeping in touch. It is through constant dialogue 
with customers that port management can isolate 
problems in both its operation and that of the 
customers, and can make corrections or 
suggestions/accommodations. Customers’ problems are 
often good sources of market opportunities.
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- Providing -Facilitiss (where -Feasible) that are 
necessary to the customer’s operations, but which it 
might not be economical -For them to invest in. A 
good example o-F this is an electronic data 
processing service, especially with regards to 
vessel cargo planning and container tracking. These 
are now provided by many ports -For a nominal fee. 
Another example is the provision o-F storage space 
and processing zones -For manu-Factur i ng, along with 
computerized logistics system to e-F-Fect the accurate 
and timely distribution o-F cargo. It caters to the 
manu-Facturers need to reduce inventory and transport 
cost while still being able to respond to the 
market.
- Market surveys carried out by ports can serve to
indicate possible sources o-F cargo. Such
in-Formation is invaluable to carriers, and with the 
prior approval o-F the companies surveyed can be 
copied to shipping lines. ■
- The port's promotional e-F-Fort is also important.
While the previous steps are well known by the 
recipients o-F the assistance, promotion through 
trade journals and trade fairs are useful in 
broadening the awareness among other sectors of the 
market. Increasingly, advertisements in trade
journals are no longer limited to detailing port 
facilities and using catch phrases, but to explain 
how the port has solved a particular customer's 
problem - a testimonial form of advertising. Trade 
fairs are also invaluable sources of market contact, 
as well as well as advertising media, in order to 
increase port awareness.
The level of staff motivation correlates with that of 
productivity. It is therefore necessary for the port's 
management to seek means of improving the motivation of
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workers. Methods such as incentive schemes and profit sharing 
schemes are in place in most ports. However, a significant 
influence to staff motivation and morale, is to receive public 
acknowledgement for good performance. The port of Singapore 
has found an effective (if not novel) means of doing this. 
That is, through its fortnightly port magazine. Port View. 
Here pictures of staff who achieved high productivity (often 
bannered as 'performance above par') on a vessel, are shown 
along with details of the vessel, the performance level, 
difficulties encountered and overcome during the task, and 
some group (eg. trophy) memento received for the performance. 
A port magazine can also serve to increase staff awareness and 
interest in the port's performance, competitors and the 
industry as a whole.
Thus it can be seen that the scope of the marketing mix to 
achieve port objectives are many and varied and limited only 
by management's ingenuity. It also demonstrates the need for 
a designated group of people to be responsible for the 
planning and coordination (a marketing department) of all 
these activities, since they impinge on all the aspects of the 
port.
6.5 CONTROLLING THE MARKETING STRATEGY
While planning is concerned with deciding what needs to 
be done, the emphasis of control is on the setting of
standards, measurement of performance against these standards 
to evaluate achievement level and take corrective action.
There are three levels of marketing control;
Strategic Control: This is the responsibility of top
management and entails an evaluation of whether the company is 
pursuing the best markets, offering the right products and 
using the most effective means of communicating it. To
determine this a marketing audit is carried out, the aim of
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which is to examine the organization's marketing environment, 
internal marketing system and its marketing activities, to 
determine problem areas and recommend a corrective action plan 
to improve e-F-Fectiveness.
ii) ftnnual Plan Control Involves various levels o-F 
management in determining whether the company's annual 
objectives are being met, using various per-Fprmance 
measurement tools such as
(a) revenue analysis, which tries to identify the various 
factors which contributed to the observed variance.^^,
■V ’  ^  '
(b) market share analysis.. Since the level of
throughput does not itself indicate how well the port is 
performing relative to the industry, a market share 
analysis is often used. It suggests whether the changes 
in port performance were due to uncontrollable outside 
forces or whether there is a weakness in the current 
marketing program.
c) Expense-to-revenue ratio. This aims at keeping tabs 
on costs so as to ensure that the port is not
overspending to achieve its objectives. Different
ratios may calculated for the various expense categories 
so as to detect which area of expenditure is causing the 
problem. Of necessity, some fluctuations will be random, 
so it is up to management to be able to distinguish these 
form 'real' fluctuations. Management needs to observe 
changes over several periods and plot these on a chart in 
order to detect the underlying trends.
d) Attitude tracking involves monitoring customers' 
attitudes to the port's services. If it is found that 
esteem for these services is falling, this can be a 
signal for management to take immediate action to restore
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image or expect a downturn in its terminal usage in the 
■Future and ultimately in its pro-fitabi 1 ity.
iii) Pro-Fltabi 11 tv and Control. It is not enough that 
the port is making a profit, management needs to know what 
specific areas of activity are making the profit, and how 
much. It is essential to gauge the profitability of each of 
the port’s services.■ A good costing system and a sound basis 
for assigning common costs are prerequisites to useful profit 
centre analyses.
' 4., , , - . ' ■
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c m a f >t e : r  •7’
TO W A R D S  A  MARICETTI K f G  RLAIST R O R  K T O
The objective of the previous chapter was to highlight the 
role and importance of marketing in the achievement of various 
port objectives. It concentrated mainly on outlining the 
marketing planning process and its relevance, or justification 
for its application to ports. Assuming that it was successful 
in establishing the desirability of the marketing approach, the 
natural progression is to move from the planning phase to the . 
'doing' phase. That is, how to actually prepare a marketing 
plan. Since the principal aim of this paper is to develop a 
marketing strategy for KTO, this seems the ideal point at which 
to merge the somewhat geheral discussions in chapter 6, with the 
company background and analysis of chapters four and five, sind 
move towards a marketing strategy for KTO.
Three ingredients were mentioned in the previous chapter as 
being essential to any successful marketing endeavour: Namely, a
service oriented to customer needs and wants; a marketing 
department with the responsibility for detecting these needs, 
developing the required services and devising effective means of 
establishing customer awareness for the port and its services; 
and finally, a marketing plan which identifies strategies and 
responsibilities for their implementation. The first
requirement can be dealt within the actual marketing plan. 
Accordingly this chapter will consist of two broad sections. The 
first will be in the form of a recommended marketing department 
structure for KTO, while the second will detail the steps in the 
preparation of an actual marketing plan or strategy, using KTO 
where possible, as a case study.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS OF A MARKETING DEPARTMENT FOR KTO
It was shown in chapter 4 that KTO does not have a marketing 
department and that marketing, was carried out on its behalf by 
the Port Authority of Jamaica (PAJ). While this had certain
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benefits <also mentioned), given the PAJ's involvement in and 
responsibility for all the Jamaican ports, it is inevitable that 
enough attention is not given to marketing of the Container 
Terminal. Thus such marketing activities as research and 
analysis are often carried out on a 'once off' and rush basis, 
immediately before a promotional tour. It has been demonstrated 
that marketing is a continuous process of monitoring and 
evaluation of market developments, so as to identify growth 
opportunities for the port and devise strategies for exploiting 
them successfully.
It is therefore vital that KTO establishes its own marketing 
department, with the requisite responsibility and authority to 
carry out these functions. A division will need to be made 
between the future marketing role of the PAJ and this new 
department. Since the container terminal operated by KTO is 
actually owned by the PAJ, the Terminal's management will need 
to convince the PAJ that such a change is not an attempt to shut 
them out, but is critical to the future success of the port. It 
may be that the PAJ will continue to carry out the promotion and
public relations functions, but KTO the other marketing aspects.
r
Given the constraints on costs and the current low level of 
business at the Terminal, the proposed department should be as 
small as possible without impairing its functionality. The 
following functions are identifiable:
1. Market Analysis and Forecasting
2. Identification of new services and markets
3. Strategic Planning
4. Customer relations
5. Promotion and Public Relations
For this the minimum requirement in terms of personnel is 
five to seven, with responsibility for:
i) Planning (the manager),
ii) Information Gathering
iii) Statistical analysis and forecasting
iv) Customer relations
v) Department administration (the secretary).
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The above manpower program assumes that the PAJ in
conjunction with KTO's executives, continue to carry out the 
actual promotion and public relations function of the Terminal.
Planning
The Marketing Manager should have at least a first degree in 
the social sciences (marketing, management or economics), plus 
experience and broad based knowledge of the shipping industry. 
He should report directly to the Managing Director. It is 
important that he be given the necessary level of autonomy and 
authority to plan and carry out the port's development . It is 
essential for him to have good communication skills, since there 
will be a need to liaise with and win the cooperation of the 
various departments. The support of top management also plays
a vital role in his ability to solicit the degree of cooperation 
needed from other departments. Ideally, plans will need to be 
developed and approved on a team work basis, incorporating all 
the other members of the management team. The emphasis here is 
teamwork. Top management will also have to ensure his 
accountability in terms of plans as against achievements.
Information Gathering
Information gathering is indispensable to good analysis and 
planning. Relevant information will surface from any and varied 
sources. Therefore the person responsible for this task must be 
patient and thorough. Since it involves a great deal of reading, 
extraction and classification of data, the candidate for the job 
should possess a literary background. Perhaps a degree or 
diploma in the arts or social sciences.
Statistical Analysis and Forecasting
The job of statistical analyst involves evaluating the data 
gathered in order to identify possible threats and opportunities. 
The person employed will need to make assessments of the likely 
impact of economic and political policies on the port; to 
evaluate the environment, look at current trends in
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cargo/commodity flows and services and forecast future ones. The 
Marketing Manager will need to rely heavily on his skills and 
ability in devising the actual marketing plan. For this task, a 
specialist in economic analysis is necessary - whether he has a 
port background or not. The possession of at least a first 
degree in economics or statistics is essential.
Customer Relations
Customer relations involves maintaining contact with current 
customers so as to ascertain their problems and the degree of 
satisfaction with the service quality of the Terminal as well as 
contacting and monitoring potential customers. This is also a 
task for the Marketing Manager, that is keeping in contact with 
the customers. But in order to give more time to the planning 
function, he will need assistance in this respect. The person 
assigned this job must have excellent communication skills, as he 
will need not only to speak on the phone and through the mail, 
but also make and receive personal calls to and from customers. 
An important element in his ability to deal effectively with the 
customer will be his knowledge of their relative importance to 
the Terminal, in terms of traffic volume and profitability. In 
such a case, this individual will need to possess information on 
the status of the accounts of the different clients. In fact, he 
can be very useful in assisting the Accounts Receivable 
department in their collection, efforts. This function may 
conceivably require more than one person, depending on the 
customer base and the level of attention required..
Department Administration
For the daily administration of the department, a secretary 
is essential. She will have the responsibility of the usual 
secretarial duties. At this point it must be stressed that the 
preferable combination is a typist and a secretary. The former 
would have the responsibility for preparing the various external 
and internal communications, manning of telephones and so on, for 
all members of the department. The secretary would be aligned 
primarily to the Manager . and ensure the administrative 
functioning of the department in terms of meetings, appointments
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and budget monitdring. She would report directly to the Manager. 
An experienced secretary is needed.
A diagram of the proposed functional relation for the 
marketing department is as below:
7.2 TOWARDS A MARKETING PLAN FOR KTO
The marketing plan is the actual written document which 
details specific marketing actions to be taken to achieve 
specific marketing objectives. It should pinpoint the strengths 
and weaknesses of the port in meeting market demands, while 
identifying future market potential, and thus facilitate an 
organized approach to their achievement. It is a plan of action. 
Preparation of the marketing plan is therefore a most important 
activity.
This section relies heavily on the work^of Robert K. Skacel 
for the methodology involved in preparing the plan. An attempt 
will be made to lend relevance to the methodology in a port
 ^ The Marketing Plan: How to prepare it, what should be init. Published by MPM Associates.'
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context by using KTO as a study. It is intended that by so 
doing, the initial step in devising a marketing plan for the 
improvement of KTO's performance will have been taken.
Six broad steps in the development of a Marketing Plan can 
be identified. Viz:
1)
2>
3)
4}
5)
6)
The first four will form the focus of the rest of this chapter, 
while the guidelines for the establishment of the marketing 
budget is presented in Appendix 7.5. Forecast of profit is a 
function of throughput, price and costs. The latter two are 
internally decided to a large extent, and are therefore more 
predictable. The real task is therefore to attempt a forecast of 
terminal throughput. A methodology for forecasting container 
traffic is presented in Appendix 7.6.
Preparation of the fact base 
Identification of Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) '
A statement of specific objectives 
Development of the market strategy 
Establishment of a marketing budget 
Forecast of throughput and profit-
7.2.1 PREPARATION OF THE FACT BASE
The first step in developing the actual plan is to establish 
the basis for the plan. This is achieved by using the 
information gathered from the market information system discussed 
in the previous chapter. The fact base, so created, must give a 
thorough account of all the current conditions and situations in 
the marketing environment, pertinent to the current position of 
the Terminal, what is now being proposed as a solution and why. 
Since everything else flows from this fact base, it therefore 
represent a most crucial part of the entire plan.
Based on the analytic classification for the port fact base, 
presented in Appendix 7.1, the relevant fact base for KTO could 
be as below:
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The Kingston Container Terminal offers cargo handling 
services to port users.
IFACT BASE FOR KTO____________
1. THROUGHPUT
- For the years 1988-1990, a declining trend in throughput 
is observable. This is a result of a decline in KTO s 
share of the transhipment market. Recently, the domestic 
traffic also suffered decline due to worsening economic 
situation of the country. ^
- In the transhipment market KTO's customers consist 
entirely of the shipping lines, while for domestic cargo 
there is a combination of cargo interests and shipping 
lines. Their contribution to Terminal throughput is as 
below:
DOMESTIC TRANSHIPMENT
ZIM 26.6% 78.7%
SEALAND 27.0 -
EVERGREEN 14.0 -
CAROL 20.0 16.7
OTHERS 11.7 -
— Kingston serves a transhipment point via Zim for Miami, 
Houston, San Juan, Santo Domingo and Port-au-Prince. 
Domestic traffic flows are centred primarily around the 
USA, Far East and Europe and more recently the CARICOM 
countries.
2. MARKET
- Regional container throughput is increasing and
therefore the potential market for transhipment is
growing.^
- Liner trade is expected to increase by over 5.1% to the 
year 2000. ^
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2 FACT BASE FOR KTO (CONT'D)
- KTO's market share is falling.
- The Terminal is losing ground in transhipment primarily 
because of:
a) low service quality in terms of productivity and 
unreliability due to stormy labour relations.
b) poor security image re contraband in containers
c) increasing use of the US Landbridge
d) increased port competition
“ The trend towards disintegration of consortia continues 
(Scandutch consortia will separate after January, 1991, 
for example). This has created new opportunities for 
ports, since these now independent lines are seeking hub 
ports for their operating networks.^
- Increased landbridge usage can be expected to continue in 
the future.
“ Increased container penetration for tropical produce is 
expected to continue. ®
- The latest trend in port services, in addition to storage
facilities, has been distribution logistics. Cargo
information service using international EDP linkages has 
also been introduced by some of the leading ports in the 
industry.
- The trend in larger ships sizes necessitating required 
depth alongside of over 13m compared with 11 or so metres, 
increased crane outreach (post panamax) and air height to 
serve 5 high containers on deck, is now established in the 
industry.
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3FACT BASE FX)R KTO <CONT'D)
- Productivity levels in ports are on the increase with 
market leaders such as Singapore recording average moves
in exxcess of 40 per hour  ^ . Increased productivity is
also a function of newer equipment technology.
- After relative stability during the 1987-1988 period, 
vessel operating costs have experienced steep increases
exceeding an annual rate of 10%.^ . Shipowners will need
to continue to exert tight control on costs in order to 
remain competitive. -
-i fi. , ■! 'a  ^ 9 '
3. THE MACRO ENVIRONMENT
- Expected change in the direction of trade due to:
* closing of gap in US balance of trade deficit and 
softening of the US dollar. Imports to US exxpected 
to decline while exports to increase.
^ creation of economic intra-regional trading blocs.
In particular the reduced preference status of 
countries signatory to such trade treaties as LOME 
etc., following the European Community integration in 
1992. Therefore a reduction in exports to these 
countries, from the developing world can be expected.
* decentralisation of production
« new market horizons for trade in Eastern Europe
^ scarcity of financial loans to developing countries 
expected in the future due to emand from Eastern 
Europe.
- World economic growth is expected to average between 3.2gto 3.5 percent.^
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4 FACT BASE FOR KTO (CONT'D)
4. KTO'S SERVICE
- Slow vessel turnaround time, averaging 14 hours per call.
- Poor operational performance of ship-to-shore cranes. 
Also a shortage of cranes to serve vessels adequately. 
Increased downtime attributable to age and unavailability 
of spare parts.
- Abundance of container storage areas. Over 6,500 TEUs now 
available.
- productivity averaging 13 moves per hour.
- increasing industrial unrest has marred the reliability of
the Terminal's service. Especially following the
protracted strike in September, 1990, during which the 
major transhipment carrier threatened to pull out.
- Offering storage and distribution service (under free port 
status) to cargo interest has the potential to increase 
the Terminal's transhipment performance.
- Involvement of the Terminal in through transport movement 
(on-carriage via feedering) can serve to enhance the 
port's attraction as a transhipment centre.
5. COMPETITION
- The major competiting ports are on the one hand, those 
along the coasts of the United States. However, since the 
economics in favour of land bridge usage is quite
overwhelming, KTO is not in a position to compete 
successfully for the cargoes so moved.
The second source of major competition is from those vying 
for ccargo transported on the all-water route vi the 
Panama Canal. These include San Juan, Cristobal, Limon- 
Moin and Santo Domingo.
............ ... ... . m
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5 KTO FACT BASE (CONT'D)
San Juan has the largest market share, but in general all 
competitors have been experiencing increased market share. 
The San Juan Terminal seems to be well developed. 
Cristobal's weakness is seen in terms of future scarcity 
of facilities relative to KTO:
KTO CRISTOBAL
BerthslengthdepthCranes __Storage <TEU) Reefer points
4640m 10.4 -11.9m56,500 72 plus 64 con air
2426m 10.7 - 12.2m 
23,00040
In 1969 Cristobal handled over 100,000 TEUs. This means 
that to avoid congestion, an average dwell time of 11 to 
12 days per container is necessary. It is therefore 
evident tliat Cristobal might face capacity problems in the 
future, not only in terms of transit areas, but maybe 
also, berthing facilities. Two cranes serving two berths 
also imply slow vessel turnaround and probably high vessel 
waiting time.
Notes
1. See figure 5.12. Table 5.2 chapter 5.3. Chapter 3, page 5.4. During a field trip to Rotterdam, a visit was paid to Nedlloyds headquarters. The view of the Network Planning Manager was that, the next 5 to 10 years will determine the ports that will survive in the face of the reorganization of shipping networks, which, in his opinion, shipping companies will be making in the future.
5. Trade Horizons; Annual Issue, 1990. Published by Port Import & Export Reporting Service (PIERS). USA. Page 3 of the report states that in 1989 15,000 more northbound containers of bananas & coffee accounted for more than 50% of trade increase from Central America.
6. Port Views. February, 1990. Published by the Port of 
Singapore Authority.
7. Chapter 3, page 2.8. Lloyds Shipping Economist, Sept. 1991. Pages 6 & 7.
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7.2.2 SWOT ANALYSIS
The SWOT analysis utilizes the management's perceptions of 
the various market trends, competitor's weaknesses and the 
company's own strengths in order to identify opportunities which 
may be exploited profitably. The analysis flows naturally from 
the prepared fact base.v/ Table 7.2 presents some guidelines in 
identifying problems and opportunities and these may be used to 
present a SWOT analysis for KTO as below:
6 SWOT ANALYSIS FOR KTO 
STRENGTHS ,
1. Location of the port of Kingston relative to
a) the major trade routes utilizing the Panama Canal
b) the rest of the Caribbean, Central and South
America (see appendix 7.1 for comparative 
distances from Kingston and Cristobal to Major 
ports in the region).
2. Adequate availability container stacking space.
3. Location of the Kingston Freezone adjacent to the 
port with adequate storage and factory space.
4. Adequate facilities for refrigerated cargoes.
5. Modern EDP system offering container tracking and 
cargo preplanning of vessels.
6. Proximity to the US Landbridge makes it ideal 
consolidation point for cargo between Far East and 
West Coast USA from the rest of the Caribbean, 
Central and South America.
WEAKNESSES
1. Poor labour relations and low level of motivation.
2. Slow vessel turnaround due to ;
a) poor ancillary services such as pilotage and 
towage, and
b) an imbalance .in the cranes to berth ratio
7 SWOT ANALYSIS (CONT'D)
3. High operational delays due to crane breakdown
4. High operational costs
5. Inability to respond to investment demands due to PAJ
regulation
6. Poor Terminal surface conditions hampering operations 
and impacting on equipment performance
7. Dependent on a narrow base of customers for large 
portion of throughput
8. Poor image regarding container security against
contraband . ^
9. High labour cost due to high gang strength.
OPPORTUNITIES
Scope exists to strengthen KTO's transhipment position
by:
1. Arranging feeder service for users interested in 
transhipping
2. Offering storage, distribution and processing 
service to cargo interests due to the existence of 
the IFZ and the abundance of stacking areas.
3. Actively vying for tropical produce from Central 
and South America to utilize the cold storage 
container facilities.
4. Using the existing EDP system to offer logistics 
services to customers for a nominal fee.
5. Further involvement in cargo consolidation for 
small shippers and so reduce the imbalance re 
empties and loaded, containers.
6. The possibility to allocate some of the existing 
container stacking area to container leasing 
companies for repositioning of boxes.
THREATS
1. Increased usage of the US Land bridge
2. Development of numerous container facilities in 
the region
3. Possible reduction in regional trade following a 
reduction in the US export market and the European 
Community .Integration in 1992.
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7.2.3 STATEMENT OF SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
Objectives represent desired solutions to existing problems 
or the exploitation of perceived opportunities and therefore 
represent a natural outgrowth of the SWOT analysis. Because all 
previous steps in the plan led to the formulation of the 
objectives and all subsequent steps are geared at achieving them, 
the objectives represent the core of the marketing plan. In as 
far as is possible, objectives should be specific and measurable, 
with a time frame for achievement. This allows for more 
efficient control. Objectives are not revenue and profit goals, 
but desired results which lead to their achievement.
Appendix 7.3 outlines some basic considerations in setting 
port objectives. Possible objectives for KTO:
6 KTO PORT OBJECTIVES
WBWBBiaiWBBawwitwwniniiiwiniiiiiiiiiiiiiwiim
1. Improving the service quality of the vessel 
operations by reducing overall turnaround time 
through:
a) improved productivity to say 20 moves 
per hour, and,
b) reduced waiting time of vessels
2 Increase
a)
b)
c)
customer base by 
attracting new traffic
expanding the service range to include 
storage and distribution logistics 
attracting smaller lines to enhance the 
port's on-carriage possibilities and 
therefore serve to attract larger lines
3. Restrain/ reduce cost per container handled
4. Improve the port's image in the market place.
IHHHWWfllllUlill
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7.2.4 KARKETING STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
While objectives specify desired end results, strategy outlines 
specific marketing programs aimed at achieving item. As will be 
recalled from the previous chapter, a marketing strategy consists 
of two basic elements:
1) Market Targeting, and,
2) The Marketing Mix. The mix can be internally 
directed and or market directed. Internally 
directed strategies aim at service and tariff 
development, policy formulations and so on. While 
externally directed strategies are those presented 
to the customer in order to win his patronage.
Based on the guidelines for strategy development outlined in 
Appendix 7.4, KTO's strategy is presented below,
9 STRATEGY FOR KTO
MARKET TARGETS
With a view to broadening the Terminal's customer base, 
a) KTO should continue to'target:
(i) container shipping lines using both the Panama Canal 
and the OS Landbridge. Emphasis should be placed on 
attracting a broad range of carriers of different sizes.
(ii) regional shipping lines in order to facilitate on 
carriage to these countries.
Where formerly the great strength of KTO was
location relative to the Canal, and therefore ideally
its
10 KTO STRATEGY (CONT'D)
placed to serve as a transhipment point for the Europe Far 
East, US Gulf and East Coasts to Far East and US West
Coasts, this is- no longer the case since these trades are 
now largely being landbridged. A review of the map
presented in Figure 4.2 will show that KTO is also ideally 
placed to serve as a hub for Central and South America and 
the Caribbean. Further, in terms of marine distances saved 
KTO is better placed, relative to the major competitor, 
Cristobal, to act as a transhipment point for southbound 
cargo to the regions specified. This sub-region was
originally assessed by KTO but not pursued.
It has also been noted that RTW operators still tend to use 
the route through the Panama Canal on at least one leg of 
their service. However, the preferred choice to act as hub 
has been Cristobal. For example the Tricon group
comprising Senator Line, Cho Yang and DSR call at
Cristobal on both their East and West bound service.
Barber Blue Sea uses Cristobal as a hub for the Caribbean, 
Central and South American cargo. Evergreen, on its 
eastbound service now feeds Kingston's cargo over
Charleston but on its westbound service, calls at both 
Kingston and Cristobal before continuing through the Canal.
This implies that there is still scope for KTO to attract 
business from some of the original routes targeted (Europe 
& US to Far East), but that this will involve a lot of 
marketing expenditure since they are already settled at 
Cristobal. And the degree of publicity with which 
Evergreen terminated its transhipment activities at 
Kingston has greatly tarnished the port's reputation and 
created some degree of skepticism among potential carriers. 
Since it easier to try to keep customers than to regain 
them after they have left KTO may want to wait until it has 
secured a broader base of clientele and reduced the stigma 
currently attached to the port before pursuing this market.
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A more rewarding strategy may be to pursue the second 
segment of the market. That is to act as hub for 
southbound cargo destined for Central and South America and 
the Caribbean. In addition, KTO has the advantage of also 
being strategically located relative to the land bridges 
(primarily those to the Gulf Coasts) to act as a 
transhipment point for both imports and exports of these 
regions.
KTO will need to undertake market research to assess these 
possibilities and what strategies to pursue. Although 
these markets are smaller than those of the Far East trade 
now, if "a better economic climate among the West Coast 
South American nations is expected to boost container 
exports seven percent this year C19913 and a further 18% in 
1992."  ^ , then by getting involved in this market, KTO
would have the possibility to grow as this market does. In 
total, exports to Central'America are forecast to grow 20% 
per annum in the near term.
Whether KTO would need to target the smaller and or 
national lines for the northbound journey to Kingston and 
then the bigger lines for the trip from Kingston to say 
Charleston, would largely depend on the current operating 
pattern of both sets of lines and whether there is any 
advantage for them to make an intermediate stop at 
Kingston.
b) Efforts should also be focussed at cargo interests.
Namely,
<i) major exporters/importers of the region regarding 
using the port as a storage and distribution centre 
(ii> the producers' association of regional farmers 
regarding the need for cargo consolidation and 
containerized cold storage. facilities for 
agricultural produce.
1. 1990 Annual Issue of Trade Horizons.
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£iii} container leasing companies.
As shippers spell out the criteria for service and carriers 
try to respond, vast opportunities have opened up for ports 
whose management are willing to capitalize on them. The 
latest shipper's preoccupation has been with the need to 
reduce inventory costs while still preserving their ability 
to respond, with minimum delays to market demand. This
gave rise to the Just In Time (JIT) concept. As a research 
by Nediloyds revealed, large producing companies have 
changed their approach to international trade. This is
mamifested in:
a) a concentration primarily on production and sales
b) production being organized internationally and on 
a decentralized basis, and,
c) a reduction in the period between product manufacture
and delivery.
This Nedlloyd interpreted to mean that these companies
would need another company '• ^ to handle logistics and 
distribution. Not only is there opportunity here for
shipping lines to offer logistics services, but there 
exists a real market opportunity for ports to act as 
regional distribution centres.
KTO will need to target and actively canvass shippers, and 
not only the lines. The question of necessary space to be 
used for storage arise. In this regard, the use of the 
neighbouring freezone would be an advantage. In other
words, part of the task of getting business for the 
Terminal, will involve that of securing business for the 
Freezone.
The likely shippers to be targeted are the ones who are 
still in the process of developing thueir trade and 
distribution channels. In this regard, the greatest
potential rests with the ASEAN countries such as Thailand, 
Indonesia and Malaysia.
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The 1990 annual issue of the PIERS report on Trade 
Horizons, forecast the following growth in containerized 
trade to the US from these countries:
THAILAND INDONESIA MALAYSIA
1991 <TEU) 
GROWTH RATE
158,456
19.7%
65,121
16.5%
56^720
19.0%
1992 (TEU) 188,629 76,908 67,587
GROWTH RATE 19,0% 18.1% 19.2%
II II 11 II II 11 11 II 11 It II II11IIIIIIIIII1111IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII11IIIIItII11 11IIIIIIIIIIItII1111IIIIIIIIIIII II II II II It II 11 11 11
The major commodities and the dominant shipping line
engaged in this trade are as below
IMPORTS TO US FROM SOUTH EAST ASIA (1990)
LINES SHARE COMMODITIES SHARE
(TEU) (TEU)
APL 65,028 FURNITURE 34,794
MAERSK 60,263 CANNED FOODS 29,774
EVERGREEN 51,797 APPAREL 21,804
SEALAND 42,099 ELEC. PROD. 15,451
OOCL 41,968 WOMEN'S &
OTHERS 149,352 INFANT WEAR 14,782
OTHERS 293,902
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The degree to which KTO would be able to tap this market 
will largely depend on the lack of distribution facilities 
within the US, since the first pprt of call of the major 
carriers in this market is the US west coast ports, from 
which cargo is bridged to the East and Gulf ports. It
would also be a function of savings in shipping costs as a 
result of bulk shipment, against the additional cost of 
shipping cargo to Kingston and storing it. Further market 
research will need to be carried out to determine which 
market segments to choose.
Further market development opportunities exist for the 
Terminal in the area of repositioning, storage and repair 
of leased containers. Nearly 45% of all containers in 
operation are leased. The major leasing companies are 
listed below along with their fleet size in 1990.
FLEET(TEU) HEAD OFFICE
GENSTAR/ITEL 920,000 SAN FRANCISCOTIPHOOK GROUP 420.000 LONDONTRANS AMERICA LEASING 290,000 NEW YORKTRITON CONTAINER 200,000 SAN FRANCISCOTRANS OCEAN LTD 130,000 SAN FRANCISCOSEA CONTAINERS LTD 90,000 LONDONINTERMODAL EQUIP. ASSOC 80,000 SAN FRANCISCOTEXTAINER GROUP 75,000 TRIESTE/ITALYINTERPOOL 70,000 NEW YORKSCANDINAVIAN CARGO SYSTEMS 40,000 , STOCKHOLMMATSON LEASING 20.,Q00 SAN FRANCISCO
Source: Containerization International Yearbook, 1991.
The port of Kingston already has a company (Equipment Care) 
which carries out container repairs. This experience is an 
added advantage if KTO chooses to target this market.
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2. THE MARKETING MIX
Tlie service: INTERNAL STRATEGIES
<i) The objectives: To improve service quality especially 
re vessel operations, through improved productivity 
and reduced waiting time and to increase customer
base. This requires:
(a) a solution to the problem of obsolete cranes and the 
increased operational breakdown being experienced, as 
well as a deficiency in the berths to cranes ratio.
Historically, the drawback to renewing or increasing port 
investment has been the reliability of KTO's management on 
the PAJ, resulting in considerable lag time between 
identification of the need and response. One solution may 
be for the Terminal's management to negotiate a new 
agreement with the PAJ, wherein a percentage of the 
operating surplus is not remitted to them, but retained by 
KTO to meet investment needs. The PAJ might wish to 
retain the right to approve the investment. But the fact 
that they are not required to fund it, should serve to 
speed up the process.
One basis for the percentage of earnings to be retained 
could be the annual depreciation cost, based on projected 
replacement value and port development need. A second
solution is for KTO to look at the possibility to lease 
cranes. The European and Japanese markets might offer 
possibilities. The older cranes can be sold as there 
exists a market for these equipment.
<b) Solution to the problem of other port services such 
as pilotage and towage will depend on Management's 
efforts to influence the performance of these 
entities. The system of payment for these services 
on a 'work done' basis .should be implemented, with 
penalties (loss of revenue) for delays in performing 
the service.
141
16 KTO STE^ATEGY (CONT'D)
(c> Measures to improve the motivation and performance 
of stevedoring staff need to be taken. The primary 
reason for the poor productivity level on the
Terminal was ascribed to:
- ' the fact that KTO had no direct control over the
hiring, training, and therefore motivation of the 
stevedores
the fact that stevedores, being paid hourly and not 
per box, had little incentive to increase
productivity. /Some incentive scheme was put in 
place, but the rate of incentive is not high enough 
to compensate for the wage loss by executing their 
job with dispatch.
One strategy is for KTO to adopt the approach most 
container terminals are today using. That is, employ 
crane operators directly on a salaried basis, and 
utilize the labour pool only for aboard ship
activities, such as lashing. Unions need to be made 
to recognize that containerization has changed the 
definition of 'dock work'. Crane operators are no 
longer dock workers but highly paid and skilled 
technicians.
An alternative strategy is for stevedores to be paid 
on a box rate and not a hourly basis. This has the 
obvious advantage of giving workers a vested interest 
in the level of Terminal throughput as well as afford 
them the knowledge that it is no longer in their 
interest financially, to prolong the job, since their 
wages would be the same. This principle has been 
employed in several British Ports and has been 
successful in improving productivity.
>
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(ii)The objective: 
container handled.
To restrain and or reduce cost per
An essential step to restraining and reducing Terminal 
costs is to accrue the benefits . of mechanization in terms 
of labour reduction. The current level of 27 men -per crane 
(excluding supervisory personnel), closely approximates to 
the situation that obtains for breakbulk terminals. A 
survey carried out by the author into this matter of gang 
strength, revealed that in the ports of Rotterdam, Colombo^ 
New York, Malmo, Copenhagen and Los Angeles, the average 
gang strength ranges from 12 to 17'men. KTO cannot -expect 
that investments in terminal equipment will have the 
desired cost savings if they are over manned.
Another factor of Terminal cost is that for tractors used 
to move containers between ship's side and the stacking 
area. One area of cost reduction could be to have a
trailer to each tractor. That is, each tractor/driver crew 
would take two to three containers instead of one. This 
would not only serve to reduce labour cost, but enhance the 
vessel operations. The other solution proposed by the 
Terminal, of using the straddle carriers for this purpose, 
would also achieve the cost savings objective.
MARKET DIRECTED SERVICE STRATEGIES
The objective: 
customers base.
To attract new traffic and broaden the
(i)Throuah Transport. The objective may be achieved by
offering a wider range of services to new and existing 
users. Different customers require different services, 
therefore a customer needs-oriented approach will possibly 
entail the port positioning itself to handle everything 
between the production and selling of cargoes. It will
necessarily involve the use of partners, such as
forwarders, short sea vessel operators and so on. This 
will enable the port to offer through transport to clients.
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M
On carriage arrangements will represent an essential part 
of KTO's service improvement strategy. The existence of a 
wide network of feedering possibilities can serve to 
attract larger lines, that would otherwise be unable to 
enter the relatively fragmented regional market.
<ii) Storage and Distribution services
The essence of the distribution logistics service is to 
meet the 'Just In Time' needs of cargo interests. On the 
'one hand, efficient port services regarding feedering 
arrangements will ensure that importers receive cargo on 
time and on short notice, therefore reducing the need for 
stockpiling. While the manufacturers are able to produce 
on a short term basis to meet customer demand and also 
reduce cost of inventory build up.
Essential to this service is a reliable EDP system. In 
addition to facilitating easy storage and retrieval of 
information the EIDP system will need to enhance the port s 
logistics function by providing information on different 
routing options and costs, in the distribution process. 
The essence of logistics is to optimize time and cost of 
distribution. This means that there will be the need for 
a data base on the various operators on the different 
routes, in order for KTO to select the best partners for 
each route.
The aim of the storage function is to meet the need of 
cargo interests to reduce transportation costs, by 
shipping in bulk, therefore achieving economies. The 
■ cargo can then be shipped to the various destinations as 
demand arises.
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The Tariffs
INTERNAL STE?ATEGIES 
This involves
<a> establishing the cost base or minimum charge that can 
be levied for KTO's services, without accruing a 
loss,
(b) comparison of the port's charges with those of
competitors to ensure competitive a price level and, 
<c) policy decisions regarding the Tariff in general,
such as flexibility of the published tariff, and so 
on.
These can be crucial in meeting the objective of attracting 
new customers, while retaining existing ones.
(a) KTO has a high level of fixed costs, therefore in
order to minimize unit cost and increase
profitability, it needs to pursue a pricing strategy 
aimed at gaining high volume throughput. One basis 
for setting the price is to establish the different 
' throughput and price levels at which the Terminal
will break-even. The selection of one of these price 
levels as the minimum charge will depend on the
probability of achieving these volumes. This 
provides minimum targeted throughput for the 
Terminal, above which, at a given charge it will make 
a profi t.
This does not mean that this minimum charge will be that 
levied at customers, rather it establishes the degree of 
freedom management has in negotiating rates, by 
establishing the floor. The difficulty in using this 
approach is that it tends to establish a composite rate, 
not one for each service and would be more useful if the 
Terminal is pursuing a strategy of providing consolidated 
rates.
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An alternative approach is to base the miniitium rate on the 
direct cost of each service. The pricing policy will be 
to charge^ at a rate at least above the direct cost, so 
that each service will contribute towards fixed costs and 
profitability. Assuming the establishment and
apportioning of the various costs to their costs centre, 
some degree of accuracy in calculating the direct cost can 
be achieved. However, while this approach is invaluable 
•in underlining the minimum charge that management can levy 
for each service area, it does not take into considerai:ion 
the overall profitability of the Terminal, as it neglects 
the consideration of the volume of traffic needed at 
particular rates, to cover fixed costs.
The ideal strategy is to combine both approaches. Thus, 
based on direct cost established for each service, a 
sensitivity analysis can be carried out by incrementing 
this direct cost and calculating the necessary volume to 
achieve break-even point. The choice of rate will 
therefore be based on that level of traffic which is most 
achievable. The price so determined is the minimum charge 
for the particular service.
(b> In determining the final tariff level, consideration 
as to continued competitiveness has to be made. 
Many ports do not publish container handling tariffs, 
so it is difficult to acquire comparative data. 
However, a judgement can be made. For example, the 
comparatively low investment level at the port of 
Cristobal might mean that their fixed costs are not 
as high as KTO's and therefore charges might be 
lower. Consideration has also to be taken regarding 
vessel operators concern over escalating costs.
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EXTEEWAL PRICING STRATEGIES
— Instead of having a single published container handling 
tariff, KTO may conclude separate contracts with 
customers. The rate agreed on depending on the volume, 
size of ships, service required and the level of 
productivity desired. These charges should be founded 
upon an understanding of the carriers position in terms 
of revenue base.
This requires an approach of charging (within limits) what 
the traffic will bear. Thus for carriers with a market 
dominated by low valued- cargo, the approach will be to 
generally be willing to charge a lower rate than for those 
which move say electronics. This means management will 
need to know the basis on which each carrier charges his 
freight. The approach proposed is applicable when freight 
is levied on a commodity basis. The objective of this 
approach is to encourage a variety of traffic so as to 
broaden the customer base, and reduce the Terminal's 
dependency on a narrow range of trades and customers.
- Lower rates might be levied to encourage vessels to call 
at off-peak periods or when there is not a heavy demand 
for cranes. For example. Appendix 7.6 shows that the 
demand for berth and crane usage at the Terminal is 
heaviest on Mondays, with Saturday being the lightest. By 
reducing the overtime charge on weekends it might be 
possible to spread the demand and therefore reduce the 
possibilities of congestion.
- In order to attract the business of storage for container 
leasing companies, it might be useful of offer free 
storage for a certain percentage of their containers. 
Thus storage charges can operate as a 'loss leader' the 
real objective being to gain substantial revenues from the 
container handling activities and not necessarily directly 
from storage.
KtO
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- Increased vessel calls can be encouraged by giving a
reduction in port dues, pilotage or towage charges, after 
a certain number of vessel calls per customer per year has 
been achieved. This should be directed at transhipment 
carriers. However, since these areas are not revenue
sources for KTO, some arrangement will need to be made 
with the PAJ regarding compensation. The basis of the 
reduction must be in terms of additional calls (and 
traffic) expected as against revenue loss from the rate 
reduction.
- A most important price strategy in securing t,ranshipment 
might be to offer a through (consolidated) tariff. This 
makes it easier for those cargo interests, wishing to 
tranship. The rate would need to cover all the various 
activities, including feedering. KTO would then pay the 
various partners accordingly.
The Promotion
The objective of the promotional strategy is to increase 
customer base and improve the image of the port.
In order to broaden the customer base, KTO needs to create 
awareness among current and potential users of its various 
services. It needs to have access to the right people and 
then communicate to them its services. KTO's current 
promotional strategies take the form of printed brochures, 
advertisements in trade journals and personal visits to 
customers or potential customers. In addition, access to 
cargo interests can be gained by visiting or participating 
in the various trade fairs (such as EXPO), forwarding and 
other industry conferences.
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Initially, the stance might be for the Terminal to send one 
or two members of ' the marketing staff, to observe and 
recommend whether the port should take part the following 
year. Participation is normally in the form of booths 
' displaying the Terminal's facilities, services and present 
customers. It is essential in promoting the Terminal's
facilities that a. distinction be made between planned__m l
^  existing facilities. It was very surprising to this author 
to meet a top ranking official of CGM at the Port of 
Bremen, and be asked about our Freezone facilities. His 
understanding was that we have plans to build a facility, 
but he was quite unaware that the facility was in existence 
and operating for about a decade!
A crucial part of KTO's promotional strategy will be to 
repair its image in terms of container security and labour 
stability. To this end activities will have to be focused 
on detailing the various security measures which are now in 
place and highlighting their effectiveness by pointing to 
the fact that, since their implementation, no further drug 
finds were made by the US Customs. The effect of the 
degree of publicity with which Evergreen withdrew 
transhipment activities in Kingston, and the reason 
published (drug finds) must not be underestimated. It is 
much better for the marketing team to bring up the subject 
of Terminal security than to be asked about it. One 
strategy in promoting the security of the port might be to 
look at the possibility of having the US Customs come and 
appraise our security measures. An approval might be 
invaluable in eradicating the current stigma.
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TEkMINAL OPEEULTOR'S a g r ee m e n t
; An Agreement made the 30th day of July, 1982
A^ |OMG . -i ?HB PORT AUTlIpRITY, a body corporate established and » ,
ex|istid)<f under and by virtue of the Port Authority Act and 
haying tts offices at 15-17 Duke Street in the parish of 
Kihgstoii (hereinafter referred to as "the Authority") of the 
ONt ‘PAFT and KINGSTON WHARVES LIMITED, a company 
interpolated under the laws of Jamaica and having Its 
reglstajed office at 64 Harbour Street in the parish of 
Kiigston of the SECOND PART and WESTERN TERMINALS LIMITED, 
a iompaEftr incorporated under the laws of Jamaica and having 
iti registeredr office at 64 Knutsford Boulevard, Kingston 5 
in * the parish' of Saint Andrew of the THIRD PART and 
KINGSTON TERMINAL OPERATORS LIMITED, a company incorporated 
un4«r th» laws of Jamaica and having its registered office 
at |64 Harbour Street in.the parish of Kingston (hereinafter 
^rredito as "the Operator") of the FOURTH PART 
W H E R E A S :
i
The Authority has the responsibility for
regulating the- use of all port facilities in the Port of%
Kingston
I
re
1.
including the Container Terminal at Newport West in
the|pariiih of $aint Andrew
: St Af A
2. !
'w  i ./
The Authority owns^ part of. the Container Terminal
• L i :  ^t3ac|afli3i<.torths,. and is in the process of ‘
expanding the facilities of the Container Terminal,
3. • Kingston Wharves Limited owns Berths 8 and 9 at
Newport lest and has agreed to make such portions of these 
as kay b» required and as may be capable of having the 
Paceco ’ Pcrtaine(r cranes operate thereon available for use as
I
an jntegxated part of the Container Terminal.
4. j The Operator is jointly owned by Kingston wharves
Limited and Western Terminals Limited who were parties to an
agxrecent dated 23rd April, 1975 with the Authority for the
opefatlos of the Container TerminalThe Operator has been
i •[ !estibllshnd by those two companies at the request of the}
AutHorityj to enter into a new agreement with the Authority
009 9239195 10.04. 91809 92391950 ktD. FT. BUSTflMflNTE KGN.
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to operota the Container Terminal upon the terms' and 
condit^ns hereinafter mentioned, and with a view to 
avoiding the several deficiencies experienced in the 
operation .of the said Container Terminal under the agreement 
dated 23rd April, 1975, .particularly in the area of 
management and staffing. .
NOU IT IS HERESY AGREED:
1.
2.
3.
4.
This Xgreement is for the management Cf the 
Container Terminal and any new berths as from time 
to time are available for operation as pert of the 
Container Terminal and as are made available for 
that purpose. '
This Agreement’ shall come into force on the 1st 
day of danuary, -1982 and shall, subject to the 
provisions of Clause 23, continue for a period of 
five (5) years.
The operator, during ' the continuance of this 
Agreement, shall manage and operate the Container 
Terminal and any expansion of the existing 
facilities as one operation.
Kingston Wharves X<imited shall make available for 
use as an integrated part of the Container 
Terminal such portions of .Berths 8 and 
required and as may be capable of having the 
Paccco Portainer cranes operated thereon and save 
for any consideration as' set out in this 
Agreement,)^no charge shall be made to the 
Authority for such use of these Berths and 
facilities. Kingston Wharves Limited shall be 
responsible for maintaining at its 'own cost Berthe 
8 and 9 in a suitable condition for .use as part of 
the Container Terminal aforesaid.
The Operator shall in respect of the opere^tion of 
thf Container Terminal charge and collect-for all 
services rendered thereat at the rates specified
5.
8 0 9  9 2 3 9 1 9 5 0  K T D .  P T .  B U S T f l t K W E  K G N . 8 0 9  9 2 3 9 1 9 5  1 0 . 0 4 .  9 1  2 1 : 0 4
6.
n
7,
8.
y
y
b y  o r  o , r . . d  W i t h  t h o  , „ d  . . v e  o .  i .
o t h o r v l . ,  . p e c « i c o U y  . , r o . d ,  , „ e . ,
• h m  opordUon, Of th.
Cont«rn.r Toroiinl., Any rovMioo. dorivod from the 
tbronpApnt oherpe. fee end v.ter .„ppU«>
‘'O" -«*>■ ». ». 10 end n  .A.„ he 
«q««lly between Kl„5.te„ w,.„e, ,,i„at.d „d th.
! A u t h o r i t y  e n d  . h e l l  „ e t  f o r m  p e r t  o f  t h e .  r e v e n u e .
, : O f  t h e  o p e r e t i o n .  o f  t h .  C o n t a i n e r  l e r m i n e l .
.  T h e  o p e r a t o r  . h e l l  n o t  ( . . v .  i t  I t .  o u n  r i . k )
I  p r e n t  c r e d i t  f o r  t h .  . . r v l o e .  r e n d . r « J  , t  t h e
'  C o n U i n e r  T e r m l n . l ,  e x c e p t  w i t h i n  t h e  l i m i t .  . „ d  Y  
I i n  . c c o r d . n c .  w i t h  t h .  t e r m ,  . p p r o v e d  b y  t h .  V  
i Authority from time to time.
I
! T h e  O p e r a t o r  . h e l l  u n d e r t e k .  . n d  b e  r e . p o n . i b l .
: f o r  t h e  m . i n t e n . n = .  . n d  « r v i c i n ,  o f  t h e  P . c e c o
■ P o r t e i n e r  treat. ^  tn'\S;;Se„;rw;;h t h e
n e n u f e c t u r e r .  n p e c i f i c e t i o n . .  i t  . h e l l  f „ r t h . r  
u n d e r t a k e  . „ d  b e  r e . p o n . l b l e  f o r  t h e  m e i n t e n e n c .
; e n d  . . r v i c i n g  o f  . 1 1  p i . „ t  „ a '  e , „ i p „ . „ r  
: . v . l l . b l .  b y  t h e  A u t h o r i t y ,  w i t h  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  o f  
i t h .  o p e r a t o r ,  f o r  u . e  a t  t h e  C o n t a i n e r  T e r m i n a l .
! T h .  c o a t ,  a n d  e x p e n . e .  i n c u r r e d  b y  t h e  O p e r a t o r  i n  
t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  a n d  . e r v i c i n g  o f  a l l  . „ o h  p l a n t  
a n d  e g u l p m e n t  . h a l l  b e  t r e a t e d  . .  p a r t  o f  t h .  
i U r e c t  o p e r a t i n g  o o . t  o f  t h .  C o n t a i n e r  T e r m i n a l .
T h e  A u t h o r i t y  . h a l l  b e  r . . p o „ . i b l .  f o r  t h .  
p o r c h . . .  o f  a n d  w i l l  . u p p l y  . p a r .  p , r t ,  f o r  t h e  
e g u i p m e n t  m a d e  a v a i l a b l e  b y  t h .  A u t h o r i t y  f o r  u e e  
a t  t h .  C o n t a i n e r  T e r m i n a l  a n d  a l t h o u g h  t h .  
A u t h o r i t y  . h a l l  p r o v i d e  t h e  n e c e . s a r y  a t o r a g e  
d a c i l l t i e a  t h e  O p e r a t o r  . h a l l  b e  a o l e l y  
W . p o n . i b l .  f o r  t h .  . a f .  o e . t o d y  o f  e u c h  . p a r .  
p b t t .  w h e n  d e l i v e r e d  b y  t h e  A u t h o r i t y .  T h e  
O p e r a t o r  . h a l l  p a y  t h e  A u t h o r i t y  f o r  a u c h  . p a r e
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' phrts as and when used by the Operator and t h e  ^  
cost of such spare parts and the personnel 
eiqployed to ensure their safe custody shall <be 
‘ treated as part of the direct operating cost of ^
t
the'container Terminal. The Operator shall take
stock of such.spare parts not less than once in 
■ ■ Aeevery, three Cil) months and the costs of any spare 
' parts found missing shall be reimbursed to the 
Authority by the Operator,
9, The Insurance premiums ' In respect of dock
’ facilities^ all plant and equipment, including 
 ^spare parts owned by the Authority and made 
; available to the Operator for use at the Container 
Terminal shall be paid by the Operator when due 
i and shall be treated as part of the direct
; operating costs of thie Container Terminal. .i ■
10, ' The Operator shall take out such policies of
t
insurance in respect of such liabilities and upon 
such terms and conditiohs in the joint names of 
the Authority and the Operator as shall be agreed 
with the Authority as being necessary and adequate 
with such insurance company or companies as the 
' Authority may in each case and from time to time 
 ^direct or approve and the cost of such insurances 
shall be treated as part of the direct operating 
’ cost of the Container Terminal, |it being 
I understood and agreed that any insurance premiums 
: payable in respect of Berths 8 and 9 shall not be 
. treated as part of the direct operating cost of 
the Container Terminal,
11, ] The Operator shall provide adequate security for
the Container Terminal and all the plant and 
equipment thereon, and the costs and expenses of 
i such security shall be treated as part Of the I direct operating cost of the container Terminal.
V
.V
y
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12,
13.
L
The Operator shall maintain a separate harih 
account for the operation of the Container 
Terminal and all . income and expenditure in 
relation thereto shall be passed through this 
account. The Operator shall prepare a monthly 
statement of accounts within thirty (30) days of 
the. end of the month to which the statement 
relates and shall within sixty (60) days of the 
.presentation of the relevant accounts > pay over to 
the Authority any surplus shown on that account. 
•Any deficit shown by the accounts referred to 
herein shall be paid by the Authority into the 
abovementioned bank account within sixty (60) days 
of the presentation of the relevant accounts. As 
soon as possible after the expiration of each 
year# the Operator shall cause the accounts to be 
audited by a recognised firm of Accountants 
acceptable to the Authority. The audited accounts 
shall be presented to the Authority within Ninety 
(90) days after the end of the year to which the 
accounts relate or failing this as soon as 
possible thereafter. The cost of such audit shall 
be treated aS a direct operating cost of the 
Container Terminal. " Any adjustment necessitated 
by such audit shall be effected immediately. The 
Authority shall have the right at its own cost to 
have the accounts of the Operator audited from 
time to time and shall be entitled to conduct such 
investigations into the operations and management 
of the Container Terminal# as the Authority 
considers necessary from time to time.
The accounts referred to in the preceding clause 
shall be in such form and context as may be agreed 
f^ m*'''.time to time by the Authority and- the 
Operator.
!
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14. !The Operator shall confine its expenditure in
' relation to the management and operation of the
I  ^ »
' Container Terminal within such limitations as may
; be agreed with the Authority or failing such
«
agreement, then within such limitations sis may be 
* specified by the Authority provided, however that
■ it is clearly understood that any such
■ specifications shall be geared towards a
' r e a s o n a b l e  e f f i c i e n t  o p e r a t i o n . ■
. ‘ j ■ • . ■ a /  ' • •15. ‘ The Operator shall maintain an efficient operation
'■ and Ithall satisfy the Authority that planning and
J ' ■
management is' adequate to ensure such operation
1 . *
' and shall co-operate with the Authority to this 
i end.
16. ’ The Authority shall provide or arrange for the
I provision of all plant and equipment required for 
'■ the operation of the Container Terminal after
■ consultation and agreement with the Operator and 
shall take into account the availability of any 
equipment purchased by the Operator prior to this 
Agreement or with the knowledge and consent of the 
Authority for the operation of the facilities.
17. (a) ' Should the Operator not conclude with the '
1
y
V
Authority an Agreement to operate the Container 
Terminal after termination of this Agreement, the 
Authority shall immedlatiely after such termination 
notify the Operator whether any equipment owned or 
controlled by the Operator is required and the 
Operator shall then make available to the 
Authority or to such other operator as the 
Authority may nominate, such equipment owned or 
controlled by the Operator at such rental charges 
as may be negotiated between the parties not being 
more than the current sums being paid for the use 
of such equipment by the user receiving most
favourable terms for their use, or within thirty 
(30) days of the commenceiaent of such hireage the 
: Authority may purchase such equipment at cost less 
depreciation at the'rate or rates approved by the
I
Authority, if being the intention of this Clause 
' to ensure the ability of the Authority to secure 
i the continued operation of the Container Terminal 
I with as much equipment as was available for its 
; operation during the period of this Agreement, end 
1 the Operator shall be obliged to deliver such 
' dguipment to the purchaser and the purchaser or 
; the Authority shall make payment within thirty 
! -{30) days thereof.
17. (b) I Should the Operator not conclude with the
.■ Authority an Agreement to operate the Container
\!Terminal after termination of this Agreement the 
iAuthority shall indemnify and reimburse the 
Operator in. respect of any eunouhts paid by the 
I Operator under the provisions of The ISmployment 
: (Termination and {Redundancy Payments) Act or any 
icolleotiva Labour Agreement in force at that time 
ibstween the Operator and a Trade Union to its 
'employees working at the Container Terminal at 
. tsuch date of termination of this Agreement with 
£uch indemnity however being limited to the period
Of employment with the Operator.
*. !18. (There the Container Terminal is not sufficiently 
equipped to carry out any of the functions 
normally carried out at a container terminal and 
contemplated by this Agrecanent, the Operator may 
frcKB time to time sub-contract such operations as 
may be necessary in. the circumstances but only 
after consultation with the Authority on the need 
for and the terms of any such sub-contract as may 
be necessary in the circumstances. In exceptional
II
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circumstances, vhere such consultation is not 
possible, a sub-contract f o r  a specific purpose 
nay be entered Into, by the Curator and 
notification thereof to the Authority, shall take
4 *
place at the first possible opportunity. In any 
event, the conclusion of any such sub-contract 
I must be notified promptly and in writing to the 
j Authority.
I
19. Kingston Wharves Limited and Western Terminals
Limited in their respective capacities as wharf 
operators snaxi' subject t.o the provisions of the 
Wharfage Act, collect and retain all wharfage 
payable (save as containerised transhipment cargo) 
for cargo passing over the Container Terminal on 
condition that all costs and expenses in ' 
connection therewith shall, be borne by them and 
that none of such costs and expenses are charged 
to the operating cost of the Container Terminal. 
Should the Authority decide that wharfage or any 
part thereof on Containerised Transhipment Cargo 
is to be payable, then Kingston Wharves Limited 
and Western Terminals Limited shall collect same 
and the amount so collected less the direct 
expenses incurred Iti such collection shall form
• I f * ' ' 'Mtr/- -it,,,
part of the earnings of the operations of the 
Container Terminal.
20. Kingston Wharves Limited and Western terminals
Limited each agree that it will pay to the 
Operator for the sole account of the Authority the 
sum of 10 cents per ton (tonnage assessed on the
1
same basis as is used for the fixing of the tariff
}
of wharfage rates) for every ton of cargo imported
or exported .in containers excluding all 
roll-on-roll-off cargo and containerised 
' transhipment cargo which is handled by or over the
I
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Container Terminal in respect o£ which wharfage is 
collectable pursuant to iJhe tariff of 'wharfage 
rates. It being understood and agreed that such . 
amounts paid by each of Kingston Wharves, hinited 
and Western Terminals Limited shall not be taken 
• * into account by the Operator in’ determining either 
the Gross Revenue of the Container Terminal or the 
Net Revenue.
21. The Operator shall pay over to the Authority the
residue of the .total earnings frcnn'the operations 
■of the Container Temlnal after deducting from the 
total' earnings during any accounting period the 
following expenses attributable to that accounting 
period:
(a) all salaries, wages and other costs of 
personnel employed by the Operator; .
(b) maintenance costs;
(c) costs, if any, of renting equipment used, at 
the Container Terminal;
(d) . the cost of spare parte;
(e) interest on working capital which may be 
borrowed for the operations of the Container 
Terminal;
(f) insurance premiums for spare parts, the dock 
facilities and ail plant and equipment as 
provided for in Clause 9 and insurance 
premiums payable in accordance with 'the  ^
provisions of Clause ID;
(g) ahy other appropriate direct costs and should 
there be any dispute as .to whether any cost 
is a direct .cost, then normal accounting 
principles will apply in determining same; .
(h) capital charges, comprising interest payable 
by the Authority and depreciation on the 
plant, equipment and dock facilities owned by
the Authority A t  the rate or rates set out in 
■letter of the ■ same date as-, this agreement 
.between- the Authority and the Operator.;
(i) depreciation at the rate or ra.tes set out in 
letter^ of--the.-same date^Jis— thi-s—ag*4aaignt 
between the Authority—and- the—fipeeator on 
plant and equipment purchased and owned by 
the Operator and in respect of -which no other 
charge by way of rental or hireage is being 
made as o charge to the Container Terminal. 
Where such, equipment is used partly in 
respect of the Container Terminal and partly 
for other purposes, depreciation thereon 
shall be apportioned according to use;
(j) a management fee calculated to reward the 
Operator for its efforts as operator of One
■ and one-half per cent (1H%) ^he Gross 
Revenue of the Container Terminal (less the 
.lO^  rental) plus twelve per cent (12%) of the 
Wet Revenue. The terns -"Gross Revenue" and 
"Net Revenue" shall be calculated on the 
basis agreed by letter of the same date as 
this agreement between the Authority and the 
Operator.
The Authority and the Operator shall Work closely 
together for the promotion of the Container 
Terminal in order to aim at increasing the volume 
of containers now passing through the Container 
Terminal.
v;ithout prejudice to any other rights of the 
parties, and notwithstanding the provisions of 
Clause 2, this Agreement may be terminated by 
either party at any time after the expiration of 
three (3) years from its commencement by six (6) 
months' previous notice in writing.
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2 4 .  ■ Should the Operator be desirous of continuing the
management of the Container terminal after the 
termination of this Agreement* the Operator shall 
not less than nine months before the expiration of 
this Agreement give to the Authority .notice in 
writing of such desire* whereupon both parties ’ 
shall forthwith enter into negotiations so as to 
determine the terms and conditions of theI . ■ .
agreement for the continuing management of the 
^ntainer. Terminal by the Operator. In the event
I
that such an agreement is not boncluded three 
months before, the expiration of the period of this 
Agreement then unless the Authority and the 
operator shall otherwise agree this Agreement 
shall upon the expiration thereof be terminated.
25. The. Authority may determine this Agreement 
forthwith by notice in writing to the Operator if 
the Operator shall go into liguida'tlon (whether
. compulsory or voluntary not being merely a 
voluntary liquidation for the purposes of 
. amalgamation or reconstruction) or shall become 
insolvent or enter into an agreement with its 
creditors generally or shall have a receiver
V . ■
ajppointed of its assets ^ or undertaking or any part 
.thereof.
26. . any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be
referred to a single arbitrator nominated by the 
President for the time being of the Public 
Accountancy Board of Jamaica in accordance with 
the provisions of the Arbitration Act or any 
statutory modificationa or re-enactment thereof 
fox the time beipg in force.
27. ' Nothing in this Agreement shall constitute a
. partnership between the parties hereto' nor 
constitute any of them the agent of any other.
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28. No variation waiver or modification of any of the
terms of this Agreement shall be effective unless 
in writing and signed by or on behalf of the 
parties hereto.
on any party hereto shall be well and truly served 
if posted by prepaid registered post in any post 
office in Jamaica addressed to the. party at the 
address hereinbefore appearing and any such notice 
shall be deemed to have been' received within 
Scvchtytwo (72) hours of the time of posting.
IN NITNBSS NHBREOF the parties hereto have caused
29 Any notice required by this Agreement to bo served
this Agreement to be executed as of the date hereinbefore 
written.. . . •
EXECUTED under the Common Seal) 
of THE PORT AUTHORITY by )
Lucien M. Rattray, (Seneral )
Manager and H. St. John )
Iffoodham
in the presence ofx-
Secretaryl..
E
of KINGSTON TERMINAL- OPERATORS) 
LIMITED in accordance with its) 
Articles of Association in the)
presence of:- )
.M
IV
^ f;-**
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EXECUTED urjder the Conunon Seal) 
of KINGSTON WlARVES LIMITED in) 
accordanceiwith its Articles ) 
of Association in the presence) 
ofI- ■ )
B09 9239195 10. S4. 91 21:15
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EXECUTED upder the Common Seal) 
of WESTERN TERMINALS LIMITED ) 
in accordance with its )
Articles of Association in the) 
presence oft-‘ )
TOTAL P.05
APPENDIX 5.1
TRAFFIC AT TERMINAL (CONTAINERS & VESSELS) FOR 1980-1990
I YEAR {TRANSHIPMENT11
DOMESTIC { TOTAL 1 1
{VESSEL • : CALLS
! 1980 { 72,029 23,244 { 95,273 { 507{ 1981 { 64,288 29,564 { 93,852 { -543{ 1882 { 50,570 11 30,777 { 81,347 { 506{ 1983 { 58,636 11 31,564 { 90,200 : 560{  1984 { 58,888 11 26,133 : 85,021 { 515{ 1985 { 103,185 11 28,180 { 131,365 : 618{ 1986 { 126,489 tI 34,241 : 160,730 { 548: 1987 { 126,117 11 35,091 { 161,208 : 496
{ 1988 { 66,578 11 . 48,195 : 114,773 J 530: 1989 { 42,344 11 51,901 { 94,245 { 529
1 1990 : 47,512 11 . 40.601 .{ 88.113 ! 412
Source: Kingston Terminal Operators Ltd
APPENDIX 5.2
KTO BERTH OCCUPANCY FOR PERIOD 1988-1990
MONTH NO. OF VESSELS
1990 i!
I I „
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  » I1 TOTAL HRS 1 !NO. OF{ALONGSIDE: ‘.VESSELS
I _ _ _ _ _ _ » > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _—  I — - - - -  —  I 1
1989 :!
I I
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   ■“  I I:TOTAL HRS! 1 NO. OF:alongside:{vessels
I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I I   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1988 :
I— — — — — — — —  J
{TOTAL HRS: {ALONGSIDE:
I  I—  I----- — —  ,
JANUARY 37 { 321.5FEBRUARY 34 { 371.9MARCH 29 { 364.6APRIL 31 { 380.2MAY 32 { 380.3JUNE 34 { 341JULY 31 { 268.4AUGUST 32 : 396.2SEPTEMBER 28 { 423.2OCTOBER 32 { .327.7NOVEMBER 40 { 627,4DECEMBER 41 { 540.9
41 : 430.1 {
38 { 301.7 {
46 { 453.3 {
41 { 412.6 {
48 { 511.3 1
48 { 434.6 {
46 : 492 {
46 { 406 {
39 { 405 {
43 : 404.5 :
38 { 387.4 {
38 { 385 • {
40 { 696.2 {
37 { 402.6 {
42 { 545.9 {
46 { 475.4 {
38 { 413.5 {
53 { 576.7 {
44- { 387.3 {
50 { 544 {
41 { 400.4 {
45 { 440.1 {
50 { 747.3 {
41 { 528.8 {
TOTAL { 401 { 4743.3 {{ 512 { 5023.5 {{ 527 { 6158.2 {{
AVERAGE . : 11.83 {{ { 9.81 {{ { 11.69 {{
Source: KTO Statistics
APPENDIX 5.3
KTO TURNAROUND TIME (DAYS) 
FOR OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1989
MONTH ■
NO. OF 
SHIPS
TIME
OCTOBER 43 0.53
NOVEMBER 38 0.57
DECEMBER 39 • 0.57
120 0.56
S S 8 8 S C S S C S 8 B X S B S ===='=••===
SOURCE: TABLE 27. PORT STATISTICS
OF JAMAICA. 0CT-DEC’89 
PREPARED BY PAJ. JAN. 1990
APPENDIX 5.4
DISTRIBUTION OF MOVES PER GANG HOURS FOR ZIM
VESSELS FOR PERIOD 1.01.90 TO 2£
MV/GRS HR MIDPOINT FREQ CUM. F
(X) (F)
0 - 2 1 1 1
2 - 4 3 0 1
4 - 6 5 3 4
6 - 8 7 1 5
8 - 1 0 9 15 20
10 - 12 11 33 53
12 - 14 13 57 110
14 - 16 15 33 143
16 - 18 17 15 158
18 - 20 19 5 163
20 - 22 21 4 167
XF
167
0.6
0.6
2.4
3.0
0
,7
,9
.6
12 , 
31, 
65, 
85,
94.6
97.6
100.0
AVERAGE
1
0
15
7
135
363
741
495
255
95
84
2191
13.11976
Source: KTO productivity report
APPENDIX 5.5
TARIFF RECIPIENTS
KTO
OF REVENUE 
PAJ KW/WT
PILOTAGE - X -
TOWAGE - X —
WHARFAGE - — X
CONTAINER HANDLING X - —
RECEIPT 8c DELIVERY X - f -
STORAGE X — —
STRIPPING 8( STUFFING X — _ —
MOUNTING 8( GROUNDING X ' -
APPENDIX 5.6
INDICES OF REVENUE, COST It PROFIT PER CONTAINER 
(1R85 BASE YEAR)
CD LH '86 '87/88 '88/89 '89/90
REVENUE:
DOMESTIC 100 111 119
TRANSHIPMENT 100 113 119
COST (J$) 251 307 435 619 742
RATE OF EXCHANGE 4.25 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.5
COST (US$) 59 56 79 113 114
INDEX 100 95 134 191 194
PROFIT 100 70, 55 73 68
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COMPONENTS OF A PORT INFOE?MATION SYSTEM
REQUIRED DATA DATA SOURCE
ENVIRONMENT
1.1 Macro Environment
a) Economy: Historical and
forecast economic data on 
regional trading and partners 
focussing on:
GNP
« Industrial production
* Inflation
 ^ Investment & economic activity 
Foreign trade (Imp & exp) 
it Balance of Payments and debt
* Exchange rates 
Political stability
* International trade agreements
Data can be found in 
various publications: 
DRI, World Bank, IMF etc. 
However, the port can 
best keep abreast of the 
economic conditions of 
the various countries and 
regions through the local 
and international press 
as well as industry trade 
journals.
b) Technology: Developments 
are likely to affect the in-
transport modes and ship 
sizes
Port & terminal cargo 
handling facilities
c) Legislature:
* Government policy regarding 
imports and exports. 
a Imposition and removal of 
tariffs or export subsidies 
etc-
whi ch
Industry journals such as 
Cargo ware, Container­
isation International, 
Port Development 
International, etc.
Press and trade journals.
1.2 Port Industry
a) Customers
* Trends in customer service 
requirements
* Their share of the total
* Trading patterns and their 
trading partners over time.
In addition to sources 
previously quoted, such 
publications as PIERS, 
and Trade Horizons are 
useful. Also Market
* Level of freight rates for surveys.
main commodities carried to 
and from the port on specific 
routes.
Concerns: costs, service speed 
and efficiency, etc.
 ^ Financial performance.
b) Competitors: Information on
existing and potentially competing 
ports:
* Capacity : over or under See above sources,
utilization.
* Service quality
* Throughput performance and Containerisation
market share International Yearbook
 ^ Financial performance
* Port development plans 
if Pricing
* Main Customers
if Labour relations
2. PORT DATA.
The UNCTAD manual on Port Statistics outlines the needs and 
sources of port data and information. It tables each data item 
of information and this is attached for reference. The table 
tries to identify or classify information according to the degree 
of importance. It is recommended that a port setting up an 
information system, or improving an existing system, might find 
it useful to work out the essential data and then, as resources 
permit or needs demand, add first the important data and then the 
useful .
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  p o r t  d a t a  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n
Recording
Afotn calegorla o f  data Etsenllal Imporlanl U ttfid  Nature Frequency o f  eolleetlaa
Port organization.................. List of individual port operators 
Description of their functions
Information Annual
Port facilities 
Berths................................ Oassification by type 
Depth of water alongside berth 
Physical description
Information Annual
Handling equipment. . . . Classification by type 
Technical characteristics 
Capacity 
Age
Information Annual
Storage equipment . . . . Classification by type 
Physical description 
Storage capacity
Information Annual
Transport equipment for use 
within the port area . . . Transport infrastructure (road- 
rail-inland water) 
Classification of vehicles by type 
Technical characteristics 
Capacity 
Age
Information Annual
Navigational a id s .................. Signalling system
Pilotage
Towage
Information Annual
Servicing of sh ip s .................. Facilities for :
Bunker supplies 
Water supplies 
Repairs and maintenance
Information Annual
Ship traffic 
Type of s h ip ...................... Passenger ship ' Statistical Continuous
Break-bulk general 
Cargo ships : 
Liners 
Tramps 
Specialized ship 
Mixed ship
Size of ship Draught Ucani Statistical
Type of operation..................
Origin and destination of ship
Flag of the ship......................
Port operations 
Turn-around time of ship .
Services and facilities provided 
by the p o rt.........................
Goods in s to rage ...............
Supplies to ship..................
CRT or NRT
DWT
Length
Loading
Discharging
Loading and discharging 
Bunkering
Repairs, maintenance 
Other purposes
Statistical
' .I?
By country of origin and By port of origin and Statistical
destination destination
Continuous or sam­
pling
Continuous
Continuous or sam­
pling
Flag Statistical Continuous
Times o f :
Arrival 
‘ Berthing 
Departure
Times o f :
Pilot on board 
• Start handling
Handling stoppage etc.
Record of ship delay by main 
causes
Successive berths allocated to 
each ship 
Handling and transport equip­
ment for each working period 
Amount of cargo loaded and Pilot and craft at each movement 
discharged during each work­
ing period No. of tugs at each movement
For each unit of storage :
Goods received from ships 
Goods dispatched to hinterland 
Goods received from hinterlands 
Goods dispatched to ships
Types and tonnages of bunker 
Tonnages of water
Statistical Continuous
Statistical Continuous or sam­
pling
Statistical Continuous or sam­
pling
K»-
‘
Statistical Continuous or saln-
pling
Statistical Continuous
Accidents Accidents to ships Damage to cargoes
Information Continuous
Port labour
ClassiTication of port data and Information (continued)
For the whole port;
No, of supervisory staff 
No. of clerical staff 
No. of permanent dock-workers 
Average number of casual 
workers
Classification by age Information Weekly or monthly
Cargo flows 
Type of t r a f l ic ...............
Commodities
Type of packaging . . . .
Size of shipment
Type of operation
Rcc<,rtor.bs»«b,„». s.a,«fal
Number of supervisory staff 
Number of clerical staff 
Number of permanent dock- 
workers
Number of casual workers
Goods discharged 
Goods loaded 
Goods trans-shipped 
Types of traffic: 
Foreign 
Domestic 
Transit 
Entrep6t
Ocean traflic 
Near-sea traflic
Amount of cargo in bach class 
of the port commodity classi­
fication
Amount of cargo in each type 
of packaging
Statistical
Statistical
Statistical
Number of individual shipments 
in cadi class size Statistical
Transfer from ships to inland 
transport and vice versa for 
inward and outward traffic 
Direct
Throtigli port storage
Through lighter
Through lighter and storage
Statistical
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Sampling
Continuous or sam­
pling
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MARKET RESEARCH AS A TOOL IN PORT MARKETING
Having considered the general factors determining a port's 
traffic, there is a need to take steps to obtain relevant 
information about cargo movements to or from some particular 
region. In this respect market research will be geared at
obtaining information from cargo interests.
Sometimes the necessary information can be obtained by 
INTERVIEWS, without a prior postal survey. However, this is
only likely to be possible when relatively few companies are 
involved. Otherwise, there may be scope for a POSTAL
QUESTIONNAIRE. Consideration will need to be given to the
likelihood of a response. There will therefore be a need for 
follow-up calls and marketing meetings as relevant with
appropriate companies/persons as identified by the postal survey.
USES OF MARKET RESEARCH
This research technique is useful in:
a) Pinpointing potentially available traffics : moving in
worthwhile volumes.
b) Providing information for actual marketing meetings 
with potential port users (For example, abut inland 
cargo origin and destination).
c) The information so gathered is useful not only to ports 
but to the shipping lines. Therefore with the prior 
permission of the companies concerned, this information 
can be copied to a shipowner serving the port: enabling 
him to market his shipping service - and the use of the 
port - to cargo interests.
P0ST7UL SURVEYS - SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS
1. Carefully identify information needed - keeping it to a 
minimum in terms of the work it imposes on the person 
completing the questionnaire.
2. Check the draft questionnaire questions on someone who knows 
about the trade. This prevents irrelevant and confusing 
questions.
3. Time allowing, do a small 'pilot' survey with the
questionnaire before launching the full survey.
4. Length - not more than four sides. Ideally on a single
sheet folded to give four sides.
5. Draft a very careful letter to explain why the information 
is desired. Also explain why it is in the interest of the 
company to reply (such as to enable the port to meet user 
needs as well as possible, etc). The confidentiality with 
which the information will be treated must also be stated.
If it is desired that a market survey should help a
shipowner canvass traffic for his ships/your port, do 
mention that the information will be given to the shipowner 
as well. This will in fact give an excellent opportunity to 
use the letter - composed jointly with the shipowner - to 
give details of his service or proposed service.
6. It is important to write and thank all companies who 
completed the questionnaires, whether or not they show that 
they are involved in the market being surveyed. It might 
also be useful to produce and send then a copy of a 
simplified version of a report on the survey (excluding all 
commercial information) in appreciation for their help. 
This helps to provide marketing contact and can improve the 
response rate in future surveys.
7. On the questionnaire, ask the person completing it to
write in their 
« Name
* Telephone number 
if Function
indicate 'YES' or 'NO' - to whether they are 
involved in the market (commodity or trade) being 
surveyed, otherwise, companies not shipping will not
reply and their will not be any indication of how good 
the response rate is or to whom a reminder letter and 
or questionnaire should be sent.
8. After a few weeks, send a reminder letter/questionnaire to 
those who have not replied.
9. On the questionnaire, typical questions can include:
- Tonnages: specifying weight of cargo sent to whatever 
destinations the information is required on; by main 
commodities or specific commodities.
Cargo origins
Whether and how packaged; Container, pallets, break-bulk 
and so on.
- If any big changes are expected in future cargo volumes, 
origins and destinations or packaging. The latter may 
indicate need for additional port services such as cargo 
consolidat ion.
- Terms of shipment (fob or cif etc.)
- Who controls shipments and port routings. It may also be 
worthwhile asking a general question as to the broad reason 
for choice of port. This may be done by asking respondents 
to tick boxes on the questionnaire as to the most important 
resons.
- A last question could be one asking for any comments the 
company may wish to make.
Source: Extracted from E. Pollock's Lecture on Port Marketing.
August, 1991.
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Conservancy -
Port Du« -
Pilotage - 
Tug Hire -
Mooring/ - 
Unmooring
Berth Hire -
Stevedorage -
Wharfage -
Common Tariff Categories
A fixed fee for access to the port and use of the aids to navigation. This 
charge is based on the characteristics of the vessel It is sometimes called 
Light Dues, Harbor Rates or Channel Dues.
A fixed fee for general use of the port facilities. This charge is based on 
the characteristics of the vessel It is sometimes referred to as a Harbor 
Dues.
A unit, movement or time-related charge for piloting the vessel in and 
out of the port. This charge is based on the characteristics of the vessel
A unit, movement or time-related charge for towing the ship to and from 
the berth as well as for moving the vessel within the port. This charge 
is based on the characteristics of the vessel or the tugboat. It is 
som^ imes referred to as Towage or Tug Services.
A fixed fee for tieing up and releasing vessels at anchorage or at the 
the wharf. This charge is sometimes based on the characteristics of the 
vessel It may be referred to as Anchorage or Dolphin Rates if the 
vessels is at anchorage and as Berthing Fee or Line Handling if the 
vessel is at the wharf.
A time-related charge for staying alongside the berth. This charge is 
based on the characteristics of the vessel as well as the length of stay. 
It is sometime referred to Berthage, Berth Rent, Quay Dues, Dockage, 
Wharf Rates or Berth Occupancy.
A unit or time-related charge for transferring the cargo between the 
wharf and the vessel. This charge is based on the characteristics of the 
carg as well as the period of time the labor is employed. It is also 
referred to as Cargo Handling, Labor Hire, Discharging or Loading.
A unit charge levied against all cargo moved across the wharf or handled 
in the port. This charge is based on the characteristics of the cargo. It 
is sometimes referred to as the General Charge or the Berth Fee.
Wharf- 
Handling
Storage -
Equipment - 
Hire
Packing/ - 
Unpacking
Delivery/ - 
Receipt
A unit charge for moving the cargo between wharf and storage. This 
charge is based on the characteristics of the cargo. It is sometimes referred to as Cargo Handling or Labor Hire.
A time-related charge for storing the cargo in open, covered, or enclosed 
areas. This charge is based on the characteristics of the cargo and the type of storage.
A time-related charge for the use of port equipment by the stevedoring 
companies or the consignee/shipper. This charge is based on the type of 
equipment used. Where cranes are used, this charge may be referred to 
as Cranage or crane hire. For other equipment terms such as Forklift Hire, Straddle Hire or Plant Hire may be used.
A unit charge for changing the form in which the cargo is being 
shipped. This charge depends on the type of cargo and the form in 
which it is to be changed. Depending on the form of the cargo, this 
charge may^  be referred to as a Depot, CFS, Consolidation/- Deconsolidation, or Stuffing/Stripping Charge.
A unit charge for moving the cargo between storage and land transport 
vehicles (road or rail) or directly between the vessel and land transport 
vehicles. Hiis charge is based on the characteristics of the cargo and the mode of land transport.
Source : ESCAP and UNCTAD reports, individual port tariffs
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CLASSIFICATION FOR A PORT FACT BASE
1. THROUGHPUT
TFEND: Statistical performance and rate of'growth 
Breakdown by type and mix :
commodity; import and export; domestic and 
transhipment; FCL 8< LCL; empties and loaded
MARKET; - Sources of transhipment and domestic traffic
CUSTOMERS- Shipping lines' throughput contribution and 
mix; • . ,
Cargo interests'
II
Throughput by sources/destinations
Profit contribution in terms of : Customers;
transhipment and domestic traffic.
2. MARKET - State of the transhipment and domestic 
container market; 
growth rates 
total market size 
KTO's share of the market
is KTO's share of the market increasing or 
decreasing
Markets where KTO is losing ground and why 
where is the Terminal doing well and where is 
the performance poor
trends in the market; productivity, port 
routing, services offered and technology
3 . TRENDS IN­ Trade patterns
MACRO global, regional and national economic growth
ENVIRONMENT government regulations 
trading agreements
4. SERVICE All facts about the Terminal's services; 
Productivity
Crane and Equipment performance 
Labour performance
5. COMPETITION-
6. CUSTOMER -
ATTITUDE
Quality and reliability assessment 
Price of port services
Identification of additional services which 
will complement existing range and increase 
customer satisfaction.
Identification of all major competitors 
Strengths and weaknesses 
Market share (trends)
Future plans 
Pricing
Capacity .
What do customers regard highly of KTO's 
services and what they do hot.
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GUIDELINES IN IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
PROBLEMS
1. Look for deviation from anticipated results:
- less market share than anticipated
- fewer customers or a narrow customer base
- declining market share
- loss of customers
- lower throughput or profit versus increased costs.
2. Look for any deterrent to smooth Terminal operational 
performance such as:
- lack of personnel
- poor equipment performance
- inadequate service facilities, such as: shortage of
equipment and stacking area
- unfavourable government regulations (customs or port 
investment)
3. Look at any obstacles standing in the way of achieving 
performance goals such as
shortage of spare parts 
low service quality
- pricing levels
- labour relations
- customer dissatisfaction
- low awareness in market of port facilities.
OPPORTUNITIES
Opportunities are often presented disguised as problems,
therefore a review of the statement of problems and the fact base 
can turn up opportunities associated with:
- geographical location
- service advantage
- emerging technology 
resource advantage
- changing customer needs
- improvement in service facilities.
It needs to be identified whether unfavourable trends are being 
experienced by the Terminal only, or is it part of a wider 
industry problem. Thus the reason for the observed trend is 
important. A distinction has also to be made between solvable 
and unsolvable problems. In the case of the former, if its 
profitable for the port to attempt a solution. Thus a statement 
of problems and opportunities must be compiled.
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GUIDELINES IN THE STATEMENT OF PORT OBJECTIVES
State where relevant, assumptions underpinning the objectives. 
These assumptions must describe management's estimate of 
important developments or environmental conditions beyond the 
port's control which cannot be accurately predicted, but which 
must be considered when carrying out the plan.
Assumptions in a port context could be related to:
- changes in the national, regional and global economic 
conditions
- inflation rate
- status of major competition
availability of financing and rate of interest 
availability of spare parts 
currency fluctuation
- changes in patterns and direction of cargo flows
- industry over or under capacity
- economic well-being of major customers and trading 
partners
- impact of major innovations or expected developments
anticipated industry growth pattern and rate
- company capabilities
- government regulations
- labour environment
It is useful to categorize these assumptions according to the 
areas described under competitive forces in chapter 6. Namely, 
Macro Economic, Industry and Company related assumptions.
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GUIDELINES IN STE?ATEGY MIVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
1. Each action program outlined must start by first restating
the specific objective it is aimed at achieving.
2. Strategy must assign for each specific area of activity:
- responsibility ,
- deadlines
- priorities
- resources
3. For effective implementation, strategies
- need to be communicated to those involved in their 
achievement. For example. Operations and Maintenance 
departments.
- require motivation to encourage follow through, both at
the managerial and staff level.
- need to be coordinated with other port functions and 
therefore must be compatible with and can be integrated 
into other functions. It is useful and desirable to 
summarize in the marketing plan, the major port 
activities which affect its achievement, even though 
the responsibility for so carrying out, is outside that 
of the marketing department.
- must be based on the company's strengths, limitations 
and assumptions about the future, if they are to be 
viable action plans.
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CONSIDEERATIONS IN DEVISING THE MARKETING BUDGET
While strategies propose the plan of attack, the marketing budget 
specifies how much the various activities will cost. The first 
step in formulating the budget is to isolate the marketing 
department's area of responsibility. This may be seen ,as the 
activities relevant to securing and maintaining patronage of the 
port. Thus the relevant cost areas will,be; > '-a
a) Customer relations
b) Advertising, and,
c) Promotion, including incentives and rebates
Budgetary cost estimates must be assigned to the individual 
marketing action plans. This implies good knowledge of the cost 
of the various activities. This costs includes not only data on 
the external activities themselves, but also on personnel costs. 
The marketing budget is therefore synonymous with marketing 
department budget.
Costs can be projected based on historical and current data from 
the accounting department, advertising agencies personnel 
department etc.
Each major budget figure must have a supporting statement to 
justify the allocation in terms of the goals of the activities 
and how necessary they are to the overall port performance.
ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ESTABLISHING BUDGETS 
There are essentially three methods of establishing budgets:
1. Mechanical method: This method is so called, because
it involves no input from members of staff in its 
development, but is formulated by management and handed 
down. While it is simplest to establish, the fact 
that it is often created in isolation, means that the 
interests and concerns at the various levels might not 
have adequately been considered. This will lead to 
lack of identification with and understanding of the
2 .
budget, translating in reduced enthusiasm for its 
success.
The bottoms up method. This is more popular than the 
previous method, and is essentially a compilation of 
the master budget based on estimates and plans of 
various department managers. This ensures that the 
interests and concerns of the various organizational 
sub-units are considered. However, a possible problem 
is that plans of individual departments may be 
incompatible both with other departments and the 
organization as whole. Thus some coordinating force is 
necessary to prevent conflict.
3. The Cooperative method. This takes into consideration 
the shortcomings of the two previous approaches. It 
involves three phases:
a) Top management sends down a loose estimate (based 
on port objectives) as a planning guideline for 
allocation of marketing funds.
b) Marketing planners develop their strategies within 
those general guidelines, but with freedom to recommend 
exceptions, backed up by full details justifying all 
requests.
c) Top management fully reviews the marketing plans - 
which calls for a detailed marketing budget - and 
decide on a final approved figure.
While the merits of this method are obvious, the process is 
time consuming and implies a high level of communication. 
It can however be most effective.
AF>;E^E:isrD i x  7; - e
M SZ " J .  ^  ^^
GUIDELINES IN FORECASTING PORT TOAFFIC
The final step in the preparation of the marketing plan is to 
project the traffic level, costs and profit that the marketing 
strategy is intended to achieve. Forecasts of traffic should be 
broken down into categories to enable review against actual 
performance so as to pinpoint problems or opportunities which may 
be causing 'the variance.
Useful classifications for the projection of port traffic could 
be: transhipment and domestic, by
(i) commodity type 
<ii) geographic region 
(iii) carriers or
<iv) services, such as storage and distribution.
These can also be used as profit centres and so establish the 
profitability of the different cargoes and services to the port. 
Here there will be the need for a sound basis of fixed cost 
assignment.
A forecast is rarely absolutely accurate, since it represents an 
attempt to estimate likely future events and thus involves 
uncertainty. It is usual therefore, to qualify forecasts. The 
finished forecast should be supported by a description of the 
underpinning assumptions and their effect. The method of 
preparing the forecast should also be described.
Forecasting methods can be divided into two major categories: 
Objective methods, comprising various statistical approaches, and 
subjective methods, based on surveys and opinions. The
statistical approach includes methods such as moving averages, 
exponential smoothing and correlation, while subjective methods 
employ surveys of user and expert opinions. A more accurate 
forecast for ports might be obtained by using a combination of 
the two approaches.
METH0D0LCX3Y FOR FORECASTING CONTAINER TRAFFIC FOR KINGSTON.
The methodology first utilizes forecasts of trends in world 
trade and expected changes in commodity flows through the 
Caribbean. These are determined by factors such as:
- economic activity in individual nations that gives 
rise to international trade.
- changing industrial base of many nations 
currency restrictions
- protectionism
- debt crisis.
Based on these, a forecast of cargo flows to and from specific 
areas which make up Kingston's transhipment market can be made. 
The procedures for carrying out the above analyses are outlined 
below.
Step 1
Utilizing both qualitative judgement and quantitative 
evaluations, a generic view of world trade patterns, shipping 
patterns, cargo types and vessel itinaries of the major carriers 
that ship through the Caribbean basin must be developed.
A decision as to the appropriate basis to be used to make the 
forecast must also be made. That is, commodities or trade 
routes? Here for transhipment at KTO, the appropriate basis
would be general cargo. General cargo can be derived by taking 
all commodities traded (based on UN trade statistics) and deduct 
liquid and dry bulk and other non~containerisable cargoes. This 
gives the maximum cargo that can be containerized. The analysis 
should concentrate on trade (import S export) between specific 
regions in the world and countries in the region,'' rather than 
trade routes.
s te p  2
To forecast import and export trade flows through the Caribbean 
Basin, there may be the need to divide the world into trading 
blocs. This division can be based on considerations such as 
historical trading relationships, participation of regions' in 
international trade, distance from Kingston and types of products 
the region might trade. Consideration should also be given to 
the prospects of these countries shipping any significant volume 
of general cargo through the Caribbean.
3.
4
The next step is to identify the countries that will most heavily 
influence future general cargo trade volumes for each region. 
The^e 'indicator nations' can then be used to forecast import and 
export for each of the regions, instead of it being derived based 
on a country by country forecast. The decision to use indicator 
nations will of course depend on the degree of accuracy required.
Step 4
The next task is to convert the projected trade flows to 
container flows. For this it is necessary to combine two data 
sources in order to gauge the degree of container penetration: 
General cargo trade based on the UN statistics with the container 
movements in the region provided from Containerisation 
International Yearbook. Based on the container flow as against 
the total general cargo trade for a specific period (historical), 
the present level of container penetration can be can be 
calculated. This rate can then be applied to the projected 
general cargo trade flows (on a commodity basis) to get future 
containerized trade flow.
To convert containerized trade flows to actual number of TEUs 
requires the application of the various cargo stowage factors, 
and where applicable, any existing regulations on container 
weight limits. The process just described is summarized in the 
flow diagram below;
Cargo Density ContainerCapacity
CONTAINER movements in TEU and trade blocs______________________________________I
Source: Adapted from(1) Container Ships & Shipping by RoyPearson. Fairplay Publications Ltd, 1988. page 46.<2) Kingston Port Development Study, Chapter II
The attached table also gives typical cargo stowage factors.
Typiral Cargo Stoagg Factors
CoBsodity Tonnes per cubic aetre
Boxlength(it)
Copper ingots 3.3 20
Zinc ingots 2.5 20
Pressed «ool bales 2.0 20
Nuts and bolts 1.7 20
Nolasses (in bulk) l.i 20
Nails 1.4 20
Copper coils 1.1 20
Cesent (bagged) 1.0 20
Cars (in KD fora) 1.0 20
Plate glass 1.0 20
Salt (in bulk) 1.0 20
Iron I Steel scrap 1.0 20
Kardvcods 0.91 20
Tisber 0.8 20
Coal (high grade) 0.71 20
Sugar 0.71 20
Cheese 0.71 20
Potatoes 0.63 20
Condensed Nilk 0.59 20
Bacon 0.59 20
Voodpulp 0.59 20
Veg oil (in druas) 0.56 20
Coffee (bagged) 0.56 20
Rubber (bales) 0.53 20
Textile products 0.14 40
Furniture 0.14 40
Doaestic elec gds 0.52 40
Fibreglass 0.03 40
20' container 40' container18 tonnes 24 tonnes30 cbfi 66 cbi
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APPENDIX 7.7 
COMPARATIVE DISTANCES IN NAUTICAL MILES 
FROM KINGSTON & CRISTOBAL TO SELECTED PORTS
!COUNTRY/PORT 1 KINGSTON JCRISTOBAL!
!CENTRAL AMERICA 1
1 Tampidd 1263 1« 1473 !! Belize* 696 11 798 !! Honduras: Puerto Cortes 671 11 714 1! Guatemala: Puerto Barrios 732 11 824 !! Costa Rica:Limon/Moin 616 1 279 !! Panama:Cristobal 555 11J CARIBBEAN  ^
1* ’Curacoa t^586 11 766 !! Aruba ^ .529 1 632 !I Cuba:Havana 743 1 990 !! Haiti: Port-au-Prince 278 11 863 !! Dorn. Republic: Santo Domingo 428 11 891 !' Puerto Rico: Ponce 597 1t 1080 !1 San Juan 635 1I 1082 !! Antigua: St. John 867 11 1390 !! Guadeloupe: Point-A-Pitre 912 11 1440 !1 Dominica: Roseau 912 11 1145 !' Trinidad & Tobago:Port of Spain 999 11 1248 1I St. Lucia: Port of Castries 952 11 1320 !1 Barbados: Bridgetown 1045 11 1440 !I SOUTH AMERICA 1I! Columbia: Cartagena 483 I1 370 ii Barranquilla 444 11 340 !1 Santa Marta 438 11 360 !I Venuezuela:Puerto Cabello 690 tt 788 !I Maracaibo 582 11 676 !! La Guaira 730 t1 930 !1 Brazi1: Belem 2170 1t 2316 !! Recife 3027 11 3173 !! Manaus 2836 11 2982 !1 Fortaleza- 2628 11 2775 1! Guyana: Georgetown 1326 11 1550 !!US EAST COAST t1! Charleston 1060 '%1 1560 '!1 Jacksonville 1012 11 1505 !1 Miami 747 11 1200 I! New York/New Jersey 1472 11 1972 11 Port Everglades 763 t1 1217 1! New Orleans 1155 11 1403 !
Source: World Wide Distance Tables
BP Tanker Company Ltd., London, 1976. Vol 1
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DAILY DEMAND FOR K T O 'S  SERVICES 
B a s e d  o n  K T O 's  P r o d u c t i v i t y  R e p o r t  
( T o t a l  V e s s e l  C a l l  P e r  l i n e ]
F o r  p e r i o d  1 . 1 . 9 0  -  3 1 . 1 2 . 9 0
{LIN ES MONDAY {TUESDAY NEDNESDAY THURSDAY {FRIDAY
1
SATURDAY SUNDAY
1
! COLUMBUS 1 { 3 2 1
1
1 4 • 1
{CAROL 14 { 1 2 8 9 { 1 0 9 6
{NISCO 2  { 1 1 { 1 1
{SEALAHD 1 { 2 2 5 2 6 { 1 % t
{ZIM 2 6 { 2 0 1 5 24 { 2 4 2 0 1 6
{EVERGREEN ” 5 i 6 7 ■ 5 { 9 .  ‘3 2
{scon 6 fI 3 1 { 2
{CALYPSO . 4 { 3 1 2
1
1
{LIBRA 1
1
1
1
» 1
{HEDLLOYD 1 » 1 1
{JAM. PRODUCERS 3 { 3 1 { 1
{BLUE CARIBE 1
I
1 1 1
1
t
{N. A u e r .  CARIB 5 { 6 3 1 { 4 5 3
{GOMEZ S H IP P IN G 4 { 2 1 3 { 6 1
{CAVN L IN E
1
1 1
1
1
{ARANAK { 6 1 11
{CARAT { 1 1
1
1
74 65 68 7 6 { 58 4 6 3 0
MONTHLY DEMAND FOR K T O 'S  SERVICES 
B a s e d  o n  K T O 's  P r o d u c t i v i t y  R e p o r t  
( T o t a l  V e s s e l  C a l l  P e r  L i n e )
F o r  p e r i o d  1 . 1 . 9 0  -  3 1 . 1 2 . 9 0
IN ES JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH A PRIL MAY JUNE {JULY AUGUST. {SEPTEMBER{OCTOBER'.NOVEMBER{DECEMBER
OLUMBUS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 { 2 1 1
AROL 6 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 { 5 5 8 6
ISCO
1
1 3 3
EALAND 8 7 4 4 5 4 4 - 5  { 3 6 4 4
IN 1 2 11 14 1 2 13 1 2 10 1 2  { 1 0 1 2 14 11
VERGREEN 3 4 2 3 1 4 3 4  { 4 3 5 1
COTT 3 4 2 1 1
ALYPSO 3 2 1 2 1 1 t
IBRA 1
1
I
EDLLOYD 1 1
1
t
AM. PRODUCERS 1
f
t 1 2 4
LUE CARIBE 1 1 1 1
. A u e r .  CARIB 3 4 4 4 3  { 4 2 3
OMEZ S H IP P IN G 1 2 1 { 2 3 5 3
AVN LIN E
1
1 1
RAVAK
1
1 1
ARAT
1
1 1
3 7 3 4 29 31 3 2 34 3 0 3 2  { 2 8 3 4 . 4 7 3 6
S o u r c e :  KTO P r o d u c t i v i t y  R e p o r t  f o r  p e r i o d  1 . 1 . 9 0  t o  3 1 . 1 2 . 9 0
